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ABSTRACT 
The contents of Indo-Pak relations, though generally bilateral in natxire, have been 
profoundly influenced by the actions and pronouncements of the external powers. The US 
is one of such powers which does influence to a great deal the bUateral relations of India and 
Pakistan. It is a fact that vAuie the fimdamental problems of both countries have domestic 
roots, the projection of the superpowers into South Asia severely comphcated these 
problems by exacerbating tensions between India and Pakistan. 
With the globaUzation of the contaimnent pohcy, the US got seriously engaged in the 
affairs of South Asia. It has focussed on the objective of winning alUes and fiiends for its anti-
Soviet and anti-commimist campaign, as well as of preventing the development of any 
regional power which could not be made an American satellite. The US South Asia poUcy 
has also been fi'amed in accordance with the same line. 
The US is not an Asian power. Its attention is only focussed on the region in times 
of crisis in the area, be it regional conflict or a heightened perception of the Soviet threat. 
Thus the relevance ofthe region has witnessed fluctuations with evolving American relations 
with the former Soviet Union and China. If the region has appeared to serve economic, geo-
poUtical or strategic goals it has risen in American priorities. Similarly priorities accorded to 
various countries within the region has also varied with changes in international circumstances. 
Since India was not prepared to be a satellite or a cUent ofthe US, the latter found 
in Pakistan a manageable ally. To offset the expansionist poUcies ofthe USSR and China, 
the US foresaw in the geographic location ofPakistan evident strategic advantages in meeting 
these supposed threats. Pakistan's geostrategic significance in the fiilfilment ofthe US oil 
interests in the Persian Gulf and the extension of its poUtical influence m Middle East, South 
West Asia were other important considerations in the thinking of US poUcy-makers 
Moreover, India's poHcy of nonaUgnment was perceived by the US as an obstacle to its 
aspirations in the region. It also presented the risk of creating an additional world force based 
on political mobilization of national elites in Asia and Africa. 
The US. by making Pakistan its Cold War partner changed the whole context of Indo-
Pak relations. Now it assumed a triangular character with the US as the third party. The US 
invoK'ement barely helped in unproving Indo-Pak relations rather it further widened the 
existing gap between the two neighbours. The US pohcy towards various issues of Indo-Pak 
relations have made the things even more comphcated and prospects of a solution even more 
remote. 
It is very strange to note that India and Pakistan have paid too much attention to 
improve their ties with the United States and too little to coming to terms with each other 
Had the situation been reversed, the bilateral Indo-Pak relations would not have experienced 
such a bitter taste. It is thus advisable for both India and Pakistan to end their excessively 
deferential attitude to the US and a demeaning competition in Washington to pull the 
otherside down and concentrate on improving their bilateral relations. 
Of the various factors which have influenced the course of international politics and 
diplomacy in the last five decades, the nuclear one occupies the most significant and crucial 
place. While it is true that the possibiUty of a nuclear holocaust has receded with the end of 
the Cold War and the US no longer apprehends a threat to its national security interests from 
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibility of a threat emanating from 
nuclear proliferation by a number of third world countries, including the two South Asian 
neighborus-India and Pakistan is being taken seriously by the US. 
It has become common place to think of the South Asia as the most likely region 
where a war could escalate to a nuclear exchange. The US appears to hold the view that 
continuing regional tensions between India and Pakistan combined with the ongouig 
programme in the two countries to acquire nuclear capabiHty and balHstic missile delixerv' 
system mean that the outbreak of armed conflict has the potential to escalate to nuclear 
exchange with devastating consequences for the region and global eflForts to combat the 
spread and use of such weapons. This view fits in with the nuclear theology of western 
strategists that developing coiuitries are more prone to go to war with each other and wars 
between two developing countries, armed with the nuclear weapons, are bound to escalate 
to a nuclear lesel. 
The US has long laboured to stop the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and 
has made nonproliferation a central issue in bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. With 
the end of the Cold War it has further accelerated its non-proliferation diplomacy in South 
Asia. The US objectix e has been "first caping, then reducing and eventually eliminating the 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delrven,". In the changed ciicumstances of 
the post Cold War period, the US beheves that the spread of nuclear technology and weapon 
capabihty to an increasing number of countries would pose a grave threat not only to it s own 
security but the world as well. 
The US concern about the nuclear arms race in South Asia appears to be genuine 
ahhough in resoKing the tangle successive US administrations have been playing more to the 
gallery than playing fair. Wliile Wadiington has always wanted India to concede on 
nonproliferation, it has adopted a soft and permissive approach towards Pakistan's nuclear 
development. To pursue a credible nonproliferation strategy in South Asia, the US will need 
to adopt a pohcy that does not appear discriminatory. Further attention must be drawn 
towards more substantial cuts in its own nuclear arsenal. 
It is extremely unhkely that India and Pakistan will agree to roll back or cap their 
nuclear programmes, and should not be expected to do so. Their programmes are too 
advanced to be disbanded. Outside pressure is unlikely to change this situation. The US, 
should thus focus its efforts instead on deterring the overt deployment ofthe nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missiles, blocking a subcontinental arms race and prodding India and Pakistan 
to embrace confidence building measures. 
The military aid diplomacy of the great powers has not only fomented existing 
disputes between many neighbouring countries in many cases, it even yielded in new 
problems and disputes. The US military aid diplomacy in South Asia is a case in point. The 
massive influx of US anns into Pakistan embittered the already sullen relations between India 
and Pakistan. It prevented the normalization of their relations because it not only posed a 
great security problem for India; it even made Pakistan more adamant towards the 
outstanding bilateral issues. Tlie US-Pak militar>' aUiance sharpened Indo-pak tensions. It 
became a constant factor in the reaction and counteraction which characterized subsequent 
relations between the suspicious neighbours. TTie cost of this blundering American decision, 
which had only a marginal and doubtfiil mihtary advantage was very heavy in political and 
diplomatic terms to all the three parties invoK'ed - the US. India and Pakistan. 
If during the Cold War era the US found in Pakistan a trusted aUy to counter 
communism, in the post Cold War era Pakistan, for the US. has emerged as an important 
state to counter Islamic fiindamentaiton and to ensure its accessto therepubhcs ofthe Central 
Asia. Thus even in the promising scenario ofthe post Cold War era the US contmued to follow 
the Cold War strategy of military aUiance. though for achieving different sets of objectives. 
The US still considers Pakistan an important partner in safeguarding itsinterestsin the region. 
Nothing has bedevilled Indo-Pak relations more than the dispute over the beautillil 
mountainous state of Jammu and Kashmir. As a matter of fact Kashmir is the root cause of 
Indo-Pak conflict. Till now India and Pakistan have fought three major wars over Kashmir 
but its fate is still undecided. The Kashmir problem, though it concerns mainly India and 
Pakistan, has attracted worldwide attention since it arose in 1947. The failure on the part of 
India and Pakistan to come to a negotiated settelement over the Kashmir has opened the issue 
for interference and intervention of outside powers and states. One of the most important 
states, extmal to the dispute, which has thrown its interest in Kashmir, has been the United 
States. The Kashmir issue has been one of the focal points of the US foreign poUcy in India 
and Pakistan. 
The US stance on Kashmir was more influenced by its Cold War strategies than the 
merits ofthe dispute. The US found a golden opportunity in Kashmir dispute and itsreference 
to the UN to estabhsh its strategic interests in the region. The role ofthe US m the Kashmii 
conflict was part of an overall design in the Third World and in particular South Asia. As one 
senior US official has admitted : "Kashmir is only one aspect, of course, of our larger interests 
in the subcontinent of South Asia." 
Any objective analysis ofthe US Kashmir poUcy is bound to conclude that the US 
has always taken a pro-Pakistani stand and never appreciated India's stand on the question. 
This fact was even acknowledged by the US Secretary Rusk, who said : "broadly speaking 
we have supported the Pakistani view." Tlie US was also keen on a pro-Pakistani solution 
to the dispute. It put forward several suggestions favourable to Pakistan in the name of 
conflict resolution. It championed the cause of plebiscite and evoked the hberal concept of 
national self-determination. 
The reasons behind the US pro-Pakistani stand over Kashmir are not too diflScuh to 
reveal. Gixen the strategic unportance of Kashmir m the context of the Cold War. 
Washington's decision making eUte understood that a friendly Pakistan offered an anchor for 
the implementation ofthe US strategic goals in Asia. The US support to Pakistan did not 
denve either from an ideological commitment to the Kashmiri people's right of self-
determination or from a compulsion to be on the side of equity and justice in an mtemational 
dispute; rather it w as iii respon se to Pakistan's support to the US in the Cold War. It was infact 
a matter of reciprocity. 
The US involvement in the Kashmir di lute will hinder, not promote a settlement. 
Continued provocative statements by the US have doomed whatever httle prospects of 
resolution of the Kashmir tangle. One should not forget that the more the issue is 
intemationaUsed the less are the chances of finding a lasting solution to the problem. 
American pro-Pakistani stance encourages Pakistan to harp on the issue more vigorously. 
The more America shows its concern for Kashmir the greater Pakistan will feel emboldened 
to queer the pitch. If the US does not lend its support to Pakistan, the latter will be left with 
no other option but to settle the matter bilaterally. 
The Kashmir problem, infact. requires not outside crutches but poUtical will from 
India and Pakistan. A mutuaUy satisfactory resohition of the Kashmir issue will leave the US 
with no alibi to intervene and this is where India and Pakistan must focus. A bilateral 
determination to resist outside intervention and a sustained dialogue, with small confidence 
building measures is the best antidote to the US activism. 
It wiU be in the interest of India and Pakistan and outside pow ers like the US to follow 
a poUcy of least prov ocation and try and build mutual trust. This trend has to be consohdated 
m the interest of regional and global peace. An unstable India or unstable Pakistan could be 
mutually damaging to both. In the long ran and in the interest of mamtaming peace in the 
subcontment. it is of paramount importance, that India and Pakistan ^ould leam to co-exist 
The only altemativeto co-existence is co-destraction. Thus all real or imaginary apprehensions, 
fears, suspicions, misturst and irritants should be removed through diplomacy, cooperation, 
negotiations and an attitude ofgive and take. It is only then and then alone that lasting peaceful 
relations can be ensured. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan is one of the few in the world 
today that has remained totally unaffected by the end of the Cold War and the sweeping 
political changes and reconcihation between former enemies. The two countries have fought 
three wars in 1947-48. 1965 and 1971 - and reached war level point in 1987 and 1991. Tlie 
post independence bitter antagonism between these two countries has only accelerated with 
the passage of time. 
While the fimdamental problems ofboth countrieshave domestic roots, the projection 
of the super powers into South Asia severely complicated these problems by exacerbating 
tensions between India and Pakistan. The massive influx of American military aid to Pakistan ' 
brought about damaging consequences both within Pakistan and its relations with India. 
American military involvement in the region fiiels regional tensions and directly 
undermines the abihty of the United States to act as a neutral mediator. In the post Cold War 
era the U. S. now has an opportunity for a fresh start in South Asia and should move towards 
a more detached poHcy that avoids embroilment in the region's niiUtaixnva_Iry, Such a posture 
is a necessary precondition for American efforts to promote a rapprochement between New 
Delhi and Islamabad. 
The Cold War strategy demanded the United States to look for friends and allies m 
South Asia in order to broaden the sphere of its global security system. If both India and 
Pakistan were available, well and good, if not, atleast one of them must be courted. Soon after 
independence India made it clear that it was not available for serving US global interests. The 
Indian government outrightly discarded the American view of communism as a menace to 
world peace. Pakistan on the other hand was more than eager to align itself with the US to 
establish a fair degree of parity in its militar>' power vis-a-vis India. Both needed each other, 
though with divergent policy perception and orientation. The US was guided by its global 
policy of containing international communism and Pakistan was motivated by the problem 
of national security and defence. Thus the US in the context of Cold War pohtics entered as 
a new factor in Indo-Pak relations. 
The US, by making Pakistan a Cold War partner, barely helped in improving Indo-
Pak relations rather its pronouncement and involvement has further widened the existing gap 
between the two neighbours. It is very strange to note tliat both India and Pakistan hardiv 
rely on each other but have spent tune and energy to woo the US to their favour. Had the 
situation been reversed Indo-Pak relations would not have experienced such a bitter taste 
The U.S. involvement and its uneven policy towards various bilateral issues of Indo-Pak 
relations have made the thing even more complicated and prospect of a solution more remote 
Keeping this view in centraUty the present study attempts to highliglit the US policy 
dynamics in South Asia. The special stress of the study is on the issues which have invoK ed 
India and Pakistan, the two main actors of the region. The study is divided into four chapters, 
each deahng with a specific issue. A summary of all discussion and some suggestions to 
improve the bilateral relations have been presented in the epilogue. 
The first chapter endeavours to present an overall view of the US South Asia policy 
both during the cold war and post-cold war era. It reveals that the US mterests and stakes 
in the region were largely dictated by its global strategy that witnessed shifts and departures 
in accordance with the responses and reactions of the former Soviet Union and China to the 
developments in the region. This chapter also seeks to answer vAiy the US is involved in the 
affairs of the region. It deals with the parameters conditioning the US interest and 
involvement in the region. It also attempts to present an interpretative assessment of the US 
South Asiapolicy in the post Cold War era. It examines the implications of tlie momentous 
global changes on the shaping ofUS subcontinental policy and identify the new foreign policy 
and security concerns and interests in South Asia. It also explores the consequences of such 
a pohcy to South Asia itself It concludes that the US South Asia policy hasbgenmconsisteiit 
and reactive rather than calculative, long term audjnnoyatiye^_ ^ 
The various factors which have influenced the course of mtemational politics and 
diplomacy in the last five decades, the nuclear one occupies the most significant and crucial 
place. Tlie end of the Cold War has certainly reduced the possibility of nuclear holocaust, but 
the fear of nuclear war still haunts the minds of the states. The second chapter surveys the 
nuclear landscape in South Asia, where hidia and Pakistan continue to pursue ambiguous 
nuclear policies. It points to specific incentivesandmotrvational factors that ha\e encouraged 
nuclear prohferatiou in South Asia. Special focus has been given on various forces driving 
the Pakistani and Indian nuclear development. It also exammes the US non-proliferation 
pohcy in the context of India and Pakistan and suggests anus control and confidence building 
measures to resolve the South Aaan nuclear tangle. It concludes that India and Pakistan are 
unlikely to build and deploy nuclear weapons overtly ui the near fiiture, but that regional and 
international measures will be needed to ehminate the incentives for nuclearization. 
Tlie military aid diplomacy ofthe United Stateshasnot only fomented already existing 
disputes between many neighbouring countries in many cases; it even yielded in new problems 
and disputes. The massive influx ofthe US arms to Pakistan has firrther deteriorated the 
akeady sullen relations between India and Pakistan. It prevented the nonnalization of their 
relations because the US mihtary aid to Pakistan posed a grave security problem for India and 
made Pakistan more adamant towards the bilateral issues. 
Keeping this view in centrality the third chapter attempts to examine the reasons why 
the US got interested in providing sophisticated arms to Pakistan and what were the latter's 
coTnipu\sions in striving hard to acquire such kthai arms, it aiso focusses how skJlMly 
Pakistan used the various situations mherent in Cold War for acquiring massive security 
assistance from the USA. It endeavours to analyse the unplications on India's security of 
Pakistan being armed by the USA. 
Notliing has bedevilled Indo-Pak relations more than the dispute over the beautifiil 
mouiitamous state of Jammu and Kashmir. Till now India and Pakistan have fouglit three 
major wars over Kashmir but its fate is yet to be decided. The Kashmir question, thougli it 
concerns inainly India and Pakistan, has attracted world wide attention suice it arose in 1947 
It is a fact of Indo-Pakistan relationsthat failure to resolve the Kashmir tangle at bilateral le\ el 
has resuked in outside mtervention and interference. Contumed provocative,statements by 
the US have doomed whatever little prospects of resolution of the Kashmir tangle. 
Tlie fourth chapter seeks to analyse the US perception ofthe Kashmir dispute and its 
imphcations for ludo- Pak relational It has also been argued that had the US beenjaoLinvoK ed 
^ iu^thejfiaksjhere^was greater possibihty of resolution of Kashmir issue bilaterally. It also 
suggests that the best contribution the US can make to a peacefiil resolution ofthe Kashmir 
^conflict would be to keep off it. i 
/ ^ Tliemethoaofstudyhasbeen historical, descriptive and analytical. Effortshavebeen 
made to collect all the relevant data and mterpret it both in historical perspective and from 
the point of current relevance. All source material is Ubrary based. Libraries are an important 
source of knowledge, much source material is lying deep buried un-investigated in the 
hbraries and if properly investigated many new problems and their solutions can came to light. 
Most ofthe library data come from libraries in India specially American Studies Research 
Centre, Hyderabad, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 
Indian Council of World Affairs (All Delhi based) and MA. Library, AMU, AUgarh. 
The bases ofthe present study have been various documents, official or otherwise. 
atithoritative texts on the subjects, journals, articles, newspaper reports and comments. 
5 
Congressional Records and Parliamentary Debates, the US Department of State Bulletin. 
Hearings of House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reports of Ministry 
of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Government of India, Security Council OflScial Records and 
variousotherpaperspublishedbythegovemmentsoflndia, Pakistan and the US. The present 
work attempts to develop a comprehensive understandmg of the issues under study within 
the broad framework of the problem of peace and security m South Asia. 
(^hdptee - 1 
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH ASIA 
A state's behaviour can be explained to a very significant degree in terms of 
the ever-changing distribution of power. As that distribution changes, so does a 
s ta tes behaviour or a foreign policy. For example, the impact of a shift in the 
distribution of power is evident in U.S. participation in the two World Wars of this 
century. Duruig most of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the 
United States was able to preserve its historical isolation from power politics and 
enjoyed an unprecedented degree of security because the balance of power on the 
European continent was maintained by Britain. But Germany's unification in 1870 
and its subsequent rapid industrialization, which greatly disturbed the balance of 
power in the continent of Europe, eventually forced the United States to end its 
isolation. Similarly after the World War II the change from isolationism to 
interventionism was the product of the post war bipolar distribution of power in 
which gain of power and security by one tends to be seen as a loss of power and 
security for other 
The operative word for American foreign policy until the late 1930 was 
"isolationism"; the word and the policy had a long tradition. President Washington 
in his "Farewell Address" had warned against entanglement in European quarrels, and 
America's greatest foreign policy mind of the nineteenth century, John Quincy 
Adams, had developed this precedent into a commonly accepted policy. As secretary 
of state and as President, Adams preferred not to involve America in Europe. 
American entry into World War I was the first major breach and they tended to 
interpret in one of two ways: either as a special exception that did not break the 
tradition; or as a disaster that proved the validity of the Washintong-Adams 
precedent." 
Thus after a hundred years of isolation the United States was drawn into the 
vortex of world politics two times in this century - during the first World War and 
the second World War. On each occasion the country displayed a great degree of 
consensus that there was a threat to national security and the task at hand was to 
defeat or contain it.^ Similar explanations are given about US entry into the Cold 
War. 
Here one point that deserves emphasis is, that the concept of security to the 
America is not merely limited to the security of its geographical boundary but more 
than physical security. The German threat during World War I was not the 
likelihoodof au immediate invasion, nor was the invasion the main threat even after 
the defeat of France early in World War II. Similarly the events in Korea, Soviet 
interv ention in Afghanistan did not amount to any direct threat to US security. Then 
why should the United States have broken its isolationism '!' 
The more immediate reason for U.S. intei-vention was its belief that the 
security of a democratic Araercia was inextricably interwoven with the survival of 
other democracies, especially France and Britain. After France collapsed in 1940, 
Roosevelt explained to the American people why the United States had to assert 
Britain. The United States could not survive as a lone democratic island surrounded 
by totalitarian sea. Democracy in America could not flourish unless democratic 
values prospered in other societies. There might be no physical threat to the nation, 
but the aim of American foreign policy had never been just the security of the United 
States as a piece of real estate; the purpose has been to defend the security of 
democratic America. A democratic America required democratic values to flourish 
internationally. 
Here, one must keep in mind the fact that. Great powers usually do not leave 
decisions about their security to their adversaries. The strategy of the major powers 
in the state system is or should be to oppose any state that seeks predominance 
because this constitutes a grave threat to its own security. Outlining these 
characteristics of U.S. foreign policy is not out of context; its imperative is due to 
the reason that the US interests and stakes in South Asia have never been direct, 
which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
A. U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies in Retrospect 
It is both interesting and surprising to note that the United States and the 
Soviet Union had fought the World War II in close alliance with each other. But the 
hostilities against the Axis Powers (Germanay, Itlay, Japan) were hardly over when 
their war time close cooperation turned into bitter rivalry and they became involved 
in what is popularly called 'Cold War\ This was a war for enhancement of national 
power, national prosperity and national security. It was a war of ideologies in which 
the two powers were engaged in enhancing their own spheres of influence and 
spheres of interest all over the globe. 
By the time the Second World War ended, the United States at almost a 
fantastically fractional cost to itself as compared to all other belligerents of that 
conflict, had accumulated the greatest amount of power - both economic as well as 
military, including that of the atomic bomb - ever known in human history. While the 
British empire lay bleeding to death, Europe nearly obliterated and desolate, the 
Soviet Union victorious but in a state of shock and devastation, and Japan almost 
wiped out as an entity, the Americans emerged as the most powerftil country. Ever 
since, it seized the hegemonistic role of Great Britain and acted as global leader. 
more often than not, sharmg it with other great powers and international mstitutions. 
Despite the vast war time devastation it had suffered, the Soviet Union, 
however, was able in a remarkably short time to restore production to pre-war levels 
and beyond. It had emerged as the largest land power, with a strong military 
industrial complex, and the potential in every respect of becoming a true rival to 
American interests. But its economy was shattered and the only thing it could export 
was communism and revolution. These were attractive foods for thoughts but not for 
the body and that is where the Amercian scored over their potential rival. 
Notwithstanding the USSR was seizing the opportunity to strengthen its 
security by filling the power vacuum left in Eastern Europe upon Germany's defeat. 
Far different from the traditional influence of a great power on its smaller neighbours. 
SON iet domination of the region meant the imposition of communist rule, controlled 
from Moscow, and the severing of traditional links with Western Europe. Nor were 
the Soviet moves limited to Eastern Europe. It also demanded Turkey cede two 
eastern provinces. Moscow refused to withdraw the troops it had stationed in 
northern Iran during the War, using them to protect and promote a revolutionary 
government in Azerbaijan. Local communist parties instigated trouble ranging from 
major strikes in Eastern Europe to Civil War in Greece. 
These Soviet efforts finally provoked the United States and led to a revaluation 
of American policy. Under Harry S. Truman, a number of foreign policy experts 
emerged who changed the course of American policy to make it for more hostile to 
Russian ambitions Names like Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan, John Foster Dulles 
and Dean Rusk rose to visibility, and as a group controlled the foreign policy of the 
country for the next two generations regardless of which party was in power. And 
thus in few brief years, America had gone from excessive isolationism to excessive 
inter ventionism ' 
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George Kennan, the Foreign service's foremost expert on the Soviet Union, 
in 1946 first time presented the basis of what was to be a new American policy that 
recognized the hostile character of the Soviet Regime. The essence of the policy was 
the conviction that : "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western 
world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of 
counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, 
corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy". Harriman and Kennan 
advocated a greater realism in dealing with the Soviets. America should understand 
Russia's problems and its history, and should avoid wishful thinking that would only 
interfere with a sensible policy in the area."* And the Russians moved into Poland. 
Czechoslovaki. Hungary and so on, Truman increasingly sought the advice of hard 
line anti-communist like Dean Acheson, who became his Secretary of State in 194Q 
Under Secretaries of State Acheson, Dulles and Rusk; America rebuilt its military 
force and demonstrated its willingness to intervene almost anywhere ui the world 
where it felt its interests were threatened. 
The U.S. foreign policy during Cold War veered around five main planks -
Turman Doctrine, Marshal Plan, Containment, Alliances and Foreign Aid, which 
were adhered to thwart Soviet endeavors to expand its sphere of influences as well 
as to stem the tide of expanding communism. With a view to implement the policy 
of containment, Washington embarked upon a policy of re-armament and based 
troops on foreign soil. It had also drawn around itself a network of alliances.-
The U.S. policy of containment found its best manifestation in "Truman 
Doctrine". On March 12, 1947 President Harry Truman, while addressing the joint 
session of the Cone ress, said that "the United States could survive only in a world 
in which freedom flourished. And it would not realize this objecti\ e unless we are 
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willing to help free people to maintain their institutions and their national integrity 
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitatarian regimes. 
This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free 
peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international 
peace and hence the security of the United States." He further stated : "It must be 
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."'" 
As the first step towards implementing this policy. President Truman asked 
the Congress to appropriate $400 million for Greece and Turkey and to authorize the 
dispatch of American personnel to assist with reconstruction and to provide their 
armies with appropriate instructions and training to ward off any covert and overt 
takeox er by the communists and prevent their countries from going behind the Iron 
Curtain. 
Around this time, to be precise, on June 5, 1947, at Harvard. George Marshal 
unveiled what is popularly known as "Marshal Plan" forthe economic reconstruction 
or Europe, which the Soviet Union was also invited to join in. But realizing the 
ultimate implication of American policies they walked out of the Marshal Plan 
meeting held in Paris in July 1947. The Cold War which had already been underway 
for a while was now joined in earnest. And hence in the minuet of international 
politics and alignment the time to look for partners had come. 
While the re-suscitation of Western Europe got underway and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Pact, later NATO, started getting itself into some military shape, a 
most momentous event took place in Asia, an event of great portent for the world. 
China became communist ! By the middle of 1949 the triumph of the Communists 
in the Civil War in that country added urgency to putting into effect the second step 
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in the 'Crusade' against communism; that of building a military cordon sanitaire 
around the gigantic bloc that the communist menace appeared to have carved out for 
itself The Baghdad Pact, later the Central Treaty Organization and the South East 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and some other military alliances apart from 
NATO, were all the progeny of this plan of physically containing the communists 
Here one point deserve special attention that despite the democratic purposes 
stated by the Truman Doctrine, many time it was applied even to nondemocratic 
nations. In western Europe, of course, America's strategy and power considerations 
were compatible with its democratic values; the containment of the Soviet Union 
could be equated with the defence of democracy. But outside of Western Europe, 
strategy and values were often incompatible with one another. Tlie US confronted a 
classic dilemma : protecting strategically located but undemocratic nations, such as 
Iran, Turkey and Greece, might make the containment of Soviet power possible, but 
also risked America "s reputation and weakened the credibility of the policy - tlie 
defence of the fiee World. However, to align itself only with democratic states, of 
which there were all too few. might make it impossible for the United States to carry 
out the containment policy. This dilemma continued to plague US policy throughout 
the Cold War period. 
Thus Truman Doctrine. Marshal Plan, and formation of NATO. CENTO. 
SEATO and other military alliances were ready to check any possible Soviet nio\ es 
not only in Europe but wherever communist influence seemed dangerous. 
B. Evolution of the U.S. Policy Towards South Asia 
1. Identifying A South Asian Region 
Before analysing U.S. interest and policy in South Asia, a brief geopolitical 
survey of the region is necessary. To begin with, the very notion of a South Asian 
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region is still subject to debate and question - given the varying interpretations that 
exist as to what constitutes an identifiable region. Russet, for instance, focused on 
specific indices like homogeneity and interdependence and defined region as "ordinary, 
common and practical geographical areas for which social and economic improvement 
programme have been conceived, planned and undertaken"/' Often a region is 
defined in terms of a sub-system or a subordinate system within an overall global 
system - as Canton and Spiegel did by defining a sub-system as comprising "one or 
two or more geographically proximate and interacting states, which share in some 
degree common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historic bonds and whose 
sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external 
to the system'/** 
In relation to South Asia, on the other hand, it is clear that while the region 
has shared a common colonial heritage in the form of British rule, the linguistic and 
liistoric bonds of the region outside of the colonial experience are tenuous at best. 
The following fix e outstanding features of the region have important bearing on any 
consideration of South Asia as a distinctive identity: 
(i) The preponderant size and politico-military strength of India. Power in the 
region is not defuse and, especially, after 1971 with India's involvement in the 
creation of Bangladesh, Indian prominence in the region has increased. India's 
nuclear explosion of 1974, its military role in Sri Lanka and Maldives, and its 
efforts to gain a permanent seat within the post-bipolar UN Security Council 
are reflections of its political ambitions regionally and at the global level. 
(ii) The India-Pakistan conflictual relationship -which has been one of the main 
factors underlying the strategic dynamics of the region, and changes within this 
relationship. 
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(iii) That all the states of the region share a border with India and, at one time or 
another, most have had a conflictual relationship with it. 
(iv) The conflictual structure of the region has allowed extra-regional powers to 
play an interventionist role in the region-especially through the maintenance of 
their military presence in the Indian Ocean, 
(v) All the states of the region face a multitude of similar socio-economic problems 
including poverty, population growth and related problems of under-
development. In addition, most states have within their territories fissiparous 
ethnic movements which create problems of social cohesion internally. Also as 
a result of the strategic disunity of the region, inter-state political conflicts have 
tended to take precedence over regional cooperation to counter problems of 
underdevelopment common to the region as a whole. 
Within the framework of these five features, at a minimum level. South Asia 
can be identified as a subordinate system. Specialists on the South Asian region have 
now acknowledged it as a sub-system of the global or international system. As 
Thomas Perry Thoronton agreed upon that - despite its lack of formal institutions or 
even shared objectives. South Asia definitely constitutes a system. Nations are 
drawn into mutual relationship by geographic proximity, shared problems, and even 
mutual hostility, and South Asia has all of these in abundance. The South Asian sub-; 
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system is highly vulnerable to outside ijitrusion or intervention because of the split 
within it, indeed, in some regards its internal situation is about as bad as it can be 
since the two major members are in especially dangerous imbalance. Pakistan is 
neither strong enough to assert itself effectively against India nor it is so weak that 
it can readily acquiesce in a subordinate position." 
The geographic and cultural bounaries of the South Asian region are well 
defined. Historical and political variables also form the basis for the definition of this 
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region.'" In a geostrategic sense, the South Asian region has traditionally been 
looked at as a unified entity. Neither heterogeneity ofits members nor their conflicts 
and rivalries have altered its traditional identity." One might disagree, however, 
about the criteria for identifying core and peripheral members of the South Asian 
sub-system. Questions might be raised about the inclusion or exclusion of Afghanistan 
or China. '^  In the case of Pakistan, one is impelled to see its participation in two other 
sub-system - South West Asia and Central Asia. The reasons for this are strategic, 
as well as political and cultural. The intention is not to downgrade Pakistan's 
membership of and relevance to the South Asia sub-system. Thus with its fairly 
distinct boundaries - the Himalaya in the north and the Indian Ocean which surrounds 
the peninsula on the other three sides - South Asia is probably the best defined sub-
system in contemporary international society.'^ 
Politically, South Asia is not a homogenous system. The internal characteristics 
of the polities comprising the region range widely from democratic, federal and 
parliamentary to monarchical and unitary." The historical circumstances and 
orientations of the South Asian elite have shaped the structure and process of 
political institution. Even those states m the region which inherited similar institutions 
from Britain began to diverse in their political paths. Over the decades, they ha\ e 
restructured, developed and maintained altogether different political traditions. In 
the process some of the member states have experienced chaos and upheavals. One 
might disagree about the political successes and failures of the South Asian countries. 
The lack or inadequacy of popular participation has contributed to political 
fragmentation. The absence of a political mechanism to settle who will get what and 
how has given rise to conflicts among ethnic groups.'^ Political institutions have, 
therefore, remained underdeveloped or ineffective. 
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Another factor that has shaped and continues to influence the nature of ties, 
both within the region and with the global powers, is the distribution of power. The 
region is Indo-centric. India is not only the largest, strongest and the most developed 
country in South Asia, it also constitutes the core of the region. Others are not only 
smaller powers but can be said to be on the periphery. The geographical factor further 
places India at the centre of the South Asian geopolitical system. India shares 
borders with all of its neighbours while none of them have common border with each 
other.'" The geopolitical imbalance among the constituent countries is viewed with 
concern by the neighbours of India. In the past while India has started for strengthering 
its dominant power status, Pakistan the lesser power, has made persistent efforts for 
enhancing its defence and deterrence. This was aimed at neutralizing the Indian 
dominance. It is to be emphasized here that in any case of inter-state tension in South 
Asia, India remains the common factor, willingly or unwillingly by virtue of it.s 
centrally located geographic situation in the region. 
The region is a civilizational entity. The countries and people of the region 
have a history to share. Most of the countries emerged with shared colonial past, 
similar political experience and common social values. They speak common language, 
share same religions, wear the same dresses and have the tradition of art and music.' 
There exist many bonds like ethnic, linguistic, religious and social similarities, 
administrative, legal and military system which link the countries of the region. "* But 
despite these existing similarities and links amongst them they have failed to evolx e 
consensus on important issues like regional security, stability and unity, and than 
anything else, they have been involved in constant conflict with each other which 
have made the region one of the most conflict prone zones. Politics of the region 
since its decolonization have been dominated by differences and contradictions 
rather than cohesiveness, historical and political ethos. 
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The region, like many other regions of the Third World, is economically 
underdeveloped. It is amongst the poorest, most densely populated, most illiterate 
parts of the world, with minimal rate of growth, serving a population of over a billion 
containing one half of the world's poor.'" The plight of the countries of the region 
is that they are economically very fragile, caught in a debt-trap and dependent on 
large scale foreign aid. Besidesbeing economically highly dependent on the developed 
countries, there exist economic disparities in the region. The economic development 
whatsoever, has be n very uneven in the countries of the region, which causes 
conflicting situation in the region. 
The troubles of the region of South Asia, its tensions, mutual suspicion, 
mistrust and occasional hostilities have been one of the conspicuous features of the 
region. Tlie problems like those of fragile political institutions, lack of social 
consensus, distorted economic development etc. which are more or less, prevalent 
in all the countries, create an environment of insecurity and instability not only within 
the countries of the region but very often they also resuh into cross-border 
dispersions. These problems interacting with various others have con\ erted South 
Asia into a conflict prone zone. There exist a large number of conflicts of varying 
degrees and nature both at inter and intra-state levels, which have many oftheir roots 
in colonial and post-colonial policies and strategies of superpowers. 
Outlining these characteristics of South Asian politics is necessary for two 
reason. Firstly, there are important linkages between the internal strife/conflict in 
one country and interference/intervention from another. This is because of either of 
compulsion of geopolitical considerations or a response to the spilloxer effects of 
political conflict or civil war in a neighbouring country.^" Secondly, internal political 
disorder or pohtical rivalry and quest for foreign support and legitimacy have opened 
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up domestic politics to extra-regional influence and penetration. In the case of 
Afghanistan, which is a peripheral member of the South Asia sub-system, internal 
conflict had resulted in foreign intervention.^' This is not to suggest that domestic 
political stability and order would put an end to the influence of global powers. 
However, the resolution of some types of political conflict would certainly reduce 
external involvement in the internal affairs of South Asian States. 
Perpetual conflicts among the different states of South Asia in general and 
Indo-Pak conflict in particular, to a large extent served the interests of the super-
powers to expand their sphere of influence and thus serving their national interest. 
It is an undeniable fact that India is far superior to Pakistan in almost every respect. 
Pakistan from very beginning, being conscious of its regional inferiority, has strived 
hard to counter-balance India's regional superiority by obtaining extra-regional 
support and intra-regional linkages explicity designed to deal with India.^^ India on 
the other hand has always sought to structure the region free from extra regional 
involvement in order to preserve and protect the pre-eminent position it enjoys in the 
region.-' 
In the South Asian sub-system, thus one can easily discern two types of 
dialectical struggles that have in the past influenced the nature of ties in the region. 
One type of struggle is by I dia for a regional role of dominance, maturing into either 
a sphere of influence or a hegemonic order. Another which is primarily influenced 
by India's ambitious role, is the struggle by Pakistan and others for autonomy, 
independence and sovereign existence. The outcome of this dialectically opposed 
struggle is the pei-petuation of tensions and conflicts. There are two more effects 
which the interactive process of'dominance' and 'autonomy' have produced. First 
is a higher degree of instability in the system. Second is the amenability and 
vukierability of the South Asian system to the intrusiveness of the global system. 
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In the case of Pakistan one might argue that it would be wise and natural 
course for the weaker in any regional system to look towards power that would 
support its quest for security. But this balancing is neither automatic nor inevitable 
Success of any endeavour to contain a threat within the region from an extra-regional 
component would depend much on the identity of interests. In Pakistan's case, the 
basic drive to search for alliance came from the regional threat milieu.^^ 
2. Interaction with the Global System 
Bipolarity and Cold War tensions between East and West were successfully 
exploited by the regional antagonists to augment their power, which they used 
against each other. Undoubtedly, competitive globalism ofthe great powers motivated 
them to establish an influence relationship with the local powers in various subsystems 
ofthe world. 
Till the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, the global system since World War 11 
had primarily remained divided into two camps, the US and the Soviet. This was 
perhaps the natural outcome ofthe new distribution of power in the world. Wliile the 
power and influence of Europe declined, the great power status shifted to the US and 
the Soviet Union. Power and ideology bifurcated the traditionally influential Europe 
into two, along the East-West dimension. Ambitions, interests and roles ofthe tuo 
pjst war major powers began to diverge. Wartime allies failed to maintain consensu.^ 
on important world issues. The rivalry between the two generated by conflict of 
interests and perceived world roles gave rise to competitive globalism. This mode 
of superpower interaction was bound to influence the basic dynamics of world 
politics. With unprecedented accumulation of power, resources, destructixe 
technologies and orgaDuatioD, the US and the Soviet Union achieved global 
penetration and inflecne. 
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3. U.S. Interests and Objectives in South Asia 
This section of the chapter seeks to analyse the parameters conditioning the 
U.S. interests and involvement in the subcontinent. Before proceeding fiirther, 
however, it must be made clear that the US perception of its regional strategic 
interests and policies pursued to protect them have varied according to the predictions 
of the political party in power and shifts in the 'mood' of the US electorate. For 
instance US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles viewed nonalignment as 'immoral'. 
But the succeeding Democratic administrations downgraded the military pacts and 
wooed the leading nonaligned nations." Similarly with the inauguration of the Nixon 
administration. South Asia began to be characterized as an area that was marginal 
to US security interests.^" But when Soviet forces intervened in Afghanistan the 
Reagan administration accorded high priority to the region. 
So there have been changes regarding the importance of South Asia to the 
United States. The US interests and stakes in South Asia were largely dictated by its 
global strategy that witnessed shift and departures in accordance with the response 
and reaction of the USSR and China to the development in the region.-^ The pace, 
degree and direction of US presence building in South Asia depends largely on 
diplomatic strategic moves of the monolithic Russia and China. 
Just how important to the United States is the subcontinent ? Is it vital to 
national security that the subcontinent not be hostile toward the United Stated "! Or. 
at the other end of the spectrum, is such a development really matter of indifference 
? Or does the answer lie some where in between, namely, that the area is important, 
atleast m certain respects? If so, why and in what respect is it important.' 
Unfortunately there is no way of answering such questions with great precision. This 
is partly because of the nature of the area. But the fact that precision about the 
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importance of the subcontinent is impossible doesh^t mean that no judgment can be 
reached on the matter. Governments must make such judgments-implicitly if not 
explicitly - as a basis of their policies. 
From the point of view of the theory of international relations there is no 
unanimity on why one nation gets interested in the affairs of another. Theoretical 
paradigms range from the outrightly cynical to being foolishly altruistic. The national 
interest paradigm, which is the oft-cited explanation is closer to cynical model than 
to the altruistic model.^* 
A nations vital interests are those for which it is prepared to undertake a 
serious economic, political and military action irrespective of the cost involved.-' 
Preservation of such interests is accorded so high a priority that even military action 
is regarded as a legitimate act. Perhaps that is why aggression has often been justified 
by its perpetrators as absolutely necessary for the security of the nation. However, 
it need to be mentioned here that a superpower's perception of threat is not merely 
confined to an attack on home territories, but may include threats that are much more 
distant in space. 
However, threats to the source of important raw material, supply lines, and 
allies could constitute a threat that warrants a firm response from a superpower. The 
nature and degree of response depends on the thinking of the incumbent administration. 
The agreed response is then translated into what is coimnonly referred to as strategic 
objectives which, infact, are more specific goals calculated to serve those \ital 
interests.^" 
Strategic policy presupposes certain interests and objectives. We will attempt 
to determine these interests and objectives so as to focus on the evolution on of 
American policy in the region. Any outline of the interests" of the United States in 
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brief would stress the preservation of the American nation, especially its economic, 
political and cultural ideals. 
The South Asian region has always received a low priority in the US foreign 
policy formulations in the post world war II period, compared to other regions of the 
world, especially Europe, West Asia, Southeast Asia and the Far East." This is 
because, according to Robert L. Hardgrave, "South Asia is not a strategically vital 
area for the United States and the latter's involvement in this region has been 
episodic and derivative" of other interests, such as containment of communism, 
protection of oil in the Persian Gulf and access through the lanes of the Indian Ocean. 
" Thus the main consideration governing its South Asia policy stems from global 
pursuit and interest. And the area's importance has fluctuated in rhythm with the shift 
in america's global policies." 
Of course, the denial of the region to the adversary (former USSR) forms an 
important part of American calculations; but of greater importance in a more 
immediate sense has been American concern in the two neighbouring regions; South 
East and South West Asia'- and the Indian Ocean. American commitments in South 
East Asia have historical antecedents in the nineteenth century. US trade and 
economic ties with that region gained importance. In addition to this South East Asia 
is also a source of supply for certain strategic minerals like tin. columbium. tantalum 
and tungsten. Equally important is the fact that ideologically. South East Asian 
countries are closely aligned to the US and their preserv ation ser\ es the long-term 
national interests of the US in more ways than one. And, South West Asia, the other 
area flanking South Asia and of enormous concern to it has infact one single natural 
resource of vital importance to the US - oil - the engine of industrial society. 
In contrast to these two regions, certainly in strategic terms South Asia does 
not command the importance of the mediterranean region which constitutes the vital 
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under-belly of Europe. Nor does it possess natural resources such as those of the 
Persian Gulf area, which are vital to the economic life not only of American allies in 
Europe and Japan but also to that of the United States itself. It also does not have 
the economic muscle of Japan or the military muscle of China to be perceived either 
as a pole of attraction or as a threat. 
Even though it may not compare with the South East Asia or the Persian Gulf. 
South Asia has a certain inherent strategic importance"^ by virtue of the size of its 
area and population, its location astride the Indian Ocean and flanking the Persian 
Gulf and the straits of Malacca, and in its being centre of some power especially now 
with the possession of a nuclear explosive device. Highlighting the importance of 
South Asia, George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South 
Asian and African Affairs, said: "I need but note its location as a key area, linking 
the Near East and the Far East. It dominates the vital communication lines between 
Europe and the Far East. The countries of South Asia contain almost one fifth of the 
world's population. They have some 3.000 miles of common border with coninumist 
dominated lands of Asia. "'^ 
Obviously, the issue of the states in the region going nuclear has been an area 
of major American concern. Those in the US who have taken up this issue have put 
forward the possibility of regional conflict between two potential nuclear weapon 
middle powers that could very weJl lead to general nuclear holocaust. Besides this. 
the region has other strategic assets. It possesses an enormous scientific-technical 
manpower pool, a reservoir of skilled labour and industrial infrastructures that can 
have impact in various ways on the world economic system and thus either help or 
harm the system in which the US has a vital stake. In addition to these human 
resources, the region has great mineral and other raw material resources which are 
equally important for the USA. 
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There is a difference in the nature of American interests in South Asia during 
the earlierperiod (covering the 1950s and 1960s) and period since the 1970s. In the 
first period Cold War considerations were paramount, in the second they were less 
so, as both the US-Soviet detente and Sino-US detente were in operation, though 
with varying degrees of impact. The difference in nature of American influence can 
also be expressed in another way. The first period during which the Cold War 
paradigm regained, the American claim for global dominance was latent and muted. 
The conflict with India was only indirect. By the time we arrive at the second period 
a crucial change has occurred in American strategic doctrine. Detente no doubt may 
have loosened the East-West rivalry. But the very same loosening process has 
generated more ambitious objectives, and appropriately convincing rationals in the 
mind of superpowers, the US and Soviet Union alike. Paradoxically indeed, the East-
West detente process led to two contradictory trends in the Soviet-American rivalry 
On the one hand the rivalry was driven further below the surface with both the 
powers committed to a long-drawn out process of outwitting each other's influence 
On the other a mutual consensus that they should together establish the niles of the 
game of the world system was also apparent. 
The involvement of the USA, arose in South Asia not from an intrinsic interest 
in the region but principally from its concern about the containment of communism 
and Sovie^^^aian^jonisni. There appears to be consensus among obserxers that the 
US interests in South Asia, instead of being direct and economically motivated, have 
been a function of its strategic competition with the Soviet Union and the US policys 
inherent drive of maintaining its global superiority over other competing and 
potential powers and interests. Accordingly, the US involvement in South Asia 
fluctuated, depending upon its intensity and style of competition with other great 
powers at global level. 
25 
The US motive in generating strategic consensus among the pro-west elite in 
the sub-system of South Asia was to deny the Soviet Union's political influence 
Therefore, centrality of motives and objectives among the security partners diverged 
widely-while Pakistan succeeded in developing a respectable military infrastructure 
through the US and western security assistance, the US secured its objective of 
influence and regional stability in addition to development of and access to local 
facilities. 
Thus the US policy in the region appears inconsistent, confused and reactive 
rather than calculated, long term, and innovative. While the confusion is influenced 
by regional dynamics, the inconsistency in the policy is the product of internal 
American factors including periodic changes in administration. 
One of the products of the coufiision arising out of the internal policy making 
dynamics in the US with regard to South Asia, is a persisting debatte over the past 
two decades, on the question of the importance that South Asia acquires in the US 
interests and scheme of priorities. One school of thought accords a very low 
priority'^ to South Asia since it is geographically distant and economically uninspiring 
from the US point of view. The example ofvery low US interest in South Asia during 
the later half of sixties and almost the whole of seventies is cited in support of this 
assumption. However, there exist another shade of opinion'' in the United States 
which challenges this view and regards the US involvement in South Asia as being 
strategically vital and therefore deep and pervasive. The phases of low profile US 
policy towards the region are terminated as the products of America's stronger 
compulsion elsewhere, such as in Vietnam. 
C. U.S. South Asia Policy : An Overview 
Since the initiation of the superpower rivalry after the World War II, the US 
has constantly been ui search of new areas and new allies to extend its influence in 
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international community. It has focused on the objective of wiiming allies for its anti-
Soviet and anti-communist campaign, as well as of preventing the development of 
any regional power which could not be made an American satellite/" The US South 
Asian policy has also been framed in accordance with these objective. 
In pursuit of these objectives, the US leaders invited the South Asian states 
to join hands with the Western powers. Hoping to receive independent India's 
support, it had advocated the cause of Indian liberation and its domestic aspirations 
duruig the struggle against the Britishers.^' It had expected the ideological bond to 
bring India into its fold after independence. In the initial years the United States 
undoubtedly tended to attach more importance to India than to Pakistan primarily 
because of its larger size, its industrial potential and the general impression about 
India.""^  But India's policy of nonalignment and its reluctance to associate itself with 
US foreign policy objective of containing communism led it to conclude an alliance 
with Pakistan, which was also in a frantic search for an ally who could guarantee its 
security vis-a-vis India. 
The US and PaUstan subsequently entered into a wide-ranging security 
relationship, the basis of which was Pakistan's entrance into a web of US sponsored 
security arrangements designed to assist in the achievement of its geopolitical aims. 
Besides the 1954 US-Pakistan Mutual Security Agreement."" these eventually 
included the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)^ and Central Treat} 
Organization (CENTO) as well as a 1959 bilateral executive security agreement. 
India deemed US-Pakistan security ties as a threat to its security. There are 
many, however, who \ iew the US-Pakistan ties in a different way. The American 
outlook", observed Satu P. Limaye"*- "regarding Pakistan has not been based on anv 
such national or regional considerations. Rather global considerations such as the 
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containment of the USSR and PRC have driven the US to seek a closer relationship 
with Pakistan America was favouring Pakistan, but not out of any hostility 
towards India per se. Rather the US had continuing ties with Pakistan in the context 
of its larger strategic interests which were deemed worth sustaining even at the price 
of alienating India." 
Indias policy of uonalignment was viewed by the US as an obstacle to its 
aspirations in the region. It presented the risk of creating an "additional world force 
based on a political mobilisation of national elites in Asia and Africa rather than ou 
military capabilities".^"^ Thus India's "quest for self reliance"^^ and its alleged 
creation of an independent centre of power prevented it from acquiring a place in US 
regional and global designs. This led the US to show a distinct preference for 
Pakistan over India 
Whether US policy was directed against India or not. but it is true that its 
perpetual military assistance to Pakistan not only hampered the Indian security but 
also destroyed the hopes of a reduction in Indo-Pak tensions. It is believed that the 
US interests were best served if the two neighbours remained engrossed in their dispute. 
Tlieir rivalry not only pre\ented the emergence of a regional threat to the USA but also 
provided an opportunity for it to assume a role in the area. Thus Pakistan, by wav 
of becoming an ally sei-ved the two primary objectives of the US-becoming its strong 
hold in the Asian region and preventing India from creating its own centre of power 
or emerging as a regional power. 
The Kennedy administration made the first subtle change in viewing South 
Asia from the traditional cold war eyes. This administration was much more attuned 
to Indian sensibilities. An important factor determining this was the growing thaw 
in US-USSR relations and the split in Sino-Soviet relations. The Kennedv 
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administration sought to change the content of Indo-US relations and injected some 
positive changes. The 1962 Sino-Indian border clash was an opportunity through 
which the US was trying to build bridge with India. It reacted decisively and urgently 
to the Indian requests for military equipment and supplies. Although the aid quantum 
was of no match to the intensity of threat which India faced but honouring Indian 
requests certainly produced some changes in New Delhi. 
Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 was a severe test to the US South Asian policy. 
The US wanted to halt the fighting in order to preclude possible Chinese involvement 
on Pakistan's behalf or the Soviet Union's on India's for fear that the conflict would 
spread, endangering wide US interests. The US wanted to get out of its increasingly 
vexing entanglement in the region as quickly and painlessly as possible. It is not out 
of context to note here that the US had always given assurance to India that the arm.'^  
supplied to Pakistan would not be used against it. The 1965 war served as a 
"watershed" since Pakistan used the American arms against India. Though Pakistan 
violated the US assurance by using the weapons, the Johnson administration was 
"unwilling to choose between the two rivals'".^" It did not differnciate between the 
aggressor and the aggrieved and imposed an embargo on both, suspending military 
and economic aid to both. However. Satu P. Limaye feels that the "US did not impose 
an arms embargo on both states not out of antipathy for India (or Pakistan), but 
rather because of larger geopolitical interests".^** 
Prior to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, there was a case to be made that the 
United States was actively interested and involved in South Asia-largely in pursuit 
of global objectives. The 1965 war. however, marked a turning point for a variety 
of reasons, and m the following five years or so, US interests dropped of dramatically 
A major factor was the disillusionment in the United States over the fact that the two 
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large South Asian nations had become embroiled in a war that was counter to US 
political and economic objectives in the subcontinent and used US-provided weaponry 
in the process. Also important were the increasing pinch on resources that the United 
States had to pursue its policies and the emerging preoccupation with Vietnam that 
would ultimately lead to broad disillusionment with US involvement in the Third 
World. 
In the sixties, especially during Nixon administration. Pakistan had acquired 
an additional significance due to its ability to assist Sino-US rapprochement. 
President Nixon took office in 1969 determined to end American involvement in 
Vietnam. To do so, he realized that US relations with China needed to be addressed 
Since Pakistan had established cordial relations with China, it was considered a 
useful bridge for Sino-US rapprochement. Thus during this period Pakistan emerged 
as ''most allied ally" of the US due to its significance as "middleman".^" It was in this 
context that in October 1967 a "one-time exception" to existing US weapons transfer 
policy in the subcontinent was approved.'" 
This one time exception remained unconsuiimiated due to the outbreak of the 
1971 Indo-Pakistani war over Bangladesh and the US imposition of another arms 
embargo on both countries. However, the Nixon administration, even in the wake 
of US domestic opposition, despatched the seventh fleet to the iiay of Bengal to 
demonstrate its support for Pakistan. This US act was seen by most Indians as a 
direct threat to India.'' But western scholars look thething from different perspective, 
as one scholar has observed their certauily might have been an element of warning to India 
in this action, but it appears that the US action was directed more at reassuring Peking 
than antagonizing New Delhi."--
The US embargo, however, was lifted partially in March 1973 and by Feb 
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1975" the embargo was totally lifted with the delivery of 300 APCs for which 
Pakistan had already paid but not received due to the 1971 embargo. 
For a short period in the late 1970s, US-India relations appeared to follow a 
smoother path than they had got accustomed to since the early 1950s. Perhaps it was 
due to relative decline in Pakistan's significance in US strategic designs At that 
juncture, Saudi Arabia and Iran served as principal supporters of US interests in 
West Asia; therefore, Pakistan was not essential to the American policy in the region 
Secondly, the establishment of direct relations between the United States and China 
had ended the requirement of Pakistan as a link between these major countries. 
As a consequence of Pakistan's relative insignificance for its interests, the US 
openly charged Pakistan of developing itsnuclear programme for a weapon capability, 
reacted strongly against President Zia's announcement of'islamic punishments" and 
in August 1978 finally terminated all its aid to Pakistan under the Glenn-Symington 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. 
Thus this phase clearly gave evidence of the fact that with a change in the 
climate between two superpowers, the regional binds that held the US with Pakistan 
came under strain. The strategic entente that was present during the heyday of the 
Cold War disappeared with the detente between two superpowers and US's 
normalization of relations with China. The decline in Pakistan strategic significance 
raised hopes for an improvement in Indo-US relations. The change in the US policy 
was reflected in the visit of President Carter to India, during his first year of 
presidency and its reciprocation by the visit of Indian Prime Minister Desai in June 
1978. There was a greater understanding in the US on India's commitment to 
democracy and respect for human rights. It viewed the Indian nuclear programme 
with markedly less suspicion. Efforts were made by the administration to release fuel 
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for Tarapur.'"* Since the US appeared to be moving away from Pakistan. India hoped 
this positive phase to stabilize. But this could not last long as the sudden onset of 
the new Cold War with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan threatened to 
nip these new American initiatives in the bud. The strategic importance of Pakistan 
to the United States was once again on the cards. 
Thus the Soviet 'adventurism' in Afghanistan resulted in dramatic changes 
in United States policies globally and in South Asia. It immediately changed the 
United States priorities and tactics - opposing and containing the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan replaced nuclear nonproUferation as the primary US concern, while 
engagement replaced disengagement at the tactical level. 
Tlie most dramatic change came in the United States dealing with Pakistan. 
Before the Soviet intervention, US- Pakistani relations were at their lowest ebb; the 
US security assistance to Pakistan had stopped because of latter "s nuclear programme. 
But after intervention, overnight, Pakistan became a 'frontline state' and an 
"essential anchor" of US in South West Asia. Carter administration made a determined 
but unsuccessful effort to establish closer security and political relations with 
Pakistan. Washington offered a package of $ 400 million in aid which was rejected 
decisively by Pakistan's President Ziaul Haq as "peanuts".•• Infact, Zia intended to 
exploit the situation to Pakistan's advantage. 
The admmistration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-89) made a preater 
effort to improve US-Pakistan relations. Finally, the Reagan administration succeeded 
in winning Pakistan through its $ 3.2 billion aid package in September 1981, This 
included the sale of 40 C-16 advanced combat aircraft, which were superior to any 
aircraft in the Indian inventory'^ Thisaidpackage was followed by a second package 
of $ 4.02 billion in aid for 1987-1993 period. As due to the continued presence of 
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Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan remained significant for US interest. However, 
on account of Pakistan's nuclear programme the aid to Pakistan was suspended since 
October 1990 under Pressler Amendment. The US Senate had passed the Pressler 
Amendment in 1985 but its aid to Pakistan was stopped only after the Soviet Union 
withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. 
The US administration's justification for a military relationship with Pakistan 
despite evidence that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, were First, 
befitting its broader foreign policy ideology, the administration was of the view that 
nonprohferation ought to be subsumed to other compelling national security interests, 
in this case, responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and building a 
"framework of regional security" in South West Asia. Second, the administration 
noted that American le.':islation placing curbs on military and economic assistance 
had done nothing to curtail Pakistan's search for a nuclear weapons capability. It. 
therefore, seemed counterproductive, in the administration's view, to maintain an 
arms and economic assistance embargo when it did nothing to acliieve its goal and 
harmed American interests in a country threatened by Soviet adventurism and \ ital 
to assuring US security interests. Finally, the administration argued that by gi\ing 
Pakistan the military and economic wherewithal it needed to address its security 
fears, the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons would diminish. While prima facie 
the arguments had a certain logic, a closer examination of them reveals that for India 
their implications were negative and the arguments were themselves unconvincing. ' 
It is commonlv \ iewed in India that the American justification for Pakistan's 
nuclear programme was also due to India's own nuclear capability. But US official 
musthave known that India'snuclearprogramme was less Pakistan centered and was 
given special impetus by the Chinese test of 1964, coming as it did in the wake of the 
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1962 Sino-Indian border war. This clearly meant that the US administration was 
implicitly justifying Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear capability because of India's, it 
was concurrently exerting pressures on India to refrain from its nuclear activities 
without appreciation for the totality of Indian motivations. This fact highlight the 
fundamentally discriminatory nature of the American approach to nuclear 
nonproliferation. 
Thus during the Cold War era, the US policy in South Asia has been 
characterized by various degrees of engagement. When it has perceived that the 
region is threatened by an outside power, Washington has tended to become 
seriously engaged. When the perception of a threat from outside the region has been 
low, the United States has focused on regional issues.'* Its attention is only focused 
on the region "in times of crises in the area, be it regional conflict or a hightened 
perception of the soviet threat."''* 
D. U.S . Interests and Policy in South Asia : The Post Cold War 
Dilemma 
Prof Stephen P. Cohen'" - a respected authority in South Asia, spelt out the 
interests and strategies of the United States in South Asia in the post Cold War era. 
He is of the view that "The Cold War period provided a context for American 
Regional Policy. It was not perfect but it allowed Washington to order and direct 
American interests in a coherent fashion". And now, he proceeded to say, "We do 
not now have a policy; we have urges and inclinations. Our policy process, as far as 
South Asia is concenied, will be initiated by mobs baying through the halls of 
Congress calling for the punishment of India or Pakistan (abetted by the respective 
embassies of the two countries). The Department of State and the White House will 
struggle to appease them to 'strike a balance', as they gapple with the Human Rights 
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Violations of the Week, or the Nuclear Bad Deed ofthe Month" "But realistically 
we are losing political ground that was taken with great difficulty over the past 
twelve years.""' 
Prof Cohen believes that the "United States has no vital interests in South 
Asia; all the same America has continuing interests in South Asia (democracy. 
non-proliferation, economic liberalization) and potential interests in working with 
some South Asian state to pursue common strategic objectives (peace keeping 
outside the region, possible containment of China)" 
It is true that South Asia has so far never been an area of vital strategic 
interests to the US as it poses no overwhelming threat to USA nor is it afloodin vital 
resources. However, even after the end of Cold War, the region deserves US 
attention for atleast three cogent reasons as suggested by Sumit Ganguly.''" First, the 
region is significant for its sheer size and population. The United States as a 
superpower with global interests can hardly ignore the fate of nearly a quarter of 
humanity. Second, the region's Ic cation between the oil rich Middle East and the 
increasingly prosperous South East Asian nations is of strategic importance Tliird. 
as India and Pakistan, the two principal powers in the region, acquire nuclear and 
ballistic missile capabilities, the prospects of more destructive wars in this conflict 
prone region are liable to increase.'^ 
Explaining the importance of South Asia in the post Cold War era. Richard 
N. Haass obseiAes that ".strategic thinking may be out of fashion in some quarters 
nowadays, but it is not out of date. South Asia is not only important in itself but has 
the potential to effect developments in other areas of great significance as well •'' 
What are the American interests in this region now that the scepter ofthe 
Soviets does not haunt them? To quote from John Mallot's testimonv to the House 
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Foreign Affairs committee on 23 April 93, "We have the following fundamental 
objectives in South Asia"" : 
* First and foremost, to prevent war and the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery. 
* To support economic reform and development, and obtain greater access for 
US trade and investment and improve intellectual property rights protection. 
* To support, strengthen democratic practices and institutions and greater 
respect for human rights. 
* To enhance militar> to military contacts and preserve unhampered maritime and 
naval transit rights. 
* To end terrorism. 
* To work with host governments to control the production, trafficking, and 
shipment of narcotics, to help promote population planning, control the spread 
of AIDS, protect the environment; and support disaster relief efforts; and. 
* 7 o support international efforts to ensure the care, maintenance, and repatriation 
of the region"s three million refugees." 
In tlie po.st Cold War era the engine driving US interests in South Asia, as 
anywhere else, is its economic interest. Today the primary area of US domestic and 
foreign policy is linked directly to economic factors. President Clinton's administration 
has a major task in hand to reverse domestic recession, increase employment and 
drastically alter the balance of payments position of USA. Therefore, it can be 
surmised that any factor that contributes to economic gain to USA will become an 
important foreign policy issue. The US sees South Asia, like it sees China, as an area 
that has ver^ great potential to develop into a major market for USA. 
With the region's move toward economic liberalisation. South Asia mav be 
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viewed increasingly as a part of the hroader Asian-Pacific community which also 
includes the USA. America stands to gain from access to a potentially massive and 
growing market in South Asia, which is home to one-fifth of mankind. An economic 
revolution is moving relentlessly across South Asia as goveniments recognise the 
need to reduce controls, expand private sector activity, and liberalise foreign trade 
and investment regimes. From large economics of India and Pakistan to the smaller 
ones of Bangladesh. Nepal and Sri Lanka, South Asian are shedding outdated, self-
defeating policies and replacing them with more open approaches that integrate their 
region more closely with the global market place. Tliisnew environment of economic 
reforms and openness provide an opportunity to the US for its trade and in\ estment 
in South Asia. 
Apart from strengthening its economy, the US has to take care of its securit> 
concerns too. The end of Cold War has not nade the world safe for US security. A 
new set of security concerns has emerged \\hile some of the old ones still persist. In 
South Asia. American,^ are particularJN sensitive about the nuclear issue. This is one 
of the main reasons why the Clinton administration has created a new bureau in the 
State Department on South Asian Affairs." Robin L. R; phel. who was confirmed on 
July 16. 1993 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be the first Assistant 
Secrelary of State for South Asian Affairs, had said before the committee that one 
of the main challenges for the United States in South Asia is "checking the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of deli\ ery and "fust 
and foremost this means persuading India and Pakistan to begin to roll back their 
nuclear programme " Prior to this John Malott, Interim Director and Deput\ 
Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, who was on a \ isit 
to India and Pakistan in June 1993. also had stated that the top US priority in the 
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region was to cap, reduce and finally eliminate from the region weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery. 
The US concern about the nuclear arms race in South Asia appears to be 
genuine, although in resolving the tangle the Clinton Administration is playing more 
to the gallery than playing fair. Its motive in providing embargoed military equipment 
worth $ 368 million (under Brown Amendment) to Pakistan and thus promoting a 
conventional arms race are suspect.''" How else can one explain the repeat of the Cold 
War persuasions? To pursue a credible nonproliferation strategy in South Asia, the 
United States will need to adopt a policy that does not appear discriminatory. Further 
attention must be drawn towards US failure to move with greater clarity in making 
more substantia] cuts in its own nuclear arsenal."' Latest disclosures of the Chinese 
transfer of nuclear technology and material to Pakistan, and inability of the United 
States to take any action against China, has further complicated the US nuclear 
dilemma in South Asia. 
There is, of course, no scope for any nation like India or Pakistan to go 
Nuclear in this Post-Cold War period. The international environment is m favour of 
non-proliferation, eventually leading to nuclear disarmament. But until that 
materialises, it is best for these two countries to formalise the present nuclear 
ambiguity.™ Since the two nations are suspected to have gone beyond the nuclear 
threshold, it is wiser for them to declare commitment to "no-first strike". 
The US administration, infact, appears to be echoing the theme of Joseph 
Nye's book^' that contradicts Paul Kennedy's decline thesis^- and inspires his 
countrymen with the hope that America still has the power to lead the world, despite 
its apparent decline in traditional attributes of power like strong economy and 
military. The Harvard Professor contends that the real power of the United States 
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lies in its embodying and championing a set of universal values like democracy, 
respect for human rights and free market economic system that creates wealth 
necessary for leading a decent human life. Indeed, the US administration is topping 
this intrinsic power of America to offer it to the countries of the world with a \iew 
to influencing them. 
Keeping with this policy objective in South Asia US has been pressurising 
India to improve its record on human rights.'' Simultaneously it is also pressurising 
Pakistan not to encourage terrorism in India. The US has often threatened to declare 
Pakistan a terrorist state but then gone back on the pretext that there is not sufficient 
proof ofthe state's in\ olvement in the promotion of terrorism in India. Other policy 
priorities, infact. ha\e weight against taking such a drastic decision. In particular, 
the imperatives ofthe US policy in the Gulf and Central Asia, in the context of which 
Pakistan is seen as a moderate and modern Islamic state, were no less important 
Such considerations are also promoting the Clinton administration to ignore iion-
pioliferation restraints (under Pressler Law) imposed on Pakistan since 1990. and 
supply it with military hardware worth $ 370 million. This waiver may run into 
difficulties with the disclosure of Chinese nuclear supplies to Pakistan, but US has 
to cultivate Pakistan as an ally. 
One ofthe factors behind the revival ofthe security relationship between the 
US and Pakistan after the end ofthe Cold War could be the desire to maintain a 
balanced relationship in South Asia. Indo-US relationship has improv ed in the recent 
years, involving cooperation in defence field. Not only the Indo-US militar\ 
exercises have taken place but close cooperation at the level of armed forces and 
defence decision making has been initiated. Pakistan has been complaining of neglect 
by its former ally, when its adversary. India, is being looked with favour. A particular 
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sore point has been the US refusal to supply F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan for 
which payment has already been made. The latest efforts to bypass the Pressler Law 
was, therefore, to assure Pakistan that Washington cares and it is not being ignored, 
or its relationship with the US is not being downgraded. 
However, the US policy of balancing its relationship in South Asia has 
generated some basic misreadmgiii India and Pakistan about its policy. In India there 
was hope that Clinton rhetoric on democracy could bring the world's two largest 
democracies closer. But that was an illusion. Many Indians also hoped that the US 
would declare Pakistan a terrorist state and end external interference in Kashmir. 
Instead there is a more activist American diplomacy on Kashmir. 
Pakistan, on the otherhand, had hoped the new American rhetoric on human 
rights would help it to internationalise the Kashmir issue and had devoted enormous 
diplomatic energies to put India on the mat in inteniational forum. To an extent the 
activist American "preventive diplomacy" on Kashmir has helped Pakistan. But 
Pakistan is living in a fool's paradise if it believes the US can deliver to Pakistan in 
a conference what it has not been able to gain in the battlefield. 
Whatever be the US policy dilemma in South Asia, the end of Cold War. 
undoubtedly, has provided it an ample opportunity to look at South Asia afresh 
Acknowledging this Joiin R. Mallot; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaiy of State 
for South Asian Affairs, said that "for the first time the United States can look 
directly at the nations in the region without reference to any outside power. Now it's 
just us. and the policies and actions that we take vis-a-vis each other" .^ ^ The US fresh 
look at ludo-Pak relations is also apparent from the acknowledgement of Richard N. 
Haass, special assistant to US President and senior Director for Near East and South 
Asian Affairs. He had said that the US penchant to see in East West terms and to 
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apply extension of containment of communism to this region were no longer items 
in the United States strategic menu. It emphasises a shift in US foreign policy from 
looking to issue between India and Pakistan in South Asia as derivative and 
mechanically connected and weaved into its global strategic fabric in a dialetical way 
to perceive issues and South Asia as a region as separate and distinct, not as a subject 
of its global whole. To quote him "it is important to note that we will do everything 
possible to resist making our relation with India and Pakistan on either/or zero sum 
proposition In the modern age it is neither pnident nor possible to have a 
successfiil relationship with only one of these two states. We will require good 
relations with both or we will likely end up with good relations with neither."" 
Tlie above statement of two high officials from the US administration 
confirms that Washington has no desire to build a special strategic relationship with 
either country in the Post-Cold War world. Although this could change, for now 
these assertions must be taken as American policy. Infact what Americans now 
perceive is that India and Pakistan must bury the hatchet if the US policy in South 
Asia is to succeed. To achieve this the Kashmir problem should be resolved 
peacefully. Another set of ideas dictate that balance of power must be maintained in 
South Asia, and that neither India nor Pakistan be allowed to become a major power 
centre. A third set of imperatives dictate that China must be contained and not 
allowed to increase its military presence in South Asia. Lastly, Islamic fundamentalism 
must be controlled, and moderate Muslim countries should, therefore, be strengthened 
and encouraged. 
It is true that in the Post-Cold War era I'akistan suffered a setback as its 
importance to the USA certainly receded with the demise of Soviet Union. USA 
showed very little continued interest in Pakistan and it was forecast that USA has 
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dumped Pakistan, as it no longer serves its strategic interests. It was, however, 
Pakistani leaders' smart and innovative skills which brought Pakistan, once again, 
back into USA's area of interest. There could be several reasons for the change in 
US attitudes : firstly, as an alternative mode to fundamentalists, reactionary Islamic 
states a democratically ruled modern Pakistan offers great attractions. Secondly, as 
an advanced Muslim nation it would be an asset and an ally for influencing the Muslim 
republics of the former Soviet Central Asia. Thirdly, it is small and manageable, does 
not have the potential to become an independent power centre. Fourthly, it could 
keep India, Iran and China in check in different ways. Finally, it is an old reliable ally 
and partner of the Cold War era. 
India scores lov* because it has the potential to become a big power centre in 
South Asia and is unlikely to support US policies vis-a-vis China. Moreover, it can 
not be relied upon given its past pro Soviet stance during the Cold War period. Some 
in USA also believe that India has hegemonic ambitions and tendencies which 
threaten its smaller neighbours. India's refusal to sign the NPT and progressive 
development of its long range missiles are cited as confirmation to this view. TlieUS 
South Asia policy basically aims at pressurising India, economically, politically and 
militarily to prevent it from nursing any grandiose design of dominating South Asia. 
In the end it would be appropriate to make the USA and the world aware of the 
dangers of the US South Asia policy. In South Asia, the consequences of this policy 
are likely to be : 
(i) India and Pakistan will plunge into a lethal arms race, including nuclear 
weapons which will economically ruin both the countries and make them highly 
unstable and politically volatile. 
(ii) Indo-Pak relations will deteriorate sharply increasing the danger of a hot war. 
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(iii) A stronger and self assured Pakistan will expand its proxy war against India 
(iv) Terrorism and Narco-terrorism will flourish both in India and Pakistan inviting 
destablisation and chaos. 
Incidentally this scenario is not new; however, in the post Cold War era the 
stakes are much higher. The lessons of Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia can not be 
swept under the carpet. The current US policy is bound to promote chaos and 
conflict in South Asia, the very trend which the US wants to control and cap. 
The disappearance of the USSR while depriving the United States of a focus 
for its effort has at the same time brought forward major problems of ordering the 
world in the light of American interests. America has to not only take on the 
immediate task of regaining its lost economic pmnacy and in many areas even 
technological primacy, it has also to ensure that no viable challenges arise nor that 
any country in the world acquire the means of forcing the United States to accept 
embarrassing and damaging compromises. It is onthe basisoftheabovethat American 
policy towards the countries of South Asia collectively or separately, as well as those 
countries who ha\ e any interests in South Asia, will be designed. 
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Qhaptee - 2 
UNITED STATES AND THE EVDO-PAK 
NUCLEAR DUET 
Among the many factors which have influenced the course of international poHtics 
and diplomacy in the last five decades, the most crucial has been the nuclear one. Ever since 
the advent of nuclear weapons, whose destructive power was so conxancingly demonstrated 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1944, they have become a symbol of power and prestige among 
the nations of the world; and possession of nuclear weapons has been given special status in 
inteniational power hierarchy.' 
Tlie importance of nuclear weapons in the world today, however, is tied intrinsicalK 
to their political value actually derived Irom the political etfects of the existence of nuclear 
arsenals, including their ability to deliue and sliape pohtical stability between lival nations and 
blocs. The political significance of nuclear weapons flows fi-om the fact that they convey 
mutual annihilation and are \ enerated as such. In military historv; nuclear amis are the first 
truly political weapon system since the dawn of warfare^ Tliey bestow immense political 
clout to their holders. Tlie failure to see them in this wider light will reduce the value of an\ 
analysis of the process of nuclearization in some major third world countries.' 
Tlie end of cold war has lowered the possibility of nuclear holocaust, but nucleas war 
remains a fear in the post-. )ld war era. In addition to the fi\ e declared nuclear powers. se\ ery 1 
other states, including the two South Asian neighbours, India and Pakistan can now develop 
and deploynuclear devices.^ After more than two decades of secret research and development, 
bluff^ and nuclear ambiguity. India and Pakistan have passed a critical threshold by saving 
openly they ha\ e a nuclear capabihty. It has become commonplace to think of the South Asia 
as the most likely region where a war could escalate to a nuclear exchange. Tlie United States 
appears to hold the view that continumg regional tensions between India and Pakistan 
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combined with the ongoing programme in the two countries to acquire nuclear capabiUty and 
baUistic missile delivery system mean that the outbreak of armed conflict has the potential to 
escalate to nuclear exchange with devastating consequences for the region and global efforts 
to combat the spread and use of such weapons. 
This region, according to CIA. I>irector James Woolsey, represents the most 
"probable prospect for the future use of the nuclear weapons.'" The history of mistrust and 
anger persist over long-standing, bitter disputes that sparked three short but unforgotten wars 
in the first 25 years after partition and more tlian once having flirted with a fourth contributed 
to this alaiTning assessment. The hostilities between India and China further comphcate the 
situation. Tlie risk of nuclear conflict in South Asia is, however, significant but the concern 
is exaggerated. Tlie United States, iufact is obsessed with the possibihty of a nuclear war in 
South Asia.'" 
Tlie United States has long laboured to stop the spread of nuclear weapons in South 
Asia and has made non-proliferation a central issue in bilateral relations with India and 
Pakistan. With the end of cold war it has further accelerated its non-proliferation diplomacy 
in South Asia. Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretaiy of State for South Asian Affairs has said 
that one of the main challenges for the United States in South Asia is "checking the 
proliferation of weapons ofniass destruction and their means of delivery" and thin means 
'persuading India and Pakistan to begin to roll back their nuclear prograimnes." American 
objectix e is "first capping, then reducing and e\ entuaUy eUmiuating fi-oin South Asia weapons 
of mass desti-uction and their means of deUvery.Mn the changed circumstances of the post 
cold war period, the United States beUeves that the spread ofnuclear technology and weapon 
capabihty to an increasing number of countries would pose a grave threat not only to its own 
security but the world as well." 
This chapter begins by surveying the nuclear landscape in South Asia, where India 
and Pakistan continue to pursue ambiguous nuclear policies. It points to specific incentix es 
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that have encouraged proliferation in South Asia with special focus on various forces driving 
the Pakistani and Indian nuclear programmes. It then examines the United States non-
prohferation poHcy in context of India and Pakistan and suggest arms control and confidence 
building measures to resolve the South Asian nuclear tangle. It concludes that India and 
Pakistan are unlikely to build and deploy nuclear weapons overtly in near fijture, but that 
regional and inteniational measures will be needed to eliminate the incentives for nuclearization. 
A. Nuclearisation in South Asia : Incentives and Motivations 
Since India detonated a nuclear explosive device in 1974, the spectre of a nuclear 
anns race has loomed over the Indian subcontinent. Today both India and Pakistan have 
source of the fissile material for nuclear weapons as well as substantial command of the 
technology for manufacturing weapons. They also have aircraft that are capable of delivering 
nuclear weapons to targets inside each other's tenitory and, missile technology advances in 
both nations are strengthening rival delivery capabiUty. China, whose actions strongly 
influence the South Asian proliferation landscape, has also imiched an ambitiousprogramme 
to expand its nuclear aimouiy and has made important strides in recent years. Significantly. 
however, neither India nor Pakistan has chosen to develop a declared nuclear weapons 
arsenal. Tliis restraint. \\ hich is due both to hitemationa! pressure and subcontinental strategic 
considerations. pro\ides some hope that some anns control and confidence building 
measures can be constructed to stop the fuiiher spread of nuclear weapons in the region. 
A plethora of literature is available which analyses nuclearisation process from 
theoretical \iew point. Two American strategic specialists. Lewis A. Dunn and Hennan 
Kahan, have listed as many as fourteen reasons or pressures encouraging a countr} to go 
nuclear.' Tliey ha\ e classified these reasons under several heads such as security, status or 
influence, bureaucratic factors and domestic factors. They have also identified eight types of 
events as 'trigger' acti\ atnig consideration on the pressures or reasons for a countiy going 
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nuclear. These are : (a) involvement in foreign crisis, (b) reduction in alliance credibility, (c) 
nuclearisation of other countries, (d) weakening or breakdown of international constraints, 
(e) domestic crisis; (f) government or leadership change; (g) increased availability of 
necessary resources and inputs; and (h) changed perception and utility of nuclear weapons. 
Mayer, another analyst, notes three basic types of incentives.'" First, incentives of 
international poUtical prestige and image-building. These can aflfect the country^ s appearance 
and posture. Second, incentives to advance national military and security objectives, to 
minimise external threats to the country and to strengthen its relative power position and 
strength. Tliird, incentives to support and promote domestic policies and to prevail in 
domestic political stmggles. Tlius four sets of argimients are frequently advanced by 
threshold states aiming to retam the nuclear options; military security, political prestige and 
influence, economic gains, and domestic pressure and compulsions. 
So far as South Asia is concerned, national security concerns has been the principal 
factor in the process of nuclearisation. South Asian proUferatiors border hostile countries, 
ornuclear weapon countries, some times both. India and Pakistani hostility has existed since 
partition in 1947, and there have been three wars. Tliere has been another war between India 
and China. Tlie key territorial issue of Kashmir has its roots in the colonial histoiy of the 
subcontinent and involves Pakistan, India and China, hidia and PaHstan continue to claim 
the entire state of Kashmir for themselves. Since 1984, India and Pakistan have engayed in 
sporadic battles over the control of the Siachen glacier in Kashmir. In December 1987. poor 
connmuiicationsand mutual misperception almost led to war, and by the spring of 1990. many 
expected a subcontinental nuclear war between the two. 
From a strategic viewpoint, Islamabad's nuclear programme is driven mainly by its 
threat perception and security concern with respect to India. In contrast. Indias nuclear 
calculations are centred on Cliina which has an expanding nuclear arsenal. Pakistan sees its 
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potential nuclear forces as a deterrent to India's conventional military advantages and 
strategic ambitions. India, whose military build-up was spurred by its humiliating defeat in 
the 1962 war with China, views its nuclear programme as the vital component of a strategic 
plan to deter agamst a more powerful China. 
John J. Schulz has rightly observed that : "The rationale presented by leading 
government officials in New DeDii and Islamabad to justify the ciurent state of their weapons 
programme is analogous to the ocean food chain-big fish eats littler fish that has just eaten 
littlest fish. China created its nuclear deterrent with fears ofMoscow and Washington ui mnid. 
China is feared by India, and India is feared by Pakistan. All tlireecomitriesjustifytheir present 
nuclear policies as a solution to security problems - a fiilly declared arsenal in China, a nuclear 
weapons "option" in India and now in Pakistan "an ability to assemble'', as the equalizing 
deterrent."" 
Another potent force propelling the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programme is 
nationalism. Hiis is e\ idem fiom the national consensus in each countiy on nuclear policy '* 
Both countriesenjoyo\envhclining domestic suppoil to their nuclearprogrammes.Nationahsm 
has played a ke\ lole in shaping Indian poUcies since independence in 1947. Nehru 
championed self-ieliance as part of India's "neutralism", and New Delhi's drive for 
indigenous science, technology, and nuclear capability reflects that self-reliance. Flie 
Pakistani nuclear programinehas also emerged as the leading s>Tiibol of Pakistani nationalism 
and pnde. According to a retired anuy general "it enjoys bipartisan and popular support and 
isabo\epolitical controxersy. Pakistan'snationalinterest demandsthathernuclearcapabilit\ 
be taken to its logical conclusion."" As Pakistan emerges as a technological leader of the 
Muslim World, itsnuclear programme isa visible symbol oflslaraictechiiological sophistication 
and power. 
Tlie desire to seek inleniational respect and prestige is also an important incentis e for 
nuclearisation in India and Pakistan. As one of the world's oldest and most populous 
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civilization, India sees the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability as the key to winning 
great power status. There is strong feeUng among an articulate section of Indian strategic 
analysts that without nuclear weapons India cannot be counted as major world power and 
cannot influence decisions for arms control and disarmament; nor can India stabilise its status 
as the dominant regional power in South Asia. Pakistan, though, it possesses the first Islamic 
bomb, is motivated by ethno-natiouahsm and the desire for regional respect and prestige fi^om 
the 'Muslim crescent"' and Central Asia. 
IntherecenttimestheiinpactofDesertShieldyStonnprovides another incentive. This 
event demonstrated the advantages ofhigh teclmology weaponry and in the eyes of the Tliird 
World countries, illustrated the likelihood in the ftjture of a technologically advanced. 
Westem-led coalition defeating to a low-to mid-technology developing countiy. A lesson 
learned by some Tliird World countnes from the war was not to challenge the US without 
possessing deliverable weapons of mass destmction. An analyst commented that, "the 
foremost lesson for de\ eloping coimtries (was) that had Iraq already developed a 
nuclear weapons capability, the United States would not have been in a position to decimate 
Iraq's miHtaiy might with impunity "'^  
Several factors make thepresence of nuclear weapon capabilities on the subcontinent 
more dangerous than the super power nuclear rivaliy that preceded it Too many of the 
specific conditions in the region, including an asymmetrical balance of power, bitter personal 
remembrance, wars within li\ ing memoiy, border and religious disputes and luistable and 
highly emotional domestic constituencies, point to the need for special and perhaps urgent 
efforts to prevent New Delhi and Islamabad fi-om taking those last small steps to flilly mount 
the proverbial nuclear tiger 
In contrast to the situation on the subcontinent today, many elements in the more than 
40 years of super-power confrontation helped prevent that nuclear-amied Cold War ri\ ala 
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from becoming hoi. Tlie two superpowers had no contiguous borders or outstanding 
territorial disputes. Tliey carefully avoided direct confrontation, troops from the two sides 
fr)ught in Umited regional warsfor international power and influence but did not clash directly. 
Little in that Cold War history equates to the strong feelings in India and Pakistan about past 
wars, unresolved boundaries, terrorist incidents or religious issues. 
Some current conditions in the region also bear striking similarities to several of the 
more destabilizing elements of the Cold War relationship, which further explains why many 
experts won-y over the prospect of two nuclear armed South Asian neighbours with so many 
simmering . unresoKed disputes. As was the case with the US-Soviet rivalry', relations 
between India and Pakistan are exacerbated by deep mistrusts, a quick tendency to blame the 
oiher side for any misfortune, belief that the other side is dedicated to gaining the upper hand 
and. in Pakistan, the idea that India directly threatens the survival of the country. Tliere is an 
ahnost paranoid tendency to see evil intent in each other's actions, and conspiracy theories 
are endemic and readily articulated by a vast cross-section of the two populations. 
However, the things have been exaggerated by the Western analysts. The alaniiist 
appreliensious of the US intelligence agencies are perhaps a consequence of the "Saddam 
Hussein S>aidronie'". nuclear weapons in the hands of irresponsible nations may be used 
setting aside the consequences of such a course. Tliey need to understand that if India and 
Pakistan ha\ e acquired nuclear weapon capability, it is going to ensure symmetiA' and not for 
a nuclear war. Not only that, of late both India and Pakistan have realised the fiitiHt\ of war 
and ha\ e adlierence to the dictum that war is no longer a viable instrument of policy. 
B. Nuclear Programmes of India and Pakistan 
For a proper understanding of the nuclearisation of the subcontinent a historical 
perspective on nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan and their current capabilities is 
imperative. Tlie histoiA' has somehow always been a discount, esjjecially in matters of 
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technology and politics. Both are in a great rush and get exclusively focussed on the present 
and future. This near total neglect of history - the neglect of a substantial part of the whole 
- tended to distort perspectives. Tlie nuclear issue is no exception. 
1. India's Nuclear Programme 
Although it has now gone for more than 20 years since its test atomic ex-jMosion 
without conducting farther explosions or officially constructing and deploying nuclear 
weapons. India is widely assumed to havetheabihtyto assemble several dozen atomic bombs 
on the time scale of a few hours to a few days. With its Prithvi missile and its localK 
manufactured aircraft, it now has the abihty to deliver such weapons a few hundred 
kilometers (i.e., to targets in Pakistan) and with the Agni missile it may soon have the ability 
to deliver weapons a couple of thousand kilometers (i.e., to target.s m central China). 
India has taken a \ eiy different approach to nuclear weapons than did the United 
States, the USSR, China. France and the United Kingdom. Rather than embarking on a 
\ igorous programme of deplo\ing a large weaponized capability and deH\ eiy systems. India 
has been content to demonstrate capabihty, put basic infrastmcture in place, and lea\e 
detenence implicit or somewhat ambiguous. Partly this approach may ha\e been driven by 
economic necessity but mainly it has been the resuU of a thoughtfiil policy choice and 
cuhurally influenced tradition and instinct. 
As a nation with significant scientific and technical capabiHties an*d with aspirations 
to play major role, India was interested in nuclear technology from the outset of the nuclear 
era. Tlie Indian atomic energy programme began even before independence, three years 
before India became free and fifteen mo;iths before the first ever nuclear test explosion was 
conducted by the United States, Homi Bhabha, the father of India's nuclear programme, in 
a letter to the Sir Dorabji Tata Tmst proposed the settling up of an mstitute for fiuidamental 
research. In Iris proposal Bhabha described the institute as "the embr>'o" from which (Bhabha) 
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hoped '1o build up in the course of time a school of physics cotiqjarable to the best in the 
world when nuclear aiergy has been successfully appUed for power production, in 
say, a couple of decades from now, hidia will not have to look abroad for its experts but will 
find them ready at hand."" It was tliis initiative wliich fructified in the form of the Tata In stitute 
ofFundaraental Research in Bombay in 1945 which became a pioneering institution in nuclear 
and allied subjects. 
Soon after independence the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was estabhshed 
with a mandate to launch a comprehensive nuclear programme so that India could produce 
all the basic materials required for the utiUsation of atomic energy. Homi Bhabha v\a.'> 
appointed the first Chairman of the Commission. The essential focus of the nuclear 
programme in the early years of mdependence was harnessing of nuclear energy for civilian 
power reactors. Nehru was so appalled by the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that he 
abhorred the idea of any military use of atomic energy. In fact he expressed India's 
unequivocal opposition to nuclear weapons and their use, and declared that India had no 
intention of producing nuclear weapons. Nehru opted for the application of atomic energy 
to secure benefitsto society and to the sum total ofliumaii welfare and happiness. Nehni once 
said that: "if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, 
we must de\ elop this atomic energy for quite apart from war. Indeed I think we must develop 
it for peaceful purposes.""' 
India formulated a long-tenn three stage strategy for the development of nuclear 
power. In the first stage reactors fuelled by natural uranium would produce both plutoniuni 
and electric power. In the second stage the phitoniura will be used to fiiel breeder reactors. 
The breeders will convert thorium, which India has in abundance, into U-233. In the third 
stage U-233, a fissile material will be the fixel for reactors, thus ensuring a self sustaining 
nuclear power programme using India's own resources.'^ To back up its plans for power 
58 
development and continued research India set up a number of research reactors, nuclear 
power stations, heavy water plants, a fuel fabricating facility, plutonium separation plants, 
a pilot-scale breeder reactor and so on. 
In 1956 India built the first nuclear research reactor APSARA in Asia outside the 
Soviet Union, a pool type reactor in the Bombay suburb of Trombay. The reactor was 
constructed indigenously and used medium enriched uranium supplied by the United 
Kingdom. Though determined to estabhsh indigenous capabUities in the nuclear field. India 
did not fail to appreciate the benefits of foreign collaboration. A 40 MW research reactor. 
CTRUS. was completed with Canadian assistance at Trombay in 1960; the 1956 Canada-
India agreement on CIRUS predated the IAEA's estabhshment and, therefore, involved no 
international safeguards. A small heavy water plant at Nangal, completed in 1962 with West 
Gennan collaboration was to make up for the heavy water needs of the reactor. Another 
research reactor ZERLINA. using natural uranium as fiiel and heavy water as moderator, got 
under way in 1961. It was altogether a different concept m nuclear reactors, other than 
CIRUS and A!*SARA. but wa^ an outcome of totalh indigenous eflFoits."* 
The Indian nuclear programme considered reprocessing - extraction of plutonium 
flora spent reactor fuel - as an integral part of it. Constmction of a chemical reprocessing 
plant, which had been decided upon as early as 1958. began in 1961. Tliis reprocessing plant, 
called Phoenix, was to separate plutonium fiorathe spent fiielofClRUS. Tlie essential thnist 
behind the building up of a reprocesshig facility appeared to be the uUimate need to attain self-
sufficiency in energ>. By the end of the decade, an Indian nuclear programme had come to 
almost the take offstage. Most of the later part of the 1950s had been a rapid expan.sion in 
research facilities in this area.'' 
In the power development programme of the Third Five Year Plan, an atomic power 
station was included and approved by the Planning Commission in August. 1958. It was to 
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be installed in the westeni region to supply power to Maharashtra and Gujarat. Tlie site 
selected was Tarapur about 100 km north of Bombay. The responsibility ofconstructmg this 
atomic power station was entrusted to the international General Electric Company, U SA. on 
the basis of global tenders. An agreement was signed on August 8, 1963 under which the 
United States agreed to supply enriched uranium for power reactors and, under another 
agreement concluded on December 7, 1963, the United States Agency for International 
Development was to provide a loan of Rs. 38.1 crores financing the foreign exchange cost 
of the project, including the fabrication of the initial load of fuel elements. ^ " The station St art ed 
commercial operations on October 3, 1969 after post-operational and start up testing phase 
necessary for aU atomic plants. Western wiUmgnessto help India in developing nuclear power 
was both a product of Indian persistence and a fall-out of the 1960 agreement between India 
and USSR for nuclear cooperation. 
India shuniiHating defeat in a war with Cliina in 1962 and the detonation of Chinas 
first nuclear device in October 1964 created a grave security threat to India and provoked 
a national debate ill the country. Tliesc events marked a major shift in India's nuclear thinking 
Until 1962 peacefiil use of nuclear technology was a widely accepted phenomenon, but after 
1962 the consensus began to break down. The government of India came imder iiea\\ 
pressure to abandon its policy of peacefiil use of atomic energy and to immediately start a 
nuclear weapons programme.-' Wliile Nehm was alive he was able to resist such proposals. 
but after his death in May 1964 the demands for Indian nuclear weapons increased. Piessure 
buih up from the Congress Party and the Opposition, the Piess and the intelligentsia in fa\ our 
of a reconsideration of the Indian stand. 
In September 1965.86 members of ParUament belonging to different political parties 
pleaded with the then Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri for nuclear weapons. Tliey argued 
: "Since the security of this country can no longer be left to the mercy or whims of so called 
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friendly countries, India's survival both as a nation and a democracy casts a duty on the 
government to take an iitmiediate decision to develop our own nuclear weapons."^^ 
The ongoing debate in favour of India's nuclear weapons programme in the mid of 
1960s was fiirther electrified by two separate statements made by Dr. Homi Bhabha, the then 
Chairman ofthe Atomic Energy Commission. Upon hearing ofChinese nuclear test, he called 
a press conference and told reporters that India too could produce a nuclear bomb within 
eighteen months, if it so widied.^ ^ A few days later on October 24, 1964 he spoke in detail 
about the costs involved in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. He stated that making a 
bomb isnot a costly affair, one bomb costs $ 350,000 or 17.5 laklisand a stockpile of 50 bombs 
of two megaton would cost around 15 crores of rupees.^ ^ Tliese statements were used b\ Jan 
Sangh and all others who wanted to see India nuclear, to demand loudly the development of 
Indian nuclear capability. 
Bhabha's views about the cost and availability of nuclear bombs would not ha\e 
provoked much controversy in ordinary circumstances. But, in the charged political 
atmosphere of New Delhi, which followed on from China's nuclear test on 16 October |Q04. 
his statements created an immediate stir. Tlieyprovided valuable ammunition for both MPs 
and other politicians who were pressing the govennnent to change its policy of developing 
of nuclear energy for peaceflil puiposes.-' 
File effect of growing demand in favour of India's nuclear weapon on the nev\ Prime 
Minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri was two fold.-^ First, he expressed willingness to develop 
explosive technology in India, albeit for peaceful and constructive puiposes.-' Tlien be 
followed tliis up in early 1965 by agreeing not to rule out the development of nuclear weapons 
in the future.^ * This was a shaip departure fiom the views of his predecessor. Nehru, who. 
shortly before he died, said India would never develop nuclear weapons lutder anv 
circumstances. 
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This shift in policy raises some basic questions regarding capabiUties and mtentions 
of Indian nuclear programme. First, that in 1964, while the pohcy shift had become apparent, 
the changes, if any. had not really materiahsed fiiUy. The second point to note is that a 
retrospective analysis would show that bidian capabiUties in terms of a potential nuclear 
weapon power status were already in existence in the 1960s. If technological and economical 
barriers to proliferation diminidi, the decision whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons 
becomes principally political.^' 
In spite ofthe discouraging approach ofboth the superpowers, enunciated in the non-
proliferation treaty (NPT), to the development and use ofthe peacefiil nuclear explosives by 
the non-nuclear weapon states, India continued its eflForts to develop the peacefiil nuclear 
explosion (PNE). However death of Shastri and Bhabha. the two principal architects of 
Indian nuclear programme, caused a serious setback to India's programme. 
Given Bhabha" s confident prediction, India should have been able to test its first PN E 
by the late 1966 or 1967. But it took nearl> 10 years more for Indian scientists to detonate 
that device. One ail ;ilySt hasgivai two reasons, one >oncenied with technolog>'and other with 
poHcy, for such delay in India's first PNF.'" Firstly, despite Bhabha's ambitious plans. India 
had not yet achieved the necessary technological base to logically pursue Shastri's policy of 
a PNE. Tlie chief obstacles they faced were a shortage of plutonium fiom legitimate, 
unsafeguarded source, and the absence of relevant technology (Tlie Pooniima Reactor) to 
enable them to cany out the theoretical calculations for an explosion. A second reason for 
the delay was the re\ iew of nuclear pohcy earned out by Piime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, 
after the death of Shastri and Bhabha hi 1966. 
Another important factor which caused delay in India's PNE was the ongoing 
negotiations concerning the NPT. '^ India's approach to the NPT and its nuclear pohcy were 
lucidly stated by the Indian representative in the First Coimnittee ofthe General Assembh 
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on 14 May 1968. Referring to the deep and abiding interest of the Government of India in 
disarmament the Indian representative recalled that India has been consistently of the view 
that all nuclear weapons, being weapons of mass destruction, must be completely eliminated 
and pleaded for a wider approach to eUminate nuclear weapons instead of a limited approach 
which had been responsible for increase in the number of nuclear powers from one in 1945 
to five in 1964." India also stressed the desirability of the Great Powers undertaking some 
measures of nuclear disamiament as a prelude to the signing of a non-proliferation treaty. 
Thus Indian adherence to a non-proliferation treaty was linked with the Great powersnuclear 
disarmament. 
It would be luirealistic to expect that such hope could be satisfied, either partly or 
fully, in a continumg era of global confrontation. It would be also altogether naive to beiiex e 
that Indian pohcy makers seriously expected their hopes to be fiilfilled. Stressing great powers 
disamiament as a preconditi(m for its signature to NPT would indicate, therefore, that India 
was preparing the ground for its own ultimate rejection of the NPT in order to presen e all 
its nuclear options including the development of PNE teoiuiology." 
Tlie uncertainty wliich had cast on India's nuclear thinking ended with its final 
rejection to the NPT. Tliis alongwith the sanction given to the Puniima project in 1968. once 
again reaffinriedthe Shastri-Bhabha line of nuclear thinking.^ Poomima reactor, which was 
used by the Indian scientists for the 1974 explosion, went critical in 1972. It was around tins 
time the specific statements wore made on plans for PNE. Tlie then Defence Minister. Jag 
Jivan Ram, on 2 May 1972. told the Lok Sabha that the Atomic Energy Commission was 
studying the technology to conduct undergromid nuclear explosion for peacefiil purj)oses ' 
Earher in September 1971. the Chainnan of India AEC announced at the fourth Atoms for 
Peace Conference that India had been working, on a top priority basis, m the field of nuclear 
explosive engineering for peaceful purposes. ' Tliis line of thinking was confirmed by Mrs 
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Gandhi in her rephes to a question in Parhament. Speaking in Lok Sabha in 1972, she made 
it clear that the AEC wa s constantly reviewing the progress in the technology of vmderground 
nuclear explosives from both the theoretical and experimental angle, taking into account their 
potential economic benefits.'^  
India finally achieved a breakthrough m its endeavours when it successfiilly conducted 
its first peacefiil nuclear e;q)eriment at Pokharau in Rajasthan on 18 May 1974. It was a 
culmination of India' s nuclear energy efforts and it opened up the possibihties of deriving the 
economic benefits of peacefixl nuclear explosives. '* Tlie explosion has been acclaimed as the 
most significant event in the history of Indian science, for, it was "truly contained" and 
"surprisingly clean". The real achievement was that the science of handling toxic materials 
like plutonium had been mastered by the Indian scientists. A notable feature of the explosion 
was that India was the first country to explode a nuclear device underground in its inaugural 
detonation, flie other five nuclear powers could do it after three to ten years of their first 
explosion.'' 
Although the Government of India took great care to describe the explosion as 
"peacefiil" and reiterated its "strong opposition to military use of nuclear explosions". 
Pokharan symbolized to the world the emergence of India as a nuclear power.^" Since there 
is no technological difference between a peacefiil and a war-like nuclear explosion. Pokharan 
demonstrated India's capability to make nuclear weapons."" However Indian position has 
been that while the technology involved in the production of the nuclear weapon is the same 
as the one which produces a peacefiil explosive, what matters is its appUcation. Refiiting the 
western criticism to its PNE hidia argued that technology hi itself is not evil, and only for fear 
that poor and developing nations might use it for military puqioses, they should not be denied 
all technology.^ ^ Interestingly, PNE brought India in a unique position - 'a nuclear capable 
power without nuclear weapons'. It gave hidia a detenent capabihty in Asia. By not going 
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in for a weapons programme India legitimized this nuclear capability and also retained the 
diplomatic advantage of non-nuclear weapon power/' 
There has been no substantial change in India's nuclear thinking, except for a brief 
period during Morarji Desai'spremiership, who not only resurrected Nehru's commitment 
that India would never make the bomb, but also said that Pokharan was a mistake and took 
the decision that there would be no more secret explosions as long as he was Prime Minister ^ 
The interim government headed by Charan Singh, which had a brief existence after the 
collapse of the Janata coahtion appeared more sympatlietic to the pro-bomb lobby/' Wlien 
Mrs. Gaudlii was reelected as Prime Minister m 1980 slie reiterated the Indian commitment 
to peacefiil use of nuclear energy. 
hi 1994, the then Indian Prime Minister Narashimha Rao also declared that India's 
nuclear poUcy w ould not change. He said that in view of Pakistan having acquired nuclear 
weapons capability suggestion to restrict India's nuclear option would be 'tuiacceptable and 
unreaHstic."^" He further said that India had always advocated peacefiil uses ofnuclear energ> 
and continued to believe that non-proliferation measures must be universal. comprehensi\ e 
and non-discriminatoi7, within a given time frame. He also rejected BJP's demand for India 
turning into nuclear nation. He said that "somebody wants to indulge in one upmanship and 
mislead the people. Tliese are weapons of mass destruction. You don't play around with 
them.'^' 
Current Capability and Status : In April 94, when asked about India's nuclear status. AEC 
Ch aimiaii R. Chidambaram said : "Let me just say that we have built up an extra-ordinaiy 
range of know-how and expertise on all aspects ofnuclear technology. Tliere is now nothing 
India cannot do. "** Most western experts also concede that India'snuclear programme had. 
over the years, attained a high degiee of self-sufficiency. It has developed expertise in almost 
all aspects ofthe nuclear science associated with both the generation ofpower and the making 
of weapons-grade fissionable material. 
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Today. India has a broad-based nuclear programme, with dozens of research, 
commercial, fuel and reprocessing facilities located across the country."" It has an ambitious 
commercial nuclear power construction programme. India currently operatesnine commercial 
power plants (only four ofwiiich are safeguarded) generating 1,720 megawatts; it hasflirther 
seven under construction and firmplans for an additional ten units, none ofwhich will be under 
safeguards.'" It has two plants reprocessing spent fuel with plutonium as a by product, both 
near bombay. A third, larger plant near Madras is scheduled to be opened shortly. It also lias 
two enrichment facihties. 
From a weapons stand pomt, the most important Indian nuclear facilities are the 
Dhriiva and CIRUS Research reactors, which together can produce as much as 88 pounds 
of high quaUty plutonium every year - enough for eight nuclear bombs. -' It was estimated in 
a 1993 SIPRI pubhcation that India would have had sufficient weapons grade plutonium 
already separated to enable it to produce 58 nuclear weapons of the kind that w ere dropped 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the end of 1991. It also estimated that by the end of 1995. 
India would have the potential to accumulate up to 85 weapons.'- Earlier, 1992 repoil of C1A 
said India could assemble 25 nuclear weapons within days. Western experts argue that India 
would not have invested so much energy and flmdiiig in its ballistic missile programme if it 
did not have a blueprint to develop nuclear weapons. 
India's reprocessing capability is also set to expand significantly. Albright. Berkhout. 
and Walker estknated that PREFRE (one of the reprocessing facilities near Boinba>) alone 
could separate between 500 and 1.500 kg of' leactor grade" plutonium in the remainder of 
1990s, while Kalpakkam near Madras wliich is operational since 1994 - can be process 150 
tons of ^ent fuel per year. The latter could yield about 525 kg of reactor-grade plutonium 
per year, or a total of 2,625 kg by the end of the centui-y, more than sufficient in itself for the 
2.000 kg needed for the breeder reactor scheduled to go on stream in 2005." 
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India necessarily does not need a new nuclear test in order to emerge as full-fledged 
nuclear power. India s skills in computation and software may eventually enable it to "bench 
test" or "cold test" any nuclear device in the same way that Israel did in order to build up its 
substantial arsenal. Tliere is some evidence to suggest that India has developed a prompt burst 
reactor that could assist it's weapon design. Albright and Hibbs maintain that data obtained 
from the 1974 test could also have been used to miniaturize the design, making it easier to 
deploy on attack aircraft and perhaps on missiles.'^ 
India, in addition to allegedly possessing nuclear weapons has acquired deliven 
capability as well. India has planned the development of wide-ranges of missiles under its 
hitegrated Guided Missile Piogrammes, the most important being Pr/Z/nv. surface to surface 
missile witli range of 250 km, and a payload of one tomie; and the Ag?ii Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 1500 to 2000 km. While Agnl is seen by Indian 
militai-y planners as an essential component of a nuclear detenent against China, the Pritlni 
has been designed as a battle field weapon against Pakistan. In addition, India has test fired 
a sophisticated anti-tank missile. Nag, and a surface to air missile (SAM) Aksii. 
2. Pakiatan's Nuclear Development 
Pakistan's nuclear history reveals an evolving patteni of rapid, dedicated nuclear 
dexelopment encompassing developnients of both plutonium and eiuiched uranium bomb 
routes to proliferation but these developments are not phasal, detenninistic or ine\ itabie 
Pakistani nuclear actixities and its nuclear posture also reveal a sensitivity, indeed a 
vuhierability to the attitudes and style of its political leadership; to constraints derived from 
Pakistan's limited industrial base and external supply conditions; and finally to the impact of 
the regional strategic en\ ironment and of domestic public opinion. Thus evolving domestic 
and (regional) international settings have an impact on the lines of development of Pakistan's 
nuclear capabilities, and its incentives and disincentives. 
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Many analysts have mistakenly argued that Pakistan's nuclear programme has 
emanated "solely as a reaction to India's nuclear activities." Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a 
Pakistani analyst has argued that "Pakistan' s nuclear choices directly or indirectly Unked with 
the developments in the region; more specially the India nuclear policy."'" Ashok Kapur. 
however, in his study has revealed that the anti-India orientation has not always been of 
primary importance in Pakistani nuclear activities." It was Bhutto who gave an anti-India 
stance to Pakistani's nuclear weapon programme in his diplomacy to build Islamic links and 
to broaden the base of Pakistan's security. It would be erroneous to think that Pakistan 
developednuclearambitionsonly after hidia'stest explosion. Pakistan'snuclear programme 
infact, had an independent origin and hidia's explosion only worked as catalytic agent in 
intensifying its efforts in pursuit of a nuclear bomb. As far back as 1965 Bhutto had said : "If 
India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our 
own. We haveno aUeniative". At that stage India wasnot even thinking ofnuclear explosion. 
Akhtar Ali, however, blames the Indian "bomb lobby" for "popularising the view that 
Pakistan'snuclear effon anlidatesthat of India, that it was an independent one and that it was 
not a consequence of India's nuclear activities".-" 
Tims there isno doubt that Pakistan'snuclearweaponprogranunehadan indepc dent 
origin prior to 1974. However, tliere can alsi) be no two opinions about the fact tliat it 
accelerated its nuclear weapons programme after the myopic decision of India to conduct a 
nuclear explosion called PNE in 1974. It actually provided Pakistan a diplomatic ploy to pass 
on the responsibility for the acti\ ization of its nuclear weapons programme to India. 
Several factors have been identified which attributed to the Pakistani nucleai 
development. According to an Indian defence analyst'" Pakistan has been tiding in vahi to use 
its clandestme nuclear weapon programme for three purposes. At the core is an attempt to 
avenge the humihatiou of 1971 and blunt India's natural advamage based on its size and 
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Stature. The second objective is to use the nuclear card in stocking low intensity conflicts in 
India and 'bleed Bharat slowly. This prong was skilfiilly exploited by Pakistan from 1986 
onwards when its rudimentary nuclear capability emboldened it to step up support to militants 
in Kashmir and Punjab. Finally Pakistan has been trying in vain to link the nuclear issue with 
Kashmir, thereby attracting global attention. 
Pakistan uses sustained increase in the nuclear weapon prograimne as a bargaining 
tool, wliich probably would increase Pakistan's bargaining power so asto mduce India tojoin 
a mutually buiding agreement against the production of nuclear weapons, strengthen its 
position in any fixture arms control and disarmament talk involving India. It at the same time 
is aware that it can not sustain financially a nuclear arms race with India. 
As for Pakistan'sprogramme, the first step was taken m 1953 when an Atomic Energy 
Comicil (AEC) was set up under the chairmanship of Dr. Nazir Ahmed. Tlie cominittee was 
entrusted with the following tasks : (i) the survey of radio-active minerals; (ii) working out 
a plan for the establishment of an institute of Atomic Energy in Pakistan: and (iii) making 
recommendations on aU matters connected with the utilization of atomic energy.'" 
Here one thing is important to note that the simulation for Pakistan's first mo\ e to 
develop nuclear energy came not fiom Pakistan's domestic or regional (fear of India) 
imperatives. Hie simulation lay with an hiteniational event, namely President Eisenhower"s 
atoms for peace proposal wliich was announced in December 1953. Under this programme 
several hundred Pakistani scientists received training andthe US govt, gaveto Pakistan about 
70,000 items of iufonnation about atomic energy which was a boost to the atomic energ\ 
constituency in Pakistan. 
However, it was in 1954, the Goveniment College at Lahore established the high 
tension and nuclear research laboratoryto provide research facilities topostgraduate students 
in the physics department at the college. Tliis was the first attempt to bring the atom to 
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Pakistan as well as to train atomic scientists, engineers and technicians. Although this facility 
is not known to have a military purpose it is significant that as early as 1960, according to 
a report by a Pakistani speciaHst, popular question by the non-speciaUsts was: '\vhen will you 
give Pakistan her first nuclear bomb ?'•*' 
Tlie Atomic Energy Committee was upgraded to the Pakistani Atomic Energy 
Commission (PAEC) in 1956. The new PAEC had a reahstic mandate. Pakistan was to plan 
and to develop "peaceful uses of atomic energy with special referenceto survey, procurement 
and disposal of radioactive materials; planning and estabHshment of Atomic Energy and 
Nucleai Research Institute, installation of Research and Power Reactors, negotiations with 
International Atomic Energy bodies, selection and training ofpersonnel, apphcation of radio-
isotopes to agriculture, health, industry etc." 
Although urgent attention was given to the establishment of a research reactor for 
fundamental and applied research, the training ofpersonnel and the production of radio-
isotopes for peaceful uses. In accordance with Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and 
Teclinology(l'INS 11: <'H) and a r, search rcactorwas subsequently set up in 1963. Ho\vc\er. 
this reactor went critical only in 1965 and started producing radioisotopes in October I ''6^. 
Tliis reactor was supplied by the US and it operates under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan al.so 
acquired a laboratoiy scale reprocessing plant {l>ot cell) which became operational in the 
1960s. It had an insignificant output but it was useful for training Pakistani technicians in the 
nuclear field."' 
Hie nature ofPa'sistani nuclear development activiries earned out during the regime 
of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan clearly pointed to the direction of peaceftil use of nuclear 
energy. Tlie CANDU type nuclear power plant Pakistan had acquired was no doubt meant 
for civil puiposes of electricity generation, but a mihtary by-product had been buih into it so 
that the fiiel used in the plant could be reprocessed to obtain plutonium. However, under 
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Bhutto, Pakistani nuclear thinking underwent a significant shift. The shift related to the non-
peacefiil uses of atomic energy. Overtly, there was stress on nuclear development for peaceful 
purposes, but underlying motivations had undergone transformation, i.e, aimed to develop 
nuclear weapons. The motivation was reinforced by the Indian nuclear test. Overt and covert 
eflForts were made to build up a nuclear weapons capability and the nuclear pohcy assumed 
the character of a calculated ambiguity. 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was infact the chief architect of Pakistan's nuclear policy and its 
nuclear programme. Single handed and with great determination, he built up the nuclear 
programme from ahnost scratch to a viable deterrent capability. Bhutto himself claimed in 
his death-cell testament that wlieu he took charge of the PAEC it was no more than a 
"signboard" Bhutto stated "I put ray entire \itality behind the task of acquiring nuclear 
capability for my country."^ Bhutto was directly or indirectly associated with Pakistan's 
nuclear programme from October I958to Jul\ IQ 77, a span ofniueteen years. Bhuttojoined 
the cabinet of Gen A\vb Khan in 1958 and except for a gap of four years (1967-71). as 
Minister for Fuel, Power and Naitual Resources and Foreign Minister, and later as Pi 'sident 
and Prime Minister, iiis contribution to the Pakistani nuclear programme was significant 
Under Bhotto'^ leadership Pakistan's first nuclear power plant - the Karachi Nuclear 
I'ower Project (KANUPP). having a capacity of 137 MW and located 15 miles west of 
Karachi at Paradise Point on the Buleji Coast, was completed in 1972. Tliis IAEA safeguard 
plant w as purchased from Canada and it received enriched uranium fiiel from Canada and 
hea\> water fioni the USA. Canada also granted a soft loan of $ 23 million and a credit of 
another $ 24 million to coverthe foreign exchange costs of this plant. Japan provided a credit 
of $ 3.6 milhon for turbo-generator. Canada abrogated its nuclear cooperation agreement 
with Pakistan in December 1976 because of Pakistan's refiisal to agree to fiill scope 
safeguards. However IAEA safeguards continue to apply. 
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The PAEC - IAEA joint study had revealed hi 1973 that Pakistan would require eight 
600 MW nuclear power unhs between 1982 and 1990 and nme 600 MW and seven 800 MW 
nuclearpower unitsbetween 1990 and 2000. In the Ught ofthese findings Pakistan formulated 
a 25 year grandiose plan to construct 24 nuclear power plants to form an integrated nuclear 
complex. Under its first 12 year projected plan, Pakistan was to launch four big projects and 
some smaller ones. The Chashma Nuclear Power Project was first of the four big projects 
to be launched. Under Chasma project, a 600 MW nuclear power plant of the CANDU type 
was to be installed on the bank of the Indus river near the Chashma bairage in Mianwali 
District. Tliere was also provision of a spent fuel reprocessing plant and a heavy water plant. 
Tlie plant was to have an annual production capacity of 20 tons of fixel to feed the Karachi 
Nuclear Power Plant."' 
Pakistan began negotiations forChashma plant and an agreement was concluded after 
three years of negotiations in 1976 with a French fimi SGN. Tlie Chashma project, hov\e\ er. 
ran into rough weathei. The Indian test and other developments had meanwhile set in motion 
new tliinking on maueis of proliftiations. flie London meei .ig of the Nuclear Supplier 
countries took a ne^ ^ l().>k at export of nucleai technology and materials. Tlie United States 
brought pressure on both France and Pakistan to abandon the Chashma project. France 
refused to do so and Pakistan could not be influenced by the offer of conventional arms. It 
was only af^ ei the US presented the evidence to France ofPakistani intention ofusing the plant 
fo'- weaponspuipose that the latter heeded the US pressure. By mid-1977 France had slow ed 
down on the contract and in 1978 abandoned it completely.'"' 
French technicians, however, worked at Chashma upto 1979 and 95 percent of the 
blueprints concerning reprocessing were transfeired by the SGN to Pakistani authorities 
Reportedly no ' sensitixe" equipment such as rod cutting machine was supphed. It was also 
reported that Pakistan had invested PRs 67 crore in civil works and plant structure by the time 
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the French yielded to American demands, and, ahhougli a firm contract had been entered into. 
the Pakistanis were left to pursue the matter of nuclear power more or less alone. 
General Zia, who pursued Bhutto's nuclear plans, referred to US eflPorts "to prevent 
us from making bomb even though we have no such intention if we wanted to. no 
body can stop us anyway". He was detennined to acquire nuclear technology for Pakistan, 
and that he had "aUemative" for this, if the French failed. The Pak Minister of Science and 
Technology Ahmad Choudliary, echoed the same confidence in October 1978 wlien he said 
that he would not be helpless in case the reprocessing plant was denied to it. "Pakistan 
possesses scientific knowledge, expertise and fonnulae about atomic power and nuclear 
reprocessing plant", he said.''^  Angered by what it considered duplicity on the part ofits allies. 
Islamabad launched an all-out dri\ e to obtain the necessary technology and know-how to 
develop its own facility. Calling upon its citizens abroad to assist in this endeavour, a number 
of well-placed indixiduals were recruited to secure the necessaiy tools and blueprints. 
Despite the denial ofnucleartechiiology by its chief nuclear collaborators. Pakistan's 
niic'ear programme continued unimpeded. With its plans to produce plutonium st\inied. 
Pakistan decided to follow an alternative route of constructing its own gas-cent' ifuae 
uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. Tliis plant was almost entirely built \ia malleable 
countries and the nuclear black market, t he Pakistani plant at Dera Ghazi Klian. which 
nianufactm es the uranium liexafluoride feed for Kahuta. was also shipped between 1 ^77-80 
by a Gemian finu CES Kahhoff 
Tlie uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta was entirely under super\ision of Abdul 
Qadir Khan, who retunied to Pakistan in December 1975. Dr. Khan, a Gennan trained 
Pakistani metallurgist, had worked with FDO in the Netherlands. It was through him that 
Pakistan was able to gain access to uranium enrichment technology. A report prepared b\ 
the Dutch govenmient confirms that he was able to procure all relevant information and 
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documents, including blueprints of the URENCO gas centrifuge enrichment plant, and a list 
of hundred odd sub-contractors in Europe who could provide the requisite assemblies."'^  
Moreover Dr. Klian's approach to acquire nuclear technology was innovative He 
favoured to get bits and pieces (components) of enrichment technology, and equipment from 
small, high technology Western firms who dealt with individual components; to bring the 
components together so as to achieve mastery over tiie enrichment cycle-from acquisition 
of yellow cake, gassification/sohdification units and centrifiigesto their operation; and to do 
the design work and the assembly of imported components in Pakistan by Pakistanis with 
some foregin technological assistance by selected foreign persomiel from Europe and Noilh 
America. This approach was effective in establishing the centrifuge plants at Kahuta and 
Sihala."" 
Western authors who have been trying to chase Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
programme admit that tracking Pakistani purchases was diflficuU detective work Flie 
purchaser's expert handling of secret purchases and their daring and expert actions alwa\ s 
placed them one step ahead ofthe foreign detective and secret agencies deployed to stop the 
supply of nuclear materials to Pakistan. 
Under Piesident Zia Pakistan constructed a reprocessing plant capable of extracting 
10 to 20 kg of plutonium per year in accordance with the design ofthe French Plant. Both 
French finn SGN. and Fielgiaii finn Belgo-Nucleaire. rendered technical assistance in 
rephcation. Tlie plant undenvent cold test in 1982. h is believed to be not in operation. Iliis 
facility is known as "New Laboratories" near PINSTECT and is not under safeguards. 
Pakistan also reported to ha\e constmcted a heav>'water plant at Muhan with a production 
capacity of 13 metric tons. It became operational in 1^80. Belgo-Nucleaire was reported to 
have rendered technical assistance.^" 
The crux ofthe enrichment process is hexafluoridation. A Hexafluoridation plant was 
designed to convert yellow cake (natural uranium) into Hexafluoride. Tliis plant was set up 
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at Dera Ghazi Khan in 1980 with a production capacity of about 200 metric tons of 
hexafluorideper year. In setting up this plant Pakistan sought the assistance of West German 
firm CFS Kalth.^' In 1987 Pakistan also acquired a gasification and sohdification plant fi^ora 
CORA Engineering (Switzerland) for feeding Uranium hexafluoride gas into the centrifuges 
and for transforming it into sohd state after the enrichment process. Itslocation isnot known. 
Its capacity is also not known but it is beheved to be small. There appeared a report in the 
press that Pakistan was erecting another enrichment plant at Goka, about 10 km. from 
Islamabad. This was revealed by Dr. Khan's teacher. Professor Martin Barders of Luexin 
University. After visiting his pupil in Pakistan in 1987, he said it was known as T l^eu 
Building". ^ -
Tlie Pakistanis were also reported to have set up a sophisticated tritium purilving 
plant. Tliis facility is located in a heavily guarded bunker at a military site. 150 south of Raw al 
pindi." It was reported that Pakistan has imported clandestinely a tritium separation plant of 
96 percent purity and relevant technology fiom two West Gennan finns New Technology 
GMBH (MTG) and its associated company PBT.^ ^ 
Any niialysis of Pakistan's nuclear programme reinains incomplete unless proper 
attention ispaid on its connection with China and its Islamic orientation. Chinese technological 
assistance played a pi\ otal role in development ofthe Pakistani nuclear programme. China's 
clandestine assistance to Pakistan predates the nuclear cooperation agreement signed by tlie 
two countries m 1986 and has included the transfer of nuclear bomb designs, collahoration 
in the de\ elopment of gas centrifiiges and possibly of a joint nuclear test. Tlie US intelligence 
reports suggest that a "seismic event" in Xinjiang in May 1983 was a secret nuclear test and 
that a senior Pakistani Government leader attended the event. The official was identified as 
the then Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, triggering speculation that China may have exploded 
a nuclear device for Pakistan. 
75. 
Wliile the China connection affords a speculative area in the context of Pakistan's 
nuclear efforts, there are finner grounds in respect of the Islamic factor. Bhutto's well 
publicised statement: "Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capabiUty. Jewish and Hindu 
civihsation have this capability. Tlie Communist power also possess it. Only the Islamic 
civilization was without it, but that position was about to change"^' has been smgled out as 
the indication of the Islamic orientation of Pakistan's nuclear programme. President Zia 
echoed the same when he said: "China, India, the USSR and Israel possess the atomic arms. 
No Muslim country has any If Pakistan had such a weapon it would reinforce the power of 
the Muslim world.^ ^ Dr. A Q. Khan went even further : "All western countries including 
Israel, are not only Pakistan's enemies but also enemies of Islam All this is part of 
crusades which the Christians and Jews initiated against the Muslims 1,000 years ago. They 
are afraid that if Pakistan makes obvious progress in this (nuclear) field the whole Islamic 
world will stand to benefit,"^^ 
It is not inconceivable that Pakistanis miglit have exploited the cultural and religious 
sentiments for the development of an atom bomb. Nuclear development would certainly 
require consiilerable financial resources and also considerab' : influence in Western miclear 
business to acquire tlie material and equipment. For these, Pakistan's Islamic connection has 
paid rich dividends. 
Current Capability and Status : Pakistan's nuclear capabilitiesunlike India are much more 
modest and recent. Evidence available on Pakistan's nuclear capabilities suggest that 
Pakistan would appear to have obtained the wherewithal to manufacture nuclear weapons 
in the mid-eighties Estimates of the quantities of highly enriched uranium that it could ha\ e 
produced are necessarily speculative, since tliey are based on several variables like number 
and size of centrifuges in position, efficiency of operations; and whether low enriched 
uranium procured from China, which is suspected was used in this operation that would 
abbreviate the time and effort required for the enricluneut process. 
76 
In sharp contrast to India's reticence Pakistan has been quite garrulous m proclaiming 
its nuclear capabilities. For instance. Dr. A.Q. Khan, in early J987, Mormed an Indian 
journalist at the height of the Brasstack crisis, that Pakistan had enriched uranium to 90 
percent for weapons purpose. He fiirther suggested that the USA and the CIA were riglit in 
assuming that Pakistan possesse nuclear weapons.^* Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto also 
stated in an interview that: "Pakistan has acquired the requisite capability for making an atom 
bomb Pakistan camiot abandons its programme unilaterally." The former chief of the 
Pakistan Army, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, who has deservedly earned the nickname 'great 
spiller of beans", b an article declared that: "Pakistan had acquired that requisite nuclear 
capabihty by achieving credible deterrence". ^ ^ He further revealed that two US President s 
certified falsely for three years that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. And more 
recently fonner Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, declared that: "If India dared to attack Azad 
Kashmk it will have to face the Pakistani atom bomb. I declare that Pakistan is in possession 
of an atom bomb.""" 
Tliere is also striking unaiiinilty in the strategic community that Pakistan pos.ses.ses 
the requisite teclmological ability to manufacture and deploy nuclear devices. Altliough 
Pakistan has not yet exploded any lUhlear device it is believed to possess some confidence 
in its technological capabilities in this regard. Significantly, the US President has been unable 
to certify that Pakistan docs not possess a nuclear device since 1990. 
Pakistan's nuclear capability is basically premised on fissile uranium enriched at its 
K ihuta facility, although it has displayed some mterest in using plutonium after establishing 
a reprocessmg plant at "New Lab" in Rawalpindi. Kahuta began manufacturing weapons-
usable enriched uranium in 1986. Tlie number of gas centrifuges at the heavily guarded 
Kahuta is not known. According to one estimate, the plant could produce enougli highl> 
enriched uranium for two to three bombs aiumally. Accordhig to Senator Alan Pakistan s 
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Kahuta enrichment facility had the capabiUty to produce about 45 kgs. of highly enriched 
uranium, and was being expanded to an annual capacity of between 90 to 120 Rgs/*' Around 
15 to 25 kgs. of higlily enriched uranium are needed to manufacture a nuclear fission device 
of 15-20 kilotons Hirosliima type lethaUty. An American estimated that Pakistan had 
established the manufacturing capabihty to produce 5 to 6 bomb quanthies of enriched 
uranium in 1985. As per the estimates of the SIPRI, by 1992 Pakistan had enriched uraniuin 
sufficient for 6 to 1(* bombs." 
Pakistan's only commercial nuclear power reactor, the 125 MW KANl 'P Reactor, 
and the tiny PARR Research Reactor are under lAFA safeguards. Iliis has s]5uned 
speculation that Pakistan may be building an unsafeguarded reactor. At present Pakistan is 
reported to have produced between iOO and 200 kilograms of weapon grade iiranuun. Tliis 
material is estimated to be enough to produce 6 to 13 nuclear explosive devices. 
Besides its luiclear programme Pakistan has also developed a credible delix en 
system. In addition to ha\ ing a variety of nuclear-capable aircraft Pakistan has sought to 
develop ballistic missile capabilities. In 1989, Pakistan reported testingof two short aiige 
surface-to-surface missiles, the 50 niiie Hatf-l and 185-mile Hotf-2; there are now signs that 
Pakistan may be working on a longer-range ballistic missile. Tlie Hafftest suiprised anlavsts 
because, until .he mid-1980s. Pakistan's missile capabilities were Unihed to launcliing 
elementaiy rounding rockets. 
In the light of what is known about Pakistan's general technological base, it is unlikeK 
that tliese missiles were indigenously designed as claimed. Active China assistance is. 
therefore, suspected. Tliese doubts were coniiiined by Chhia's transfer of items relating to 
its 300 km range M-/J missiles and then" associated technology m early 1993. despite 
strenuous US objection. With Imall pay-l^djprp^"§'fi^-// and Haff-2 could reach New Delhi 
and Bombay. / * ^  
/ * ' -. ;.. ' "^  
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C. The United States and Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand-off 
The US nuclear policy has majestically been structured on the premise of two-fold 
objectives : preventing regional states from emerging as new centres of threat by retarding 
the spread of nuclear weapons, and to develop non-military mechanism including diplomatic 
means for the nuclear crisis management. The key factor that shapes and articulates the US 
pohcy is safeguarding its core national interests—security, economic and technological 
predominance and also maintaining its liberal democratic and cultural values. With the end 
of Cold War the US has shown a marked interest in nuclear non-proliferation and has placed 
emphasis on strengthening global non-proliferation regimes and on increasing its scope for 
action in defence of these regimes. Such actions include increased transparency, intnisi\e 
inspections, sanctions and even military action if necessary. 
Today, when long standing holdouts Uke China nnd France ha\ e finally come into 
NPT's fold, countries like Argentina, Brazil ami South Africa have reniimced tlieir nuclear 
option and North Korea has been virtually denied the right to invoke the withdrawal 
provi'ion.s. countries like India, Pakistan and Israel have cleariy einer; cd as the foremost 
targets of non proliferation. 
Tlie US non-proliferation policy has evolved throii^ih four main stages : the post war 
security policy that was based oninonopoHstic control by the United States; the liberal policy 
ushered in through the "Atom for Peace" pohcy of President Eisenhower; the polic\ of 
control through safegn ards sponsored by the nuclear weapons powers through the NPT and; 
fourth the creation of suppHer policy following the challenge, posed to ' PT.**' 
Tlie US non-proliferation poHcy from its very beginnuiti. has been to restrict not onh 
the development of nuclear weapon technology but also the spread of civihan nuclear 
technology as such, to mamtain its nuclear monopoly and to prevent the monolithic fioni 
attainuig nuclear weapon capability. During the Worid War II the United States kept the 
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Soviet Union out of the scientific collaboration that had specific military objective. Under the 
Qubee agreement of September 1943, the US alongwith Britain and Canada decided not to 
communicate any information (related to nucleartechnology)to third parties without mutual 
consent. Soon after exploding the nuclear device in July 1945 the US policy makers decided 
on a perfect non-proliferation policy through control ofthe indispensable teclmical ingredients 
of any nuclear eflFort-know how and Uranium.*" Tliis all was done througli the Baruch Plan 
of 1946. 
But the US policy did not succeed. The Soviet Union sensed the real moti\ ation 
underlying the plan and not only rejected it outright but much to the US dismay it carried out 
its fiist nuclear explosion in 1949 breaking down the nuclear monopoly ofthe USA. Tlie 
realization by the US that its nuclear monopoly or supremacy had ended, the Soviet 
acquisition of strategic detenent capabiUty and the reduction in the international tension 
following the death of Stalin the United States made two significant change in its nucle;n 
j)oUcy. First, it embarked upon conducting a series of nuclear tests to improve, upgrade and 
strengthen nuclear weapons system as security and defence measui .-s against the So\iet 
threats. And secondly, now it adopted a more modest and realistic nuclear poHcy. 
On December 5, 1^>3, President Eisenhower delivered liis famous ''Atoms for 
Peace" address heralding a new liberal approach by his country. Since tli .'n the US non-
proliferation policy has been structured on three basic pillars : a United Nation^ specialised 
agency to promote and watch over civihan uses ol nuclear energy and to alert the world if 
such facilities were being militarised; the Non-Prohferation Treaty of 1968. which bans 
nuclear weapons hi most nations and mcludes promises fiom superpowers to get on with 
disannament; and an agreement among major suppliers (known as the London Suppliers 
Agreement of 1976) to constrain exports of any nuclear materials or technolog> that ha\ e 
raihtar> potential.'' Besides, tlie US has also souglit to complement its global non-
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proliferation approach by supporting the denuclearization of particular states or regions 
through a variety of political, economic and military incentives. These efforts are aimed 
primarily at states that do not fall neatly into the NPT framework, such as India and Pakistan, 
and whose incorporation into that framework miglit raise questions that the United States 
wishes to avoid about the Treaty. 
The American nuclear diplomacy in practice was conceived, developed and articulated 
to chase the Soviet Union whose unpredictable "irrational behaviour" was a source of much 
anxiety to tlie United Slates. Pursuant to this, American nuclear strategists and academics 
worked on abstract theories and doctrines out of exaggerated Soviet threats which in reality 
did not exist. In psychological tenns, the\ were not prepared to take any risk from Soviet 
Union" s strategic threat s or even politicalblufl. So the American strategy during the Cold War 
lieriod was basically structured on ensuring maximum possible security with minimum of risk 
involved 
India's peacefiil nuclear explosion in 1974 reactivated the non-proliferation debate 
in the US. Ilie culmination of which was the passing of a comprehensixe nuclear policy 
legislation -theNuclearNon-prolifei;)tion Act of 1978(NNPA). It wastheniost Loniprehensi\ e 
piece of piihlic legislation dealing wiih nuclear exports enacted since the Atonuc I nerg\ Act 
of 1954. llie Act declares the US poHcy to : 
(i) Actively pursue, through inteniational iniiiativcs. mechanisms for nuclear ' lel .snpph 
assurances and estaiWisIunent of more effective imeniational controls over the transfer 
and use of nuclear materials, equipment and nuclear technology for peacefiil purposes 
in order to prex ent |)roliferation. including the establishment of conmion international 
standards; 
(ii) Take such actions as are required to confinn the rel,abilit> of the US in meeting its 
commitmemtosupplynuclearreactorsandfireltonationsthatadlieretoef^ectiveNon-
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proliferation policies by establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of 
requests for subsequent arrangements and export Ucences; 
(iii) Strongly encourage nations that have not ratified the UPT to do so at the earliest 
possible dates; and 
(iv) Cooperate with foreign nations m identifying and adapting suitable technologies for 
energy production and in particular in identiiying alternative options to aid such nations 
in meeting their energy needs, consistent wdth the economic and material resources of 
those nations and environmental protection.*" 
President Reagan, in liis statement of July 1981 set forth basic elements of his 
admini-miration's pohcy on nuclear non-proUferation and peaceflil nuclear co-operation. 
Tliese include preventing the spread of nuclear explosives to additional coimtries. Tlie 
administration's emphasis was on : 
tlie need to improve regional. iid global stability and reduce motivations that can mo\ e 
countries toward nuclear explosions. 
international co-operation as an essential part of strengthening the non-j)toliferation 
regime. 
the need to restore the US as a reliable nuclear supplier under an effective regime of 
salcguards and non proliferation controls. 
In an effort to reduce the motivations for acquiiing nc lear weapon capabilities, the 
Reagan administration, atleast in theoi-y, sought to include a wide range of diplomatic, 
economic, strategic, security and psychological instmments to achieve the non-proliferation 
goals. 
Wliile it is true that the possibility of a nuclear holocaust has receded with the end of 
the Cold War and the United State.s no longer apprehends a threat to its national security 
interests fiom Russia afler the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibility of a threat 
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emanating froranuclearproliferation by a number ofTliird World countries, including the two 
South Asian nations- India and Pakistan, is being taken seriously by the United States. Wliile 
addressing the UN General Assembly on September 27,1993 President Clinton reemphasized 
that the end of the Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace. He elaborated that 
to create peace structures, it was essential to pursue "new steps to control the materials for 
nuclear weapons. In order to achieve tliis objective, President Clinton declared that he made 
non-proliferation one or'higliest priorities". He said. "One ofour most urgent priorities must 
be attacking the prohferation of weapons of mass destmction, whether they are nuclear, 
chemical or biological, and the balhstic missiles that can ram them down on populations 
hundreds of miles away."''"* 
The US non-proliferation conceni in the post-cold war era may seem genuine hut in 
reality it isnothingbut sustaining the US leadership in this post-cold war worid. Nuclear non-
proliferation has clearly emerged as the top agenda for the US foreign policy which is 
deteniiined to work towards achieving the twin objectives of disaniiing America's nuclear 
adversaries and discouraging its potential nuclear enemies from acquiring such capabilities. 
Infact it is not non-proHferation by itself that has become sucli a favourable conceni of the 
US adiuinistration, rather as Professor Lewis Dunn had said, it was "the discoveiy after the 
199] Gulf War that Iraq was veiy close to acquiring nuclear weapons (that) has. quite 
understandably, brought nuclear non-proliferaticm closer to centre stage."*" 
American sincerity is also doubted on account of the fact that its non-proliferation 
policyhasbeen on a slippeiyslopefordecadesas Smith and ( . Shan feel. Tliesetwo American 
scholars admit that: VJe started with the aim ofpreventing additional states from developing 
weapons. Now, we tolerate several national weapons programmes that are undeclared and 
ha\ e not surfaced througli nuclear tests The United States has compromised its policy by 
acquiesceing in foreign weapons programmes ha\ing an ambiguous status Tliis is prime 
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reason why our policy is failing. The pressing problem now is how to contain and reverse the 
weapons spread that has already occured."^" 
If viewed in the hiiidsiglit, in the US nuclear poUcy of "atoms for peace programme " 
of early 1950s, thiough signuig and advocacy of the NPT, enactment of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act (NNPA-1978) and various other arms export control legislation, the 
conmion theme running through all admmistrations has been the promotion of nuclear non-
proliferation as a central foreign poUcy goal. The US pohcy strategists have been single 
mindedly concentrating theu^ eflforts on preventing horizontal nuclear proHferation while in 
conjunction and cooperation with the former Soviet Union they did little to prevent the 
vertical proliferation. Not only that, the US kept its eyes closed on nuclear programmes of 
some countries like Pakistan and Israel, where its national interests were at stake 
In regard to South Asia, one ofthe c. i dmal principles ofthe US foreign poli^ x luring 
the past few decades has been to deter the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and 
Pakistan, and it has made non-proliferation a central issue in bilateral relations with them. 
Since 1974. successive US administrations have pushed for restraint by both countries, 
utilizing a range of policy tools including diplomatic pressure, the withholding of cooperation, 
embargoes on the export of nuclear technology, and the leverage of US assistance and arms 
sales Infacl the i nited States has sought to oppose proliferation in South Asia through all 
a ailable means at its dispos ' Its goal has been to inhibit the development or acquisition of 
such systems as well as to pi c\ ent their use or threatened use. But much to the US chagrin 
these efforts have failed to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear capability 
Wliy does the United States take interest in Indo-Pak non-proliferation '^  Tliis is 
because the India-Pakistan proliferation dynamics directly impinge on the US Middle Fast 
concerns and interests wbich have nomially been deemed \ ital due to their connection with 
access to Persian Gulf oil. Consequently the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia 
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would have profound implications for US national security interests. 
According to Prof. Stephen P. Cohen", a renowned American expert on South Asia. 
the US non-proliferation interests faU into or touch upon three different areas. First, there are 
purely nuclear-related concerns; these include slowing down or controUiug regional military 
nuclear programnies by stemming or stopping the flow of nuclear materials and technology 
to India and Pakistan, ensuring that they do not aid other states with their nuclear mihtary 
programmes; seeing to it that the South Asian example of creeping proliferation is not 
emulated or admired elsewhere. Second, there are two American strategic/global interests 
associated with regional proliferation. One is containment of Soviet (and eariier Chinese) 
influence in South Asia. Further lookmg ahead to a worid of five great powers( Japan. China, 
the US, the former Soviet Union and the European commmiity - with its two independent 
nuclear systems) it is important to ensure that if regional proUferation occurs it v\ill not 
destabilize what will already be a \eiy complicated global order. Finally, there are a number 
of regional American interests at stake. American poHcy has. since 1947 favoured the 
emergence of a stable and cooperative South Asian Regional System baseH upon India and 
Pakistan coopcr;)tion so that all regional states might better solve their pressing economic and 
development problems. Flie US has a parallel interest with a moderate Islamic Pakistan in 
the Persian Gulf and Middle East. This connection will be endangered if Pakistan acquires 
an overt nuclear weapons capability. 
As stated above, since <^ arly 1970s, the US policy-makers have been endea\oiiring 
to hah nuclear proliferation in South Asia. According to Peter Galbraith"-. a well known 
nuclear expert, the Unhed States resorted to a range ofpoHc\ instmmentsto achievethisgoal 
Tliese instmments are : 
(i) An intensive effort to stop the acquisition by South Asian countries of the technology. 
equijiment. and fi.ssile material for nuclear weapons. This involved consukation and. 
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cooperation with, and the outright jawboning of other nuclear weapons programmers 
(ii) The threat of, or actual use of, sanctions to discourage India and Pakistan fiom 
proceeding with nuclear weapons programmes. Implemented sanctions have included 
the cut off of the United States' economic and mihtary assistance and termination of 
a nuclear supply relationship, 
(iii) Tlie use of incentives to encourage India and Pakistan to remam non-nuclear. To date. 
these incentives have consisted of United States economic and military assistance, 
(iv) Tlie offer of rehable suppUes of nuclear material, equipment and technology of the 
recipient country would accept full scope IAEA safeguards. 
However, the US permissive approach towards Pakistan's nuclear programme is 
often criticised. While it would be an unreasonable proposirion to make that the United States 
fa\ cured the emergence of a nuclear Pakistan but it can also not be denied that Pakistan s 
nuclear programme has gone a cad under the overall patronage of the United .States and its 
tuniing of blind eye lo Pakistan's clandestine weapons programme. Many analysts. e\en 
American too. agree that the US goverament did not take the desired steps to halt Paki.stan's 
nuclear weapons progranmie in time inspire of adequate infoniiation in that regard. On the 
otherhand. the legislative measuresthat could have been taken \\ ere postponed several times 
through nanow interpretations of the legal provisions. 
riie reason behind the US soli line toward Pakistan's nuclear programme was it> 
pressing need during the Afghan crisis. Piof Cohen opines that, when Pakistan's role in 
coiuiiering the Soviet presence in Afghanistan became important, and more high lex el 
attention was diverted to the region, that issue tended to ovenide proliferation concerns (in 
the United States)." Even after the withdrawal ofSoviet forces. Spector writes: "neitherthe 
Bush Admini.stration nor tlie Congres> was prepaicd (o tenrrinate US aid or apply other 
sanctions in an attempt to foice Paki.stan to hah its weapons related nuclear activities". And 
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now US tolerates the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme on account of latter's need to the 
US in its fight against Islamic fiindamentalism and make inroads into Central Asian republics. 
In an article m Washington Post, Senator John Glenn lambasted former Presidents 
Bush and Reagan, for having practised nuclear non-proliferation pohcy 'bordering on 
lawlessness'. He has accused the US government of winking at Pakistan's coutiimed effort 
to build a nuclear explosive device. Critisingthe administration he pomted out that "nine years 
of US assistance had helped Pakistan release funds for its nuclear weapons programme and 
had given it the means for delivering weapons." 
In fact nuclear uon-prohferation goal has often conflicted with other US policy 
objectives in the region and sacrifices its Non-proliferation coals to other objectKes. Most 
notably, the Congress and the executive branch have been uuwiUing over the years to exert 
strong pressure on Pakistan to honour its non-proliferation coumiitments for fear that 
Pakistan would retaliate h\ restrictmg the assistance pipe line to the Afghan Mujahideen. It 
was only after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in Febmaiy 1989, the Bush 
administration invoked the Pi essler Amendment, suspending military and economic assistance 
to Pakistan since October 1990, Hence onemay conclude tliat the war in Afghanistan, ifnol 
encouraged, atleast led to inaction on th part < f the US policy-makers which in tuni allowed 
Pakistan to receive a la rge amount of US niilitaiy and economic assistance and sir lultaneously 
engage in a clandestine nuclear weapons prouranime. 
As far India's programme is coucertied, the United States has little influence. Unlike 
Pakistan, India has never remained the US militaiy ally or strategic partner nor has it ever 
entered into security agreement with America. Partially in response to India's nuclear 
detonation, the Congress passed the Nucleai Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) 
luvokmg this act, the Carter administration had to suspend ahogether the supply of nuclear 
fijel for Tarapur Atomic Power Station aher the expiry of three years grace period in 1981 
87 
By doing so Washington atten^ted to use its leverage with respect to those fuel supply to 
compel Delhitoaccq)tiiill-scope safeguards. However, hidia refused this proposal, accusing 
the US of unilaterally and retroactively trying to rewrite the terms of 1963 Agreement. Tlie 
resulting impasse dominated bilateral relations for five years until the Reagan administration 
agreed in 1982 to let France provide the fuel. 
At another stage the US Congress tried to extend the Pressler Amendment to India 
as the Pakistan lobby in Washington succeeded in persuading the Congressmen to include 
India also. This, however, did not work as the legislative proposal could not be canned 
through in the Senate. And, moreover, the US administration recongnized too well that such 
pressure tactics would not succeed since it did ha\ e no significant clout with India. More 
recently, todia has been pressed to participate in a multilateral conference on non-
proliferation and regional security in South Asia which would have the main agenda of 
pressurizing India and Pakistan to 'cap' their nuclear programmes. 
Besides there has been perceptional difference between India and the USA. Tliey do 
Jiot think in identical tenns about nuclear \ve;ipons, the problem ofproliferation or a number 
of related issues. For India, the issue of non-disciiminatoiy treatment looms large, and tlie 
Indian approach is strongly influenced by its perception about future development in China 
China figures in the Indian security equation to far greater degree than it appears to enter U S 
thinking about region. Although In.iia does not articulate its concerns, but when India 
emphasizes tlie unportance of taking a global approach to nuclear issues, the underlying 
concern is China. 
In the changed circumstances ofthe post Cold War period, the United States believes 
that the spread of nuclear technology and weapons capabihty in an mcreasing number of 
countries would pose a grave threat not only to her own security but to the world as well 
So today the US is in great urgency to bring India and Pakistan into the non-proliferation net 
88 
owing to several factors and developments. These are : 
(i) The US intention to dominate in the post-Cold War unipolar world by blocking 
emerging regional powers from developing nuclear weapons capability, 
(ii) Tlie US concern that South Asia does not export nuclear and missile capability to Iran 
and other Gulf and South West Asian countries. This development will not only enhance 
the power of India and Pakistan but also go against the key strategic interest of the US 
i.e., the oil resources of the region, 
(iii) The US concern at India's rapid development in the nuclear and missile field that has 
given the latter a degree of self-sufficiency. India has crossed important thresholds and 
acquired extra-ordinaiy range of capabilities m nuclear technolog>'. 
(i\) South Asia, that had witnessed three wars between India and Pakistan, is perceived the 
most hkely area of the world to explode and wage a nuclear war in the next five years "^  
Tlie recent US report on Progress Toward Regional Non-ProHferation in South Asia 
has argued that "! etention of a nuclear weapons option and the acquisition ofbalHstic missile 
deliveiy systems, undeiniine. ,!0t strengthen tlie abilit\ of India and Pakistan to meet their 
security requirements. Die short run militaiy advantage of such weapons should not blind 
India and Pakistan to the possible cost in long term security." Outlining the US objectives ilie 
Repoi further states. "Tlie US seeksto combat nuclear, chemical and biologic il weapon and 
ballistic missile prolifei ation in South Asia and to preclude either a nuclear or missile arms 
race. Our objective is first to cap then reduce and finally eliminate tlie possession of weapons 
of mass destmction and their means of deliveiy."'^ 
To achieve his administration's non-proliferation goal outhned above President 
CUnlon has sought to adopt a "multifaceted approach", which uiclude "comprehensive ban 
on nuclear testmg, ban on production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and 
strengthening the principles of the MTCR." While touching on the threat of the development 
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of nuclear weapons, both in India and Pakistan, John R. Malott, Deputy Assistant Secretaiy 
of State for South Asian Affairs, in his speech before the Indian audience on May 19, 1993. 
remarked that the US will pursue a comprehensive incremental and long term approach to 
deal this issue.'"' 
American non-proUferation poUcy has lately appreciated the imperative need to 
defuse regional tensions which Ue at the heart of the search for nuclear arms by adversary 
nations. An effort has consequently been made to help create a climate in which the sense of 
security of both India and Pakistan is enhanced through tension reduction, confidence 
building and anns control measures and where both the countries perceive distinct advantages 
in rejecting nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems, and recognize the 
disadvantages inherent in their possession. 
Cunently America has shown more interest in encouraging direct high level Indo-
Pakistan bilateral negotiations on regional security and non-proHferation to defiise the 
nuclear crisis situation in the subcontinent. For this the Clinton administration has urged both 
the countiies lo resolve the Kashmir problem through bilateral negotiations as envisaged in 
the Simla Agreement. In early May 1994, the administration has warned Pakistan not to link 
the Kashmir issue with the nucleai problem. Visits of Assistant Secretaiy of State. Robin 
Raphel and Deputy Secretar> of State, Talbott to India and Pakistan were exercises in I)S 
diplomatic initi fives to help ease tension between !ndia and Pakistan. But neither India nor 
Pakistan has been lulled into the US "quiet diplomacy". New Delhi made it abundantK clear 
to these officials that it would neither sign the NPT nor would it accept the proposal of 
converting South Asia into a nuclear weapon free zone. In Islamabad, Taibotts efforts to 
make Pakistan agree tc capping its nuclear programme did not yield positive result. Althougli 
Benazir Bhutto obliquely agreed that Pakistan would not advance finlher its nuclear 
programme, she refused to make Pakistani nuclear facilities to open US verificatjon 
miilaterally. 
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Tlie United States also encouraged India and Pakistan to join a multilateral 
conference on non-proliferation that will include the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council and probably Japan and Germany as well. Washington also engages these 
states to undertake bilateral Non-proUferation discussion with India and Pakistan. 
The United States also seeks to inhibit the export of nuclear weapon related 
equipment and technology fi^om other countries to India and Pakistan. Tlie US Under 
Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Lynn Davis, while testifying before a 
Congressional Committee in November 1993 stated that the United States was pursuing a 
policy of V^" sventive diplomacy" in South Asia "that seeks to persuade India and Pakistan 
to fo: \o a ballistic missile arms race that combined with the region's nuclear weapons 
capability could destabilize an already fragile situation.'"' in pursuit of the above objectives, 
the United States has followed a step by step regional based approach which complements 
itsbroaderglobalefforts. As the US Assistant SecretaiyofState for Asia, Robin Raphe), said 
"our approach to baking proliferation and reducing tension in South Asia is flilK 
consistent with our global approach to stopping proliferation.'""* 
Here one thing is worth noting that the three saHcnt features that had continued to 
characterize US nuclear non-proliferation policy diring the Cold War years and that they 
need to be coiTectcd in this promising scenario of the post-Cold War uiclude : (i) US non-
acceptance ofthe inherent linkage between vertical and horizontal proliferation, (ii) ignoring 
the important Ihikage betw een luiclear proliferation and sales of conventional weapons; and 
(ill) US proliferation cone nis having often been compromised for other security concerns 
or strategic inanoeu\res Another great handicap that has all these >ears worked against 
unplementing non-proliferation measureshasbeen the competingnational interest within the 
United States. Othensise what can explam that even while bemg fully aware that Pakistan 
had crossed the fi\e per cent "red-line". Americans have continued to ignore Pakistan's 
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nuclear programme since the 1980s. This was obviously because being obsessed with 
containing the Communists, the Americans were then much more interested m using Pakistan 
as a conduit for aiding the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The situation has not changed since 
then and even today it is the poUtical and security interests that continue to play an important 
role in determining the nature of the US Non-proliferation concerns. 
However, of late the United States has realized that complete nuclear disamiament 
in South Asia may no longer be a feasible poUcy objective and that the technical knowledge 
of nuclear weapon production cannot be reversed. Tlie only workable solution can be the 
lowering of the nuclear weaponry to the level of "minunum deterrence" or what Mikhail 
Gorbachev has tenued as "reasonable sufficiency" or ''defensive defence", or lowering the 
parity for the strategic stability. 
Now the US has set its siglits on amis control and near temi concrete tension 
reduction measures, including nuclear and non-nuclear confidence and security building 
measures to avoid a nuclear war in the region. A Caniegie Study Group paper on "US-Indian 
relations in a changing inteniational environment", has suggested that "instead of pursuing 
the unattainable goal ofseeking to induce India to give up its nuclear option, the United States 
should shift from a focus on non-proliferation in South Asia to a pohcy designed to maintain 
nuclear restraint." Such a policy would seek to fiee/e the stockpile of fissile material, the 
development of militaiy lated nuclear capabilities and the de\elopment, production and 
deployment ofnuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan. Ronald Lehman. Director of the 
US Anns Control and Disanuament Agency feels that although a fi-eeze on the production 
ofbomb grade material m South Asia will not resolve all proliferation problems, it would help 
set the stage for India and Pakistan to walk away from the (nuclear) abyss."*' 
Writing in 1990. Joeck'"" argued that : 'it is possible to identify a pattern of 
cooperative action that stands in contrast to what on the surface has appeared to be 
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competitive arms race. Tliere is a false impression that India and Pakistan are hurtling. 
uncontrolled, toward a nuclear armed confrontation the leaders of both India and 
Pakistan are quite consciously and continuously attempting to prevent that from happening 
Such efforts have persisted for a number of years and despite leadership changes in both 
countries". Infact the optimism of this \iew is bom out of the several confidence building 
measures negotiated by India and Pakistan. For instance in December 1985, both agreed not 
to attack nuclear faciUties on each other's territory, and in the wake of serious tension in May 
1990. India and Pakistan agreed to take a number of confidence building measures whicli 
mclude ; (i) an agreement to provide advance information about any military exercises and 
troop movements along common borders; (ii) estabUshment of a formal line of communication 
(hot hne) between their military commanders; (iii) measures to prevent air-spaceviolations; 
and (iv) an agreement on mutual visits between militaiy delegations. 
A bilateral pact not to attack each other's designated nuclear facilities came into force 
in early 1992 after the two nations exchanged Usts of their installations. In Autumn 1992. 
Pakistan and India agreed to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, 
although they did not agree to institute any verification mechanism. 
Although thc'vc confidence building measures have helped to reduce tensions and 
resolve trouble-some disputesbut have not significantly altered the source of militaiy rivaliy. 
stabilized nuclear security, no; seriously constrained the strategic behaviour of either 
coimtrv'. However, one must not forget that Indian and Pakistan are now on the verge of 
undergoing a learning process. Tlie outcome remains to be seen, but the evidence suggests 
that the risk of nuclear war in South Asia can be controlled with effective apphcation of amis 
control and confidence building measures by India, Pakistan and the United States 
It is extremely unlikely that India and Pakistan will agree to roll back or cap theii 
nuclear programme and should not be expected to do so These programmes are too 
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advanced to be disbanded. Outside pressure is unlikely to change this situation. Tlius. the 
United States should focus itseflForts instead on deterring the overt deployment of nuclear 
weapons and baUistic missiles, blocking a subcontinent arms race and prodding India and 
Pakistan to embrace confidence building measures. 
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Qhttptee - J 
US MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AND 
INDIA'S SECURITY 
Many instruments exist by means of which the great powers create allies. 
Security assistance has become an important instrument in this context. Security 
assistance including arms aid and arms sale, no doubt, has now become an important 
and pivotal sub-system in the existing set of multiple relations among nations. It has 
formed the basis, to a very great extent of the contemporary inteniational power and 
diplomacy. 
However, the military aid diplomacy of the great powers, specially the USA 
not only fomented already existing disputes between many neighbouring countries 
in many cases it even yielded in new problems and disputes. The US military aid 
diplomacy in the Indian subcontinent is a case in point. The US military aid to 
Pakistan has not only been main irritant in bilateral relations between India and the 
USA; it embittered already sullen relations between India and Pakistan. It prc\ented 
the normalization of their relations as the US military aid to Pakistan created great 
security problems for India. Keeping this centrality of \ iew this chapter attempts to 
examine the reasons why the US has been supplying arms to Pakistan and what was 
the latter"s compulsion in striving hard to acquii such sophisticated arms. It also 
endeavours to analyse the implication on India's India's security of Pakistan being armed 
by the USA. 
Military aid is a many sided phenomenon. It covers extensive areas as it 
designed to secure a wide variety of policy objectives. In the post World War II era. 
military aid policies and programmes of the United States have been major elements 
in the diplomacy of alliances and blocs. 
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The term military aid is commonly used in the context of military transaction 
between the donor and recipient countries respectively, whether they are in the form 
of (a) grant/aid (b) credit or (c) cash. The ambiguous nature of various arms 
transactions makes it difficult to define the exact boundaries of these terms. Military 
aid/assistance includes outright gifts of military hardware; sale of select items of 
weapons systems and military equipment at concessional rates; supplies on a no profit 
no loss basis, or at market rates. Military assistance also includes lending or leasing 
of equipment on non-rental or very nominal rental basis. 
Yet other categories of aid are the training of military persoimel of aid 
receiving countries in the donor country; a variant of this is for the donor country 
to establish training centres in the recipient country. Other aspects are the building 
of military-administrative infrastructures such as air fields and roads, port and 
warehousing facilities. More sophisticated forms of aid are reserved generall> for 
countries in the middle level or those who have the ability to negotiate with donors 
otherwise than as dependents would include technological assistance to develop 
their own arms industries. This could be by the sale of designs, process details and 
o l h r manufacturing data a swell as supply ofmachinery and plant for the manufacture 
of particular items of equipment as also in some cases of certain essential semi-
finished material and sub-assemblies. 
The demand and supply of weapons is influenced by national and intemational 
compulsion. Quest for security is an important factor iu every country's national 
objectives. It can be achieved through diplomacy, foreign policy and alliances or 
through a viable defence force, or may be a combination of all these. The perception 
of threat is a vital element of consideration in the recipient's calculation to acquire 
arms. Other important factors are: political pressure, historico-military tradition. 
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inter-service rivalry, modeniizatioii offerees, requirements of these forces, domestic 
and economic conditions, teclinical capability, ability to maintain weapons and 
acquisition of arms to enhance national prestige and to increase its diplomatic 
weightage. 
The second set of variables is contingent upon the international environment 
which influence the decision of the suppliers. The supply of military equipment from 
developed to developing countries is generally recognised to have three basic 
motivations-strategic, political and commercial. The transfer of arms from one 
country to another is itself an expression ofthe state of political relationship between 
the two countries. Unlike in the case of normal commercial relationship transfer of 
arms from one country to another with whom its relationship isnot cordial or at the most 
normal, is not likely. Within the foreign policy framework ofthe donor, its choice 
ofthe strategic areas, countries and bases are important. 
Therefore, countries transfer arms and provide militar>' aid for strategic 
considerations, when they feci that the defence and security ofthe recipient country 
is of vital concern to their own national security. Political consideration led to 
transfer of military equipment to other countries, when it is felt that the political 
developments in these countries will have to be influenced in a particular direction 
by induction of such military equipment and other military support, thougli (here may 
be no security threat to the transferring countries concerned, nor the development 
relating to the security ofthe recipient country may have any direct bearing on that 
ofthe donor country. 
A. Military Aid as an Instrument ofthe U.S. Foreign Policy 
Historically, the US security assistance programme has alw ays been regarded 
by the policy-makers as a significant tool promoting the country's foreign policy 
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objectives. Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 
26,1968, the US Assistant Defence Secretary, Paul Warnke, observed : "our business 
is to use the military sales and military grant programmes to implement the foreign 
policy of the United States. We are not in the business of selling arms or providing 
arms just for the sake of providing arms".' This emphasises the fact that no arms 
transaction-sale, lease or gift is decided upon, except in the context of the donor 
country's foreign policy objectives and goals. 
The issue of security of the US and its allies, preservation of American 
interests globally and the maintenance of its superpower statushave been the corner-
stone of the U.S. foreign policy during the post second World War era. Thus, the 
predominant characteristic of the US military aid has been its support closely linked 
to the Cold Wai issues and the American-Soviet confrontation. During the last fi\ e 
decades, American military and economic assistance totalling $ 390 billion ha\e 
supported over 100 countries in order to presen'e the US foreign policy interest all 
over the world, the core of which was to contain the threat of the Soviet-style 
communism posed to the key allies of the US. Even non-militaiy aid has tended to flow 
to nations that were viewed as counter weights to the expansion of communism. 
The major problem p sed by the military aid programme is the fact that the 
United States becomes embroiled in some bitter, pre-existing disputes America 
provides the aid (atleast theoretically) for the recipient's internal o: external 
security, but it is not v iewed that way b> a neighbouring state that has a major quarrel 
with the recipient power. The classic casehas to do with the long-standing and deeply 
felt animosity between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. As an ally of the United 
States situated close to both (former) Soviet Union and China, Pakistan has received 
a substantial amount of military aid. India has always viewed this with gra\ e 
suspicion as it greatly disturbed the balance of power in the subcontinent. 
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Traditionally, the US goveniment has viewed arras aid and arms sale priniaril\ 
as au instrument of foreign policy to exert regional influence to strengthen alliances. 
and to oppose the expansion of communist power.^ The increasing antagonistic 
relationship between the world's new superpower the USA and the Soviet Union 
(former) - make the American foreign policy grow more and more dominated by the 
fears that Soviet Communism stood poised to sweep over a Europe that had been 
shattered by the war, policy makers in the USA believed that Americas pre-war 
isolationism and the failure of Britain and France to take an early stand against Hitler 
had contributed to the rise of fascism, and they endeavoured to avoid repeating these 
mistakes in dealing with the Soviet Union, a nation that they perceived as being, like 
Nazi Germany, an expansionist totalitarian regime. 
•'Collective security", thus, became the American strategy for defending what 
came to be called the "free world''. In practicethisdoctrine took the form of regional 
alliances for mutual defence against Soviet expansionism and communist supported 
insurrection. The Icar of communist threat, therefore, led the United States to 
bolster collective security with military aid and a massive infiision of economic 
assistance. 
As stated earlier the origin of military assistance as now understood and 
practised could be traced to the needs of US foreign policy. American military aid 
pi ogrammeshave been used in these ways to increase its influence and leverage. This 
perception and understanding of American administration has been reaffirmed as in 
1981. when the secretary of defence, Harold Brown in a report to the Congress 
described the significance of military aid as: "In the present international and 
political-security environment, security assistance serves the American interest by 
strengthening the ability of our allies and friends by assisting other nations in 
meeting their defence needs; we in turn strengthen our own security" ' 
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There is no gainsaying that US does have "vital" economic, political and 
security interests in the various parts of the world towards the mauitenance of the 
equilibrium of power. By means of giving military aid to different countries situated 
in the various quadrants of the globe, which figure in the ambit of American security 
matrix favourably, it ensures its strength through influence. 
There are certain other fi^inge benefits accruing peripherally to the USA from 
these arms transactions. Much of the equipment which goes out ofthe USA is of such 
degree of sophistication that the recipient country is not in a position to handle it on 
its own without the supervision and assistance from the supplier country. This 
provides enough justification for sending out technical support teams to the recipient 
nation. These teams or "task force" might by the virtue of their indispensability. 
exercise efiFective control ofthe combat use to which the weapons are put. Thus the 
United States indirectly exercises a measure of control through its "assistance 
programme". Moreover their "technicians" veiy often alluded to as "attaches" who 
invariably follow a shipment of arms provide an indirect means through which the 
USA exercises considerable control over the military and defence policy of its client 
Thus the immediate outcome to the supplier country in transferring arms is 
that it adds to the military strength of its friends and on the other hand minimize the 
recipient nation's 'ad\crse" orientation or hostile approach toward the supplier 
nation. 
In any case nations especially the superpowers with global commitment and 
interests are secretive about the details ofthe quid pro quo involved in an\ kind of 
aid in the instance if the military aid via 'transfer', the quid pro quo may invoh e and 
entail base facilities, staging posts facilities, overflying rights or similar strategic 
military concessions.^ Infacl the United states does provide official" indication ofthe 
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correlation between arms transfer and its foreign base rights in its financial allocation 
made under military aid programme for 'Basic Rights'. It says that the latter shall 
be provided for i.e. military assistance will be given to all those countries in 
which the United States has access to bases and installations essential to optimal 
deployment of US military strength.' 
However, with the breaking up of the former Soviet Union, end of the Cold 
War, changes in Easteni Europe and the new dynamics in the US domestic, political, 
economic and social scene, a new scenario has emerged. As a result, the framework 
and forces which so far have determined the U.S. foreign policy in general and its 
security assistance programme in particular seemtoha\e assumed shifted dimension 
For the past few years, concerns have been expressed with regard lo ;i long 
overdue need for substantial re-examination and redefinition of its foreign ;iid 
programme. In the words of senator Patrick J. Leahy, ' there must be a substantixe 
bottom-up review of foreign aid in the wake of communism's demise"." Infact 
there is a growing sentiment in the Congress that security assistance has lost its 
strategic rationale now that it is no longer driven by the Cold W a r s imperatixe to 
counter communism. However, there are many in the USA who believe that in the 
changed global premise foreign aid has a new role to play and hence it should take 
new forms. They also feel that it is premature to abandon long-standing U S securit\ 
interests and challenges. This view is shared by hawkish academics and politicians " 
They envision that there can be revival of older threats and there may be new threats 
which may jeopardize the order" that i r S . would like to maintain. 
Even though there were much talks on overhauling the foreign aid programme 
both within the Congress and the Executive, little progress has been made In a 
broader sense, the US foreign aid policy still contains many ofthe same elements that 
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used to characterise it during the Cold War years. Its major outlays are still driven 
by security concern. Military aid accounts for nearly one third of the total $ 1.6 
billion go to countries providing the US with foreign military bases, and Israel, Egypt 
and Pakistan continue to be the major recipients of the US aid. There are, however. 
some new elements too. With the changing global situation, there would be more 
stress on economic aid rather than military aid to Eastern European countries and 
republics of the former Soviet Union to develop their democratic institutions and 
make transition to open market economics. They need 'bread' not 'weapons". 
B. LIS Military Aid to Pakistan 
American interest in Pakistan grew in t he Cold War context. The US foreign 
policy in the post World War II period was almost revolving around single dominant 
objective-the containment of international coimnunism all over the world. And 
military aid did become the significant tool in achieving this foreign policy objecti\ e. 
The United Stales having checked the advance of communism in Europe, was 
now turni' I its attention towards Asia.** India and Pakistan were the two Asian 
countries which could play an important role by allying themselves with the USA in 
its fight against communism In the early years, the American policy-makers showed 
comparatively greater preference for India than to Pakistan primarily because of its 
larger size, industrial potential, and the general impression about India.' But the 
United States was sorely disappointed when Nehru refused to be drawn into the Cold 
War politics and decided to follow the policy of nonalignment. 
Having failed to secure Indian support for its policy of forming a ring around 
communist countries by means of bilateral alliance and regional pacts, the United 
states ultimately turned to Pakistan, a much smaller country than India but which 
orfered a foothold to America ui Asia. Moreover, the strategic location of Pakistan 
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on the door steps of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China was 
considered important. For US military strategists Pakistan represented a centrally 
positioned landing and launching site for aircraft and missile aimed at either Russia 
or China.'" Apart from strategic importance, many Americans thought that it could 
be also used as a link between South East Asia and Middle Eastern defence system 
as the eastern wing of Pakistan (now Bangladesh) formed the western boundary of 
South East Asia. 
They (Americans) must also have perceived the opportunity to them bv the 
dispute between a small Pakistan and its larger neighbour India, to fiirther their aims 
in Asia. Protection ofWesteni oil interests m the Middle East from a potential Soviet 
threat must also have been a factor in American policy in the area. Secretary of state 
John Foster Dulles, therefore, embraced the concept of a pact with Pakistan, despite 
strong opposition from the American Ambassador in Delhi and India's opposition to 
arms aid to Pakistan was also ignored." 
Pakistan's thinking, however, was quite different from that of the USA. It did 
not feel any threat, either ideological or territorial from any of communist powers 
Whatever apprehensions Pakistani leadership had from Chinese and Soviet quarters, 
it was clear that they were not so much because of their being communist countries 
as they seemed to be. but because of their t lose relations with immediate neighbours. 
India and Afghanistan with whom Pakistan had long standing disputes. 
The perceived threat of India has been the main factor in Pakistan's willingness 
to join hands with the USA. India has been the principal preoccupation of Pakistan's 
defence and foreign policies. Its overall weakness and strategic vubierability vis-a-
vis India,'^ the continuance of several disputes in which it accused India of ha\ing 
changed the rule of the game according to its convenience," and lingering memories 
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of partition riots and communal hysteria, have combined to present India as the most 
important threat to its existence and security. This has often loomed large over the 
political horizon of Pakistan'"* and impelled it to seek allies and military aid.'-
Among the varied reasons for the Pakistan government seeking military aid. 
the decisive and most important was to strengthen itself militarily against India." It 
needed modem arms in an appreciable quantity to counterbalance India's power 
position, which Pakistan could not have acquired with its own fmancial resources. 
Pakistani leaders also thought that they could pressurise India to resolve Kashmir 
dispute only from a position of strength. '^  It was this Pakistani outlook and posture 
which led Pakistan to appear pro-West and anti-communist, to give up its erstwhile 
policy of uonalignmeut, seek and accept US military aid. and eventually to join the 
SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). 
Thus, the United States and Pakistan were moving in the same direction for 
different reasons; the United states was guided by its global policy of containing 
international communism; and Pakistan was motivated by problem of national 
security and defence. 
Against this backdrop it was only natural for Pakistan and United States to 
forge a military tic up. And finally on May 19, 1954 after months of intense 
negotiations, Pakistan and United States signed the Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement. It, however, obliged the US to supply Pakistan only "such equipments, 
materials, sei-vices or other assistance as the government of the US may authorize 
in accordance with such conditions and terms as maybe agreed."* It was stipulated 
that Pakistan should not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation and 
that it should use American military aid exclusively for internal security and its 
legitimate self-defence or to participate in the defence of area or in UN collective 
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security arrangements and measures. Pakistan also agreed not to transfer American 
arms received under the agreement to any other country without the prior consent 
of the United States. In short the agreement bound Pakistan to the regional and 
global diplomatic and security objectives of the United States." 
The agreement was a significant landmark in the relations of the United States 
with Pakistan. It inevitably had a profound impact on the relations of the United 
States with India. The US found itself, in a limited but critical sense, on the side of 
division. Far from promoting stability on the subcontinent-frequently proclaimed as 
a vital objective of American policy-the military aid pact intensified dixision. 
encouraged Pakistan and Indian intrasigence in respect of outstanding issue and 
thereby hindered Indo-Pakistani reconciliation. Moreover, instead of acting as a 
bulwark against Soviet expansionism it provided an opening for the entry of Sino-
Soviet influence in the subcontinent.-" The Soviet Union now came out in fiill support 
of India. 
Other political consequences of the pact were the arousal of mistrust in India 
of Pakistani intentions and marked increase in the tensions between the two states 
And no less a person than Nehru gave an authoritatix e expression of the reactions 
of the Government and people of India when he said on March 29. 1956: "Nobody 
here imagines that the Pakistan Government entered into this pact because it 
expected some imminent or distant invasion from So\iet Union. The Pakistani 
newspapers and the statements of responsible people in Pakistan made it perfectly 
clear that they have joined this pact because of India".-' 
The U.S. Mihtary Pact with Pakistan changed the whole context of the 
problems existing between India and Pakistan. The bilateral Indo-Pakistan relations 
now assumed a triangular relationship, with the United States as the third partv. 
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Thus, the military alliance "sharpened Indo-Pak tensions. It became a 
constant factor in the reaction and counteraction which characterized subsequent 
relations between the suspicious neighbours'.^^ According to Selig Harrison, the 
cost of this blundering American decision, which had only a marginal and doubtful 
military advantage was very heavy in political and diplomatic terms to all the three 
parties involved-the United States Pakistan and India.^^ A beginning was, thus, made 
of America's active role in the sub-continent. 
Pakistan'sbilateral treaty with the United States and former's membership of 
SEATO and CENTO made it eligible to receive massive military and economic 
assistance from Washington. According to a document of National Security Council 
(USA) the total value of US mihtary aid programmed for Pakistan during the period 
1950-58 was $ 416.6 million. Items valued at $ 276.4 million had been delivered 
during the period, leaving an undelivered balance as of 30 June 1958 of items worth 
$ 135.2 million.^^And accordingto an estimatebased on statistics published in 1979 
by the comptroller of the Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defence. 
Pakistan could ha\e received $ 273.20 million during the period July 1958-Sept. 
1965, when the United States imposed an embargo on arms deliveries to both 
countries on account of outbreak of 1965 war.^' 
The substantial amount of modern planes and equipment supplied to Pakistan 
by tlu- United States consisted of B 57 Jet Bombeis, F 86 Saber Jets, F 104 
Supersonic star fighters. Sidewinder missiles, transport planes, helicopters and 
supporting equipments and suppHes. They also supplied a super Radar for F 104s. 
an acceleration in the deliveiy of previously programmed M-47 tanks, and two new 
items, anti-tank missiles and 3-130 Turbo-Jets, Cargo Planes. F-140s were delivered 
to Pakistan after General Ayub Khan's return from his tour of Washington in 1969.-" 
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The increase oi US economic aid to Pakistan was also not without military 
implications. It seemed to have been subsidy to the main percentage of the huge war 
machinery which Pakistan had tried to set up during 1954-1964. American economic 
aid to Pakistan until the end of fiscal year 1965, was estimated worth $ 2.5 to 3 
billion." 
The US-Pakistan relations received a serious setback when the former 
announced an embargo on the supply of military equipment to both India and 
Pakistan, in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pak war. The US embargo affected Pakistan more 
than India because of two reasons. Firstly, the Soviet Union had not imposed any 
restrictions on arms supply to India, and secondly, since Pakistan was almost 
dependent upon the US for military hardware, sparepartsand other ammunition. But 
one thing is important to note that inspite of embargo, America continued supplying 
military hardwares to Pakistan through other countries like Iran, Turkey. West 
Germany and Italy.-** 
The embargo, however, did not continue for long. It was partially lifted within 
six months to permit the sale of non-lethal items on cash or credit basis subject to 
a case-by-case review, consisting of spare parts for previously supplied US 
equipments.-'On October 12, 1967 US aid policy was further modified to resume the 
sale of non-lethal arms to both Pakistan and India. 
When the US imposed embargo on arms supply to Pakistan during i 965 Indo-
Pak war, Pakistan became conscious of inherent dangers of a heavy reliance on one 
source of supply of weapons. With the traditional source of supply cut off Pakistan 
looked for new source of arms procurement, which included China, France, Soxiet 
Union (1968-69) and European markets. Pakistan also obtained militaiy hardware 
through Turkey and Iran. 
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In 1969, Pakistan's clamour for more armaments'" got a favourable response 
from thenew US President Richard M. Nixon", who was known as a firm supporter 
of military aid and alliance with Pakistan. Efforts were soon began by Nixon 
Administration to lift the ban on lethal weapons that had been imposed in 1965 '^  
Presumably Nixon had plans of improving relations with China and he wanted to use 
Pakistan as go-between. In 1970 Pakistan was given military hardware worth $ 15.40 
million fi-om the US at a throwaway price, as the market value of these arms was 
estimated to be $ 150 million, probably to save of opposition in the Senate." 
Bangladesh crisis was another test of US-Pakistan alliance. Although an 
embargo was imposed in 1971 by the USA but in March 1973, it returned to the 1967 
policy. USA, however, worsened the situation by sending its task force of the 7th 
fleet into the Bay of Bengal. After considerable deliberation, the State Department 
announced on February 24.1975, the "ending" of the 1971 embargo on weapons 
transfer to Pakistan.'^ 
In the war of 1971 Pakistan had lost a large part of its inilitary equipment 
worth $ 200 million. With its inilitary demoralised and India proving its ascendance 
once again, Bhutto needed American military assistance." Since then Pakistan had 
been striving hard to acquire arms from the USA and other sources. It has not onl\ 
recovered the material which it lost in the war but even had enlarged and strengthened 
its military forces to a record level. With the lifting of the embargo. Pakistan was free 
to get US lethal weapons short of nuclear ones. In 1975. just after lifting the embargo 
the US Defence Department approved sale of 11OA-7 light bombers and it contracted 
with Pakistan worth $ 700 million for military aid. " 
The US-Pakistan relations received a serious setback in April 1979 when the 
US Congress passed the Symington-Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act. 
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which forbade US military and economic assistance to any country engaged in 
acquisition or production of nuclear weapons, Pakistan fell into this forbidden 
category with the result that all military and economic assistance to Pakistan was 
frozen. There was, however, a revival of US interest in security cooperation with 
Pakistan in the wake of downfall of the Shah of Iran and the entry of the Soviet troops 
into Afghanistan in the same year. 
The Afghanistan crisis of 1979 became a turning point for the US-Pakistan 
alliance. Thepast deteriorationin their relationship on account ofPakistan'snuciear 
programme came in for reappraisal. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan towards 
the end of December 1979 brought about a dramatic change in the situation and led 
the American policy makers "rediscover" the strategic importance of Pakistan. The 
Carter Administration emphasized Pakistan's new role as a "frontline state" against 
possible Soviet expansion American scholar Thomas Perry Thornton wrote that 
Pakistan now became "an essential line of defence and an indispensable element of 
any strategy that sought to punish the Soviets for their action"." In its effort to re-
establish close military and security ties with the threatened Pakistani government, 
the Carter Administration even overrode its nuclear concerns, which had inhibited 
it so much in the past. 
The American response towards the Afghan intervention in general and 
towards Pakistan in particular has to be viewed in the wide context of other 
developments in the region. The fall of Shah in Iran, a strong and closest American 
ally in West Asia and Persian gulf, and coming into power of a revolutionary regime 
under AyatoUah Kliomeiui which was extremely critical of the USA whose calls for 
Islamic revolution alarmed the conservative Sunni raonarchs of the Gulf inaugurated 
the crisis. America s political and strategic interests in the Gulf suffered a further 
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setback when the US Embassy personnel were taken hostage in Tehran by supporters 
of Khomeini in November 1979. The spiralling events were coupled by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet action raised the spectre of renewed Soviet 
expansionist strategy in the Middle East and had signalled a change in the strategic 
balance in the region.'* 
All these developments in the region of South West Asia and Persian Gulf 
were a matter of considerable concern to Washington, as its interests and stakes were 
in peril. Thus to contain Soviet expansionism President Carter drafted a strategic 
doctrine, which was dubbed as "Carter Doctrine". The core of the doctrine was a 50 
words declaration: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States 
of America and it will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including militar>' 
force.''' 
On the other hand as a result of Soviet advance, Pakistan which shared 2.400 
km long frontier with Afghanistan felt itself directlv exposed to Soviet military 
pressures because Afghanistan ceased to be a buffer between Pakistan and So\ iet 
Union. Islamabad had now faced a number of security threats, which included the 
threat of possible Afghan and Soviet support for separatist elements among the 
Baluch and Pathan populations of Pakistan, and the influx oi a swelling flood of 
Afghan refugees into Pakistan.^" The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had generated 
fears and apprehensions among many Pakistanis that Mascow, having consolidated 
its position in Afghanistan, would try to extend its influence beyond the Afghan 
borders by using Afghanistan as a spring board to destabilize Pakistan in order to 
fulfil its historic desire of access to a warm water port on the Indian Ocean 
According to Pakistani analyst, given the situation in his country since December 
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1979, Islamabad had faced a three-front threat scenario, viz. an Indian threat, the 
threat from Afghanistan and an internal threat. 
On account of this threat perception it was, therefore, natural for Pakistani 
leaders to endeavour to improve relations with the United States - their erstwhile ally 
and benefactor, which was also planning to assist Pakistan in order to check the 
Soviet move. Convergence of interests, thus, once again brought the USA and 
Pakistan more closer. 
Pakistani leaders, however, had some reservations about the reliability of 
American support because it had let down its ally twice in the past, in 1965 and again 
in 1971 and concern regarding the hypocrisy of the non-proliferation policy of the 
USA. It was also feared that Carter Administration would not be very forthcoming 
in extending strong political and militai'y support to Pakistan in view of its keen 
desire to maintain its friendly relations with India. 
To assuage Pakistan's doubt about the seriousness of US intentions, it 
immediately offered an aid package of $ 400 million. However, much to the US 
chagrin President Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the American aid offer of $ 400 million of 
which only $ 200 million was for military aid, on January 17, 1980 and ridiculed it 
by saying it as mere "peanuts . He felt that the aid package was'terribly disappointing " 
and it could not buy security for Pakistan.^' He added that it was too si sail to be 
effective but large enough to buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union which was 
more influential in the region than the United States.^^ 
The obvious reasons for this rejection were; first, Pakistan found the level 
of aid pledged by the USA insufficient and; second, the USA was still resisting 
Pakistani pressure for formalizing the 1959 security agreement into a treaty."' 
President Zia, infact. thought that the leaders of the United States were in a state of 
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panic after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and that was an opportune 
time for him to extract the maximum commitment from them. 
Contrary to Pakistani view, the White House felt that it was "both substantial 
and responsive to Pakistan's need." Pakistan was urged to accept ' the reality that 
the United States alone can not meet all of Pakistan's requirements".^ The offer of 
$ 400 million, Thornton feels, was perhaps not munificent, but was surely not 
"peanuts" as Zia described it. Furthermore, it was always intended as part of a larger 
package that would draw on contributions from other donors and be supplemented 
by larger American efforts in later fiscal years.^' 
The impasses continued till the last date of Cater Presidency. While Pakistan 
rejected the aid offer, stunned and peeved. Carter would not revise it. And only after 
Reagan coming into power the process of forging a close security relationship with 
Pakistan was given a distinct momentum. Unlike Carter, Reagan was determined to 
challenge the Soviets anywhere in the world and Afghanistan emerged as a major 
trump card in the containment of Soviet power and influence. To the Reagan team, 
countries in strategic locations needed to be supported with military and economic 
aid to deter any aggression against them by the Soviets. Thus in its overriding 
belligerent attitude toward the Soviet Union, Reagan and his team rejected Carter"s 
arms restraints, non-proliferation, and human rights policies. Consistent with this 
li w permissive policy framework, Pakistan emerged as strategically important state. 
With Ronald Reagan coming to power. General Zia "s bargaining position vis-
a-vis the USA impro\ed. He cleverly seized the opportunity of playing on Reagan s 
strong anti-communism to obtain a satisfactory level of military aid for Pakistan. 
Reagan was evidently trying to replace the loss of Iran by converting Pakistan into 
an outpost of the USA's line of frontification on the Persian Gulf region. The resuh 
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was a manifold increase in the US arms and economic aid to Pakistan in the 1980s 
and a substantial bolstering of its defence capabilities, despite the concerns expressed 
by some quarters on the trampling of democracy and human rights by the Zia regime 
and Pakistan's quest for achieving nuclear capability. 
The Reagan administration began to lay the ground work which would 
facilitate the eventual extension of substantial military and economic assistance to 
Pakistan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig urged the Congress to soften the ban 
on aid for countries which were keen to acquire nuclear technology in the larger 
interests of helping a strategically located country which was subject to Soviet 
pressure."*'' To that end, the US Administration proposed to the Congress on March 
19, 1981 that Pakistan should be exempted from the Symington Amendment. Jane 
A. Coon argued that the imposition of a ban on aid by the United States had not truly 
accomplished the anti-proliferation objective of US policy. The sanction had only led 
to "a growing sense of isolation and insecurity in Pakistan."'^' 
The Senate Coniinittee on Foreign Relations voted on May 14, 1981 by 10 
votes to 7 to lift estrictions on aid to Pakistan and approved the Adminsitration 
request for $ 100 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for FY - 1982 and $ 
600,000 for the International Military Training and Education Programme (IMET) 
for Pakistan. 
Several rounds of discussions stretching over six months were held between 
Pakistani and American ofTicials before Pakistan finally accepted the US economic 
and military aid package on September 15, 1981. Previously the United States 
offered a five year $ 2.5 billion package to Pakistan, which was later raised to $ 3 2 
billion beginning with FY-1983.^'' 
The package was divided equally between economic assistance and foreign 
military sales credit guarantees of $ 1.6 billion each. Of the $ 1.6 billion economic 
119 
aid component of the package. $ I billion was in the form of a grant. The remaining 
$ 600 million had a ten year grace period and 20 year repayment period at 2 and 3 
percent interest respectively. The military sales component of $ 1.6 billion carried 
an interest rate of 14 percent with a repayment period of 30 years with a 7-10 years 
grace period on the principal.^" 
The Reagan Administration package was designed in large measure to meet 
Pakistan's air defence needs as a large proportion of the total military credits (some 
$ 1.1 billion) was to go for the acquisition of 40-F16 fighter aircrafts. In addition to 
the F-16s, Pakistani ground and naval forces were also to be modernized. Among the 
items promised by the US were 100 M48A5 tanks, 35 M88AI recovery vehicles. 
20M901, 1-Tow vehicles (together with 1,005 1-Tow missiles), 64 M109 A2 self-
propelled howitzers, 75 Ml98 towed howitzers, and 10 AH-15 attack helicopters. 
Other items which were under discussion included A-10 close support aircraft. 
APCs surface to air missiles, anti aircraft artillery, and new naval ordnance.'" 
It was reported in December 1984 that Pakistan had asked the Reagan 
Administration to be allowed to acquire the E-2C airborne early warning system, 
otherwise known as Hawkeye, to guide its long range F-16 attack bomber. By the 
middle of November 1984 total 25 F-16 aircraft had been delivered to Pakistan. 
Previously the USA was evidently impressed with President Zia-ul Haq's plea for 
more sophisticated weapons system and was examining the request sympathetically. 
However, ui 1985 the Reagan Administration turned down this Pakistani request on 
the basis of a recommendation made by a specific Pentagon team, which visited 
Islamabad to assess the suitability of this aircraft for Pakistan. The team was of the 
view that the Hawkeye-E2C aircraft for early warning border surveillances was not 
suitable for Pakistan." 
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Further on March 24, 1986 the US Administration finally agreed to provide 
Pakistan with another $ 4.02 billion economic and military aid package for 1987-93. 
a 35 percent increase over the existing package but far short of Pakistan's request 
of $ 6.5 billion." The agreement marked the culmination of year long intense 
negotiations between the USA and Pakistan. The two sides announced that the 
package would be at highly concessional terms and US would continue to play an 
important role in Pakistan's defence modernization efforts. The ongoing $ 3.2 billion 
package expired in 1987. 
The US-Pakistan alliance suffered another setback in August 1987 when the 
US authorities arrested a Pakistani bom Canadian citizen Aishad Parvezin Philadelphia 
on charge that he tried to export to Pakistan a special steel alloy that could be used 
in the enrichment of weapons grade uranium. Pakistani officials, however, denied 
any links to the suspect in the case. Earlier in June 1984 another Pakistani Mr. Nazir 
Ahmad was arrested in Houston while trying to smuggle kr>loues electronic 
switches that can trigger luiclear bombs, to Pakistan. 
The United States expressed its serious concern o\ er nuclear issue and said 
that Pakistan needed to take concrete steps to restore its credibility and further 
assurance that it was not trying to develop a nuclear weapon. In the meantime (1985) 
the US Congress had passed a law (Pressler Amendment) that prohibited US aid to 
a nation that possess nuclear weapons. 
The US concern o\ er Paki.^tan's nuclear programme took a serious turn when 
in a surprise move it stalled all its aid to Pakistan till January 15.1988 when the latter 
also refused to allow the inspection of its Kahuta nuclear plant. The two aid 
programmes which had been cut off were the $ 540 million military and economic aid 
and the renewed $ 4.02 billion aid which was to commence from October 1st. Thi.'^  
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was the first concrete action against Pakistan since 1979. 
However, on December 4, 1987 in a complete reversal of its previous action 
the US Congress cleared the $ 4.02 billion military and economic aid package for 
Pakistan. Both the House of Representatives and Senate approved the resumption 
of the aid to Pakistan over the next six years stalled for 3'/2 months since October 
1987, when Pakistan was charged with violating US regulations regarding non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The death of President Zia-ul-Haq in August 1988 and the subsequent 
election of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister, evoked greater US interest in Pakistan. 
Newly elected Republican President George Bush also showed keen interest in 
cooperating with democratic Pakistan. The military after a dozen years of martial 
law, allowed the election to take place and Bhutto to power as a civilian leader. But 
it was clear that military would stay out of politics only as long as it continues to 
recieve a larger chunk of Pakistan's national budget - means US aid and high tech 
US equipment like F-16 fighters and MI tanks. It was believed in Washington that, 
suspending aid to Islamabad might even prompt a military takeover in the name of 
national security.'' 
Keeping in miud all these fact, the United States proposed a large amount of 
$ 626.7 million military economic aid to Pakistan for the FY-1990. This included S 
50 million of development assistance, $ 80 million of PL 480, $ 20 million of 
Economic Support Fund (ESF), $ 240 million of Foreign Military Sales grant, a one 
million dollar IMET programme, as well as $ 5.7 million in narcotic. Testifying 
before the House Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on Asia and Pacific, Mr. Haward 
Schaffer, the US Deputy Secretary for the Near East and South Asia, said that : 
"E\ en after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan remains \ital 
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to achieviug our goals of a non-aligned, independent, and stable Afghanistan and to 
our broad goals in South and South West Asia. For these reasons we must continue 
to honour our commitment to support Pakistan's security and economic needs."'^ 
However, once again, in a surprise move the US Administration on October 
1. 1990 decided to suspend all military and economic aid to Pakistan, worth between 
$ 564 million and $ 578 million in 1991, following renewed fears that Pakistan had 
developed a nuclear weapon. The decision was the result of the failure on the part 
of President Bush to certify that Pakistan's nuclear programme was bemg designed 
exclusively for peacefiil purposes, as this certificate had become necessary under the 
provision of the Pressler Amendment, durmg the fiscal year in which assistance was 
to be furnished or military equipment or technology was to be sold or transfei red.'' 
Hence on October 9, 1990 the US Secretary of State James Baker informed 
Pakistan's Foreisni Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan that future aid would be 
impossible unless convincing new evidence was provided that no "nuclear explosi\ e 
device" existed.''" 
It is interesting to note that for more than a decade, the US officials found 
reasons to look the other way while Pakistan moved steadily closer to becoming a 
nuclear power. That was particularly true during war in Afghanistan, when Pakistan 
served as a key staging area for supplying anti-Soviet guerillas with American made 
weapons. But now that the war in Afghanistan was over, Washington was no longei 
quite willing to turn a blind eye and no longer need to worry so much about staying 
on good relations whh Pakistan. 
C. Hank Brown Amendment 
Till recently Pakistan had been striving hard to get rid off from the stringent 
Pressler Law. It was only in October 1995, Pakistan uhimately prevailed over its 
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patron when the US Congress cleared the way for the resumption of American arms 
supply to Pakistan and soon provided an arms package worth $ 370 million, under 
the provisions of the Hank Brown Amendment - a one time waiver to Pressler Law 
as stated by the US Administration. The same Pakistan which rejected $ 400 million 
US aid in 1980s as "peanuts" was applauding over lesser aid of $ 370 million. Infact 
for Pakistan which was passing through the longest ever imposed sanction, this 
amount has much more political value than it benefited them in the real sense. 
The adoption of the Brown Amendment was neither abrupt nor surprising as 
it was the result ofconstant audcalculativemovesof Pakistan which began soon after 
the blocking of the US arms aid in October 1990. First such move to wriggle itself 
out of Pressler pressure and subsequent consequences was made in June 199 I when 
the Chairman of the Pakistani Senate. Wasim Sajjad, visited Washington with Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif s proposals for a five nation meet to deal with the nuclear 
question in South Asia. He utilized his visit to impress upon the American polic>-
makers, Pakistan's interest in non-proliferation and the Indian intransigence by 
carrying a partial and narrow proposal to address the South Asian nuclear issue.' 
While Sajjad could not convince the US Congressmen about the Piessler 
Amendment being repealed nevertheless he did not return, with empty hands too. As 
a resuh of his intensi\ e discussion and persistent lobbying with the US officials, the 
Bush Administration finally agreed to supply some military spareparts and equipments 
to Pakistan on commercial basis by providing a self-serving interpretation of the 
Pressler Amendment. Moreover on October 6. 1992 the US Congress appro\ed an 
amendment providing a "minor break" for Pakistan in terms of renewed US 
assistance through waixers on two items-assistance to non-governmental organisation 
(NGOs) and under Public Law 480" from the Pressler Amendment. American policy-
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makers, iiifact. were quite aware of the fact that it would be imprudent as well as 
difficult to restore all economic and military assistance to Pakistan, but at the same 
time there seemed to be growing realisation in the United States that Pakistan had 
already suffered a lot for quite some time and the normalcy in the relations between 
the two countries had to be restored before they were seriously ruptured. 
Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan's visit to Washington in August 
93 was the next step taken by the Government of Pakistan to wriggle itself out of the 
US pressure and to strive for resumption of the US aid. His partial success was 
reflected in National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's reported understanding on 
the need for further dialogue to tackle the problems created by the implementation 
of the Pressler Amendment. And less than a month after Klian's visit to Washington, 
the US Senate sent to President Clinton for signature a bill that would exempt 
Islamabad from the operation of the Pressler Amendment for some specific purposes 
-especially funds for the NGOs.'^ '* 
Thus, the US policy-makers had found other ways to redress Pakistai, s 
grievances. While refraining from giving any official militar\' and economic assistance 
to Islamabad, the US State Department had authorised the commercial sales of 
military sparepartsto Pakistan and had not discouraged US private businessmen and 
other multilateral funding institutions from dealing with the countr>. 
The US administration made an unsuccessful attempt in 1994 to seek a one 
time exemption to the Pressler Amendment to deli\er F-16 fighter aircrafts and to 
resume suspended military and economic aid to Pakistan, thanks to Larry Pressler 
and his colleague senators, who succeeded in aborting the administrations eftbrt to 
scrap the Pressler Amendment through a new Foreign Assistance Act. There was. 
infact. a growing sense in Washington that the Pressler Amendment had outli\ ed its 
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utility as a diplomatic lever. There were many ui the American foreign policy 
establishment who had accepted the Pakistani argument that the Pressler Amendment 
punishes Pakistan unfairly without including India to change its behaviour on nuclear 
non-proliferation. In the last five years Pakistan attempted, though without success. 
to coax the US Congress into either extending the Pressler Amendment to India or 
dropping it altogether. 
The US Administration in 1994 had insisted on three conditions for lifting the 
Pressler Amendment against Pakistan : firstly, end the production of weapons grade 
uranium; stop the manufacture of additional nuclear weapons cores: and fmally. melt 
the existing nuclear cores. Michael Curry, the US Adminsitration spokesman said on 
October 6, 1994 that : "We have offered Pakistan the opportunity to work \\ith us 
to achieve our non-proliferation goals, which could lead to a waiver of the sanctions 
that have been imposed " on Pakistan.''' 
The apparent assumption behind the US proposal was that by resuming 
conventional military aid to Pakistan the US would gain "new flexibility" in 
persuading Islamabad to place certain constraints on its nuclear weapons programme, 
something which Washington had lost through applying Presslers blanket ban. 
According to this rationale, the Pressler law was a structural impediment to progress 
on non-proliferation in South Asia."" But the flaw in this approach was that it did not 
take into account the fact that Pakistan did not shy away from its nuclear programme 
when the USA. through its niassix e military aid, during Reagan years sought to bring 
about military parity with India."' 
The unfinished task of negotiations over the resumption of the US military aid 
to Pakistan once again acquired new life when Pakistan Prime Minister Bena/ir 
Bhutto paid a visit to the USA in April 1995. During her sojouni in Washington she 
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utilised a bulk of her time lobbying with Congress against the Pressler Amendment A 
strong section in the Clinton Administration had already expressed its view in favour 
of a review of the Pressler law arguing that it had not achieved its objective of 
dissuading Islamabad from going nuclear President Clinton himself had viewed that 
he wants a review of the Pressler Amendment, "it is time we should seriously review 
the policy" he said." 
However, a powerful lobby in Congress led by Republican Senator Larry 
Pressler, the author of the Pressler Amendment, was dead set against any change, 
fearing that such a step would make a mockery of the US non-proliferation concerns. 
During Ms Butto's stay ui Washington a group of 15 US Congressmen wrote to 
American Defence Secretary Willian J. Perry voicing their staunch opposition to any 
changes in tl e Pressler Amendment. "We do not believe, events warrant a repeal of 
the Pressler Amendment, and we will resist all efforts to bypass oi weaken this 
provision", they said.''' 
Benazir Bhutto's visit to Washington recieved a setback when Washingroii 
Post revealed that Pakistan was furtively constructing a new nuclear reactor gi\ ing 
Islamabad access to substantial quantities of plutonium for more powerfiil and 
compact nuclear weapons than it now possess. To compound matters, the 
newspaper reported that after initially denying knowledge of any such facility, the 
Pakistani Prime Minister backtracked and conceded that such a project was in 
existence."-' The Washington Post decided to pull this issue out of obscurity and 
timed it with the Benazir visit to Washington, thereby leaving the Clinton 
Administration little manoeuverability in assuaging the Pakistani sentiment over the 
Pressler Amendment. However this report could not prevent Benazir Bhutto from 
setting Clinton"s assurance for a revision of Pressler Amendment" 
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For Islamabad, the removal of the Pressler Amendment from the statute 
books arguably has more political and strategic importance than its military value per 
se. During her visit Ms. Bhutto harped on the theme of a new 'geo-strategic' contract 
with America, insisting that "give us either the weapons or our money". The 
Americans chose to give them weapons.'"' 
The Pakistan government finally succeeded to wriggle itself out of the 
Pressler Amendment in November 1995 when the US Congress passed the Hank 
Brown Amendment which cleared the passage of $ 370 million aid to Pakistan. The 
Amendment provides the transfer to Pakistan of all the previously embargoed lethal 
arms and equipment, other than 28 F-16 combat aircraft for which Pakistan had 
already paid. The package to be transferred to Pakistan include 3 P-3C Orion 
aircraft. Harpoon missiles, C-Nite multiftmction Kits, M-198 Howitzer. Cobra 
Helicopters. TPQ-36 radars, TOW launchers besides spares for F-16s."" 
Why President Clinton took the path which his predecessor Bush feared to 
tread in I 990. According to an Indian analyst such a military package would appear 
to sene three purposes of the United States : Firstly, it would help the Americans 
in their efforts to win back the loyalties of a former crony. Pakistan. With Washington 
remaining wedded to its idea of projecting it as "moderate Islamic state", and with 
Pakistan threatening in the post-Pressler Amendment phase, to firmly align itself to 
either the Islamic bloc or communist China-the prime obsession of the Clinton 
Administration - it caused alarm in Washington. Secondly, an increasingly confident 
India would in the long term be a threat to the American hegemony in the region. The 
US considers the democratic, independently inclined India to be unmanageable 
factor in its regional strategic planning. Compared to this, the US has not just the 
experience, but also continuing assurances from Pakistan that it will remain a reliable 
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ally and cooperative partner in the US plans in the region.''" 
Finally, the vast American military industrial complexes keen to revive arms sales in 
South Asia, as the region was a major arms importer in the eighties. So the Hank 
Brown initiative is also designed to please the American industry as well as the 
electorate. Such a policy has echoes of the past, when the neo-Realist school of 
political thought, as enunciated by Henry Kissinger, had stated that, "morality ' ends 
at one's national borders - beyond which nothing is immoral if it helps in the 
furtherance of one's national interests. 
Thus the thesis that with the end of Cold War, Pakistan's iiuportance in 
serving US interests has diminished is not correct. The US still considers Pakistan 
an important partner in safeguarding its interests in the Gulf, on the eastern flank 
of the region. It also considers Pakistan an usefiil base for influencing political 
process in Central Asia. The US also considers building up of Pakistani strength 
essential to counter US threat perceptions regarding Iran and Iraq. The US belie\ es 
that Pakistan is a country which if strengthened militarily and technologically can 
counter India's emergence as an effective regional power. Perceptions in Washington 
since the emergence of pan-Islamic trends in world politics are that being supporti\ e 
of Pakistan will contribute encouraging moderate Islamic forces and countering 
Islamic extremism. The US is now so much obsessed with all these factors that it is 
willing to pay any price for Pakistani collaboration. Their obsession blinds them to 
the reality and Pakistanis are exploiting that to serve their own interests. 
Whilejustiiying Brown Amendment and renewed US aid to Pakistan American 
spokesmen have advanced many arguments. Ms. Raphel has said that the amendment 
would help the United States better respond to current regional and global realities 
and provide it with an opportunity to build a rounder, more realistic relationship with 
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Pakistan. At the Senate sub-committee hearings she made a spirited plea that the key 
impact of the sanctions relief is neither military nor financial. Instead, she argued : 
"the effect would be primarily in the political realm, creating a sense of faith restored 
and unfairness rectified with a country and people who have been loyal friends of the 
United States over the decades."^" 
The US policy makers contend that revival of a kind of quasi-alliance 
relationship with Pakistan will give the US leverage iii that country which was lost 
during the years of suspension of military supplies and other forms of aid due to the 
Pressler Amendment. They claim that this influence can be used to contain Pakistan s 
nuclear ambitions and freeze the development and deployment of ballistic missiles."' 
This US logic is a simplistic fallacy. During the Afghan war, the US floated the same 
theory that the supply of arms will keep Pakistan from pursuing the nuclear path. But 
what happened ? Having recieved billions of dollars worth of arms. General Zia went 
ahead with his nuclear programme. Tlie US conveniently closed its eyes.'-
The "fairness" argument advanced by the United States also lacks credibility. 
Many Indians believe that there is more to it than the issue of "fairness"" in this 
attempt to release arms supplies to Pakistan and the "one time waiver"" in just testing 
the waters of Congressional and public opinion before converting it into an all time 
waiver. The Pakistanis have already declared that their goal is the total repeal of the 
Pressler Amendment. This "fainiess"" argument has also not been accepted by many 
American Senators like John Glenn. Larry Pressler, Car Levine and 42 others who 
voted against the Brown Amendment. ' 
The US President "s arguments that his policy of releasing military equipment 
to Pakistan would not affect the military balance in South Asia and that it would 
instead actually help strengthen peace, stability and democratic forces in Pakistan 
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are also facetious. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee 
on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on September 14, 1995, Bruce Reidel, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence took great pains to establish the point that 
India already had a 2 to 1 superiority over Pakistan in conventional weapons and 
therefore the release of $ 368 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan would 
not make a difference to the military balance in the region.'^ While advancing an 
argument of this kind he deliberately ignored the fact that India is ten times bigger 
than Pakistan and its security responsibilities are qualitatively different and 
quantitatively larger than those of Pakistan. It also reveals a psychology that the US 
cannot resist the temptation to neutralize Indian strength whenever an opportunity 
permits it. 
Whatever the concerns given or arguments advanced by the United States in 
support of the Brown Amendment, the decision contradicts the declared US policy 
objective of working for non-proliferation. The US restoring military supplies to 
Pakistan and actively supporting an amendment that not only negates earlier 
legislation aimed at penalising Pakistan for its nuclear weapons programme, is a clear 
political signal that it tacitly accepts Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation as a part of 
its strategic plan to secure interests in South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia. Thus 
"all the pious concern of the US for nuclear proliferation has been shown to be an 
eyewash in relation to an old and trusted ally."^-
D. India's Security 
Pakistan by itself has never been and will never be a serious threat to Indian 
Security. It is only after acquiring massive arms aid from the USA that the balance 
of power started tilting in its favour, which certainly has a direct bearing on India's 
security. It may practically be impossible for India to dislodge any power from it.s 
131 
territory, particularly if the invading power (India's neighbour adversaries) is 
supported or assisted by any of the big powers. The American support to Pakistan 
during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars is too fresh to be forgotten. Thus. 
India's opposition to Pakistan's membership of the Western alliance system and 
demand for insulating the region from the external power need to be seen from this 
perspective.'" 
The a>sessment of the threat created by the US arming of Pakistan, despite 
conflicting and concurrent goals and interests between them, has to be essentially 
based on the extent of amis and the military equipment supplied by the US to Pakistan 
alongwith its sophistication in pursuance of the American policy of using Pakistan 
as potential instrument foi moving towards Asia to achieve extrovert and strategic 
economic interests.'^ Pakistan's enmity towards India and its past history of 
aggressiveness are other factors to be reckoned with. lufact the US mihtary aid 
encourages Pakistan in its aggressiveness'^ The histon,' of the past five decades 
shows that whenever Pakistan filled its arsenal with US weapons, it started a 
misadventure against India. The first US military aid to Pakistan encouraged Ayub 
Khan to launch the ill-fated operation Gibralltei which escalated into the 1965 war 
against India. In 1969-70. the US again supplied arms to Pakistan; this time the 
military aid prompted Gen. Yahya Khan to unleash genocide in erstwhile East 
Pakistan culminating in 1971 war with India. The recent US largesse of military 
equipment worth of $ 368 million (1995), thus, certainly caused concern to India's 
security. 
It is interesting to notice that although Pakistan affirmed its commitment to 
the building of a climate of peace and cooperation in the subcontinent through the 
Simla Agreement, simultaneously it also pursued policies aimed at strengthening its 
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military strategic linkages with the United States and China. It is true that Pakistani 
threat did not materialize in the form of war since 1970, but massive armament 
programme heightened India's perception of threat from Pakistan and tey were about 
to wage another war in 1987 and 1990. 
Feeling of insecurity in India is also on account of the fact that Pakistani 
leaders had publically confessed that their alliance with the United States and 
membership of the various defence pacts (SEATO & CENTO) had little to do with 
avowed objects of the pacts to contain international communism.^"^ Rather Pakistani 
object was merely to strengthen itself against India, atleast in order to be able to 
settle its disputes with India from a position of strength. This Indian fear can also be 
ascertained from the fact that when Pakistani leaders found that these militai^ pacts 
would not go all the way to settle the various disputes with India, they demanded 
Pakistan's withdrawal from the military pacts. 
It is important, with regard to Pakistan, to note that. Pakistan has not onh 
been ruled by military directly or indirectly, for most of its existence, military power 
has been a predominant elements in its foreign policy. And these military rulers/ 
dictators diverted the attention of Pakistani people from their oppressive dictatorship 
by imposing an armed invasion in India. Thus the induction of sophisticated 
armaments into a ''troubled area" like Pakistan under a leadership lacking strong base 
holds in it the seeds of a threat to Indian security and could be cause of instabilit\ 
and threat to peace in the region as a whole.*" The massive arms build up which is 
specifically in the nature of improving its defensive capabilities offers Pakistan a 
tempting opportunity to seek a way out of its growing difficulties.''' A similar 
situation arose when Zia came into power in Pakistan through a military coup. 
The theory propounded by Pakistan is that its defence capabilities must 
correspond to the size of threat it faced and not to the size of its territory and 
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population.*^ No doubt, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan actually posed a grave 
threat to the peace and security of the region which was quite often projected by 
Pakistan, but most of the weapon systems inducted by Pakistan could not be used in 
Pakistan's northern or western theatres and secondly, the improved strength of 
Pakistani Navy through supplies of sophisticated weapons had no relation to the 
situation in Afghanistan.**' It has been pointed out that the equipment provided was 
not appropriate for fightuig in the mountain areas which was needed to check a 
Soviet move through Himalayas, rather the arms provided to Pakistan consisted of 
tanks, motorized artillery etc which could be used only on a relatively flat terrain, 
in other words, according to Chester Bowles, "on the plain of North India". ^ 
Selig S. Harrison, a senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace has argued that F-16s and 155 mm howitzers are not suitable for 
the Afghan frontiers, to meet the Soviet challenge. He emphasized that if America 
was seriously interested in Pakistan's defence vis-a-vis USSR, it should have offered 
F-5G to it because that was more suitable in those circumstances. In the opinion of 
the defence experts F-5Gs would not enhance the striking capability of Pakistan 
against India.'*'' 
The official Pakistani justification for the supply for E-2 Hawkeye was to 
counter airspace violations at the Afghan border had low credibility because AEW 
aircraft would be ineffective for this mission owing to the topography of the border 
ftill of mountain ranges and long reaction time for the interceptor aircraft flying from 
the current location of Pakistani airfields. They would on the other hand be effective 
for monitoring Indian parts of airspace."" The fact remains that Pakistan still 
maintains a formidable armed forces (as much as 85 per cent of its army) on its 
eastern border facing India, even though they are fiilly aware that Indian forces, bv 
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and large, are spread over the cantonments of South and Central India;*^ which 
strengthen the possibility of its use against India. 
To appreciate the implications of the weapons acquired by Pakistan from the 
USA, it is desirable to understand the basic characteristics and capabilities of 
weapons. India is, infact, particularly concerned about the supply of F-16 NATO 
model offensive aircraft which has far greater technological superiority over the 
fighter bombers that India has, and bring a large number of Indian cities within its 
range of striking capability. The deployment of F-16 might cause inestimable damage 
to India's airfields, oil and nuclear installations, military depots and might involve 
the loss of lives of civilians. The superiority of F-16 has been established when it was 
used by Israel in destroying nuclear plant of Iraq. It is in this context that India 
seriously viewed the US proposal to sell E-2C Hawkeye airborne warning and 
control system aircraft to Pakistan. It is true that Indian Air Force is stronger than 
that of Pakistan; nevertheless, the tremendous striking power of the Hawkeye has 
become a source of anxiety to its defence. It can keep India's offensive power at bay 
and weaken its defence. 
Regarding the M-1 tanks, these are considered to be amongthe most advanced 
in the world. The tanks are equipped with the laser systems to guide its shells. The 
ranger finder gives a 100 per cent accuracy in destroying enemy tanks. This tank is 
much more advanced than the India's Main Battle Tanks (MBT). The M-1 Abrams has 
a dual firing capability of 105 mm and 120 mm, has a cruising range of 440 KM and 
carries a 1500 horse power turbine engine.*"* 
The new security linkages that had developed between USA and Pakistan 
during the Afghanistan crisis also had created a fear of super power intervention in 
future regional conflict. Because, in order to acquire additional sophisticated 
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weaponry, Pakistan could have provided bases to the US and thereby it would be an 
instrument of intervention in the South Asian region. Moreover the presence of the 
US navy in the Indian Ocean and the creation of CENTCOM which had jurisdiction 
for operations over wide region in the Ocean's littoral and hinterland areas from 
Pakistan to Kenya had further mcreased the possibility of the US intervention in the 
regional conflicts. In this context, the former US ambassador to Pakistan, Dean 
Hinton asserted that the US would also come to Pakistan's help if India committed 
aggression."" 
Infact, smaller nations which by themselves may not be capable of posing a 
threat to bigger neighbours can become instruments of interventionism for the great 
powers. In the context of ludo-Pakistan relations and in analysing the threat from 
Pakistan. India can not deal with Pakistan merely as a small country but has to reckon 
with all the politico-military linkages it has acquired with the Islamic World. China 
and more importantly with the US. Here lies the real threat of US-Pakistan-China 
axis trying to cut India down to size. 
Brown Amendment and India's Security :The recent (October. 1995) US largesse 
of military equipment worth of $ 368 million to Pakistan under the pro\ isions of the 
Hank Brown Amendment, preceded by the latter's five years of intense lobbying has 
caused turmoil in the Indian strategic community as well as South Block. The iuming 
of Pakistan should be taken as a warning by India on the possibility of Islamabad 
indulging in another misadventure, as is evident from past record. In this regard 
Pakistani former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s waniing about the use of nuclear 
weapons against India on the Kashmir issue is incapable of being dismissed a.s 
paranoia. Most strategic analysts in India are convinced that new arms will spur 
Islamabad to adopt an e\ en more bellicose stance towards India, whilst pursuing a 
military build up. 
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However, the perceptions of India, Pakistan andAmerica, about the implications 
of such arms transfer are diametrically opposed. Pakistan feels that there is no 
military balance in South Asia since "There is huge imbalance, tilted in favour of 
India. Today India has a military advantage of three to one". Similarly the US State 
Department has claimed that the transfer of this arms package would not aher the 
military balance in South Asia. On the otherhand Indian defence experts and 
government officials do not agree with this proposition. Jasjit Singh, Director of the 
Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis says that "the US remarks are totally 
erroneous. The impact of arms transfer might be marginal in the US context, but not 
so in the subcontinental framework." An Indian Defence Ministry official described 
the implications of these arms transfer as grim "because in some areas Pakistan will 
be acquiring capabilities that give it a distinct edge over us". 
In order to ascertain the nature and extent to which these arms transfer aft'ect 
India's security, it is important to examine the characteristics of weapon systems 
themselves and the role they are expected to play in a situation of conflict again.st 
India and also India's limitations in these areas. 
The new arms package to Pakistan can be divided into two parts- equipment 
for the Pakistani army and naval equipment. The first part of the Brown Package 
comprises C-NITH Mod kits, 155 mm towed artillery guns, artillery fire locating 
radars, and upgraded anti-tank missile launchers. This part of the package is clearly 
designed to impro\e Pak capabilities to either launch attacks or defend against an 
armoured thrust in the Rajasthau/Gujarat Sector. 
The C-Nite Mod kits are forward looking infi-a-red (FLIR) kits which are 
meant for TOW sights for fitment on the 20 Huey Cobra AH-1 5s with the Pakistani 
army. Each of these attack helicopters can carry eight TOW missiles, with the FLIR 
kits, these attack helicopters can locate and destroy Indian tanks during war at niaht. 
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while at the same time adding to the armour punch of the Pakistani army. In contrast. 
Indian attack helicopters do not have night flying capabilities; Indian tanks do not 
have thermal imagers to enable it to see long range at night. 
Another important component of the package is 15 5 mm calibre towed heavy 
artillery guns. Such guns are integral to armour strike forces and are meant 
essentially for offensive operations. In contrast, Indian army does not have an 
equipment of the 155 mm self-propelled (SP) heavy artillery. Indian SP guns are 
outdated and of a lesser calibre (105/120 mm). Pakistan's offensive capability will 
get a boost if these guns are used with AR/TPQ Radars which are also the part of 
the package. These radars are fire-finder artillery pieces locating radars, a significant 
force multiplier. 
The Brown package also includes TOW-2 Launchers, which are an upgraded 
version and will increase Pakistan's anti-tank capabilities keeping in view the army's 
perception that any future Indo-Pak land war will witness use of armour as the main 
offensive weapon. 
Under the second part of the package Pakistan will receive naval equipment 
which comprises three P-3C Orion maritime patrol and strike aircraft that would be 
armed with Harpoon air-to surface anti-ship missiles. The Lockheed Martin P-3C 
Orion is. by far. the most popular and successful maritime patrol and anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) aircraft in the world. Though nearly 450 of these are presently in 
si;r\ice in armed forces worldwide, the bulk of them are with the US Navy."*" Of the 
roughly 80 aircraft exported by the United States so far among the Indian Ocean 
littoral states, 19 are with Australia, 5 with Thailand, and 1 in Iran. The update 2.75 
version of the Orions being transferred to Pakistan includes the fitting of sophisticated 
electronics, as well as the doubling of the sonobuoy handling capacity. " Pakistani 
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pilots were being trained on these maritime strike aircraft prior to 1990. when the 
Pressler Amendment was implemented. 
The P-3C Orion is an exceedingly versatile maritime reconnaissance aircraft 
capable of launching anti-ship sea-skimming cruise missiles such as the Harpoon, and 
has a high anti-submarine warfare capability which makes it a very potent offensive 
weapons system. Its maximum normal take-off weight is over 60,000 kg. thereby 
enabling it to load up a considerable amount of fuel and ornament. It can carry MK-
101 depth bombs (including one with a nuclear warhead after modification) four 
MK-43/44/46 torpedos or eight MK-54 bombs, eight Harpoon missiles and upto 
20.000 pounds of external ordnance. While the cruismg speed of the Orion is about 
6.000 km per hour, its maximum speed level at high ahitudes is approximately 150 
km per hour. Tlie maximum endurance of the aircraft at a speed of 320 km. per hour is o\ er 
17 hours. 
Moreover, this aircraft has a 3,834 km mission radius which will make ships 
and shore installations as far as Cochin vulnerable. The Indian Navy surface fleet and 
merchant shipping would be vulnerable to attack virtually throughout the Arabian 
Sea. In contrast, unlike along the land borders, India does not have a network of 
defensive infrastructure like radars along the long coastline. The Indian Nav>'s Tu-
142 maritime patrol aircraft do not have a strike capability. A move is afoot to tit 
two Sea Eagle sea-skimniuig missiles each on the relati\ ely outdated and short-
range IL-38 maritime aircraft. The Indian force hashalf- a squadron worth of Jaguar 
maritime strike aircraft which again have a limited range. 
Another important part of the package is the AGM-84A Harpoon which is a 
very sophisticated long range air launch anti-ship missile. The weight ofthe warhead 
is220 kg. The Harpoon possesses an inertial guidance capability, alongwith an acti\ e 
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radar. Its speed is nearly 1,000 km. per hour. The most important features of the 
Harpoon are its accuracy and strike range of about 120 km. In other words Indian 
ships can be destroyed from over 100 km away without even knowing that such a 
missile is on its way. Pakistan has the advantage of possessing both the Harpoons and 
the French Exocet missiles. 
The impact of the Harpoon armed Orions on the Indian Navy, therefore, is 
essentially two fold; first, the increase to an unacceptable level the degree of 
vubierability of critical surface combatants as well as non-combatants in the entire 
Arabian Sea, and possibly a portion of the Bay of Bengal as well; and second, they 
threaten the destruction of crucial maritime and economic assets of the western 
coast. 
The only viable response to missile threat at sea is the ability to detect and 
neutralise such platforms well before they can launch their lethal armament. In order 
to carr> out these tasks successfully, adequate early warning capabilities, alongwilh 
sufficient combat air capabilities at sea are clearly imperative; while the Indian Na\ y 
lacks the former, it is clearly deficient in the latter. The fighter - recomiaissance -
strike Sea Harrier aircraft on the ageing Indian aircraft provide a modest response 
to such threats but this is inadequate to deal effectively with the kind of threat 
potential the P-3C and Harpoon represents. In the ultimate analysis the Indian Na\> 
may have to acquire suitable air-borne early warning surveillance systems - the 
AEW/AWACS - to augment the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) at sea. 
Nonetheless the Indian Navy is not all at sea. Even with the Orions coming 
in, the next naval battle may not go the Pakistani way. For. the fact remains that 
Pakistan has not got the full package as it wanted. The 28 F- 16, some of which would 
have had to escort the Orions in the next battle are still out of Pakistan's reach. Tlie 
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main concern now is >^ether Pakistan would get back the money it has paid for the F-
16s and use it to buy some other multi-role fighter like Mirage-2000. The Orioiis, 
with all their long flying capability would be a battle burden rather than an asset. 
unless there are enough fighters to escort them. And that is what Pakistan does not 
have. Experience during the Gulf War also had shown that search planes need heavy 
fighter escort. Of course, Orion does carry strike armament like the Harpoon missiles 
which, utilising the plane's over the Horizon radar capability, can be shot from safe 
distances. But then Harpoons are anti-ship missiles and cannot be used to strike at 
enemy planes which threaten the Orion. 
Similarly with escort from long range-fighters, the Orion would not be able 
tc utilize its own long range capability. It is true that the plane may be sufficient to 
strike at Indian ships as far south as Cochin. But there is no fighter m Pakistani 
inventory which can escort the Orion all the way to Cochin and protect it from either 
Indian carrier based forces out at sea or from the fighters taking off from the Indian 
mainland. Pakistan knows this full well and hence it s anxiety to buy others, preferably 
some multi-role plane like the F-16. 
There is no doubt that the billion dollar worth new acquisitons of Pakistan are 
cause for concern. But any breast-beating over arms supplies to Pakistan will not 
serve any purpose. Although we claim to be a regional power, we behave like cry-
babies, and that too when we have the national capabilities to acti\ely pursue our 
vital national interests. Air Chief Marshal S.K. Kaul has rightly remarked that, i f 
we feel threatened by some simple weapon somebody acquires, our planning should 
take care of that. We cannot have knee-jerk reaction to any acquisition by other 
countries." 
Dollops of the US military aid to Pakistan are nothing new in our experience 
which stretches back some 40 years. It has never paid to raise an uprorious protest. 
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nor has condemnation ever stopped the US in its tracks. Another factor which must 
be taken into consideration that both India and Pakistan are now 'defacto' nuclear 
powers and in strategic terms it is generally an accepted fact that nuclear weapons 
exercise a degree of restraint on a war-prone neighbour's belligerent tendencies. 
Both India's General K. Sunderji and his Pakistani counterpart Aslam Beg had 
accepted that the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have prevented the two 
from resorting to a war, despite the high level of tension during the 1987 Brasstracks 
crisis and in the spring of 1990. 
Thus there is a very remote possibility of another conventional war between 
India and Pakistan. Ahhough Pakistan's leadership can rejoice over the new set of 
battlefield toys that the Hank Brown military package would be carrying. These, 
quite frankly, would be of little use to Pakistan, except as a morale booster. This is. 
however, not to suggest that India should adopt a casual approach about its security 
\is-a-vis Pakistan But keeping in view our new economic programme in progress, 
we need to be circumspect about getting into an arms race. Nothing could be more 
disastrous than India being stampeded into an arms race binge that could affect the 
ongoing economic reform programme. 
The need of the moment is to prevent war, not to fight one and win it. Given 
these complex situations we should carefiiUy formulate such an approach to national 
security which would deter Pakistani military adventurism, but without hampering 
ongoing economic programme. There is no need for India to overreact over the 
resumption of the US military aid to Pakistan. Instead, we should take it in our stride 
and act firmly but quietly to safeguard our security without too much polemics. 
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^hitptet - 4 
KASHMIR IMBROGLIO AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
Nothing has bedevilled Indo-Pakistan relations more than the dispute over 
the beautiful mountainous state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmir question, 
though it concerns mainly India and Pakistan, has attracted world-wide attention 
since it arose in 1947. The failure on the part of both India and Pakistan to come to 
a negotiated settlement over Kashmir has opened the issue for interference of outside 
powers and states. It is a fact of Indo-Pak relations that failure to resolve Kashmir 
tangle at bilateral level has resulted in outside intervention. The role played by the 
United States in the subcontinental affairs has fiirther deteriorated the issue rather 
than improving the state of affairs which has been stated goal of the US sub-
continental policy-atleast after the end of the Cold War. The US continued support 
to the Pakistani stance over Kashmir and the largesse of huge amounts of arms and 
ammunition has not only emboldened Pakistan to remain adamant on Kashmir issue 
but even encouraged Pakistani military adventurism against India. Till now India and 
Pakistan have fought three major wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971 over Kashmir but its 
fate is yet to be resolved. Keeping this view in centrality this chapter seeks to analyse 
the US perception of the Kashmir dispute and its implications for Indo-Pak relations. 
This chapter concludes that had the USA been not involved in the affairs there was 
a greater possibility of the resolution of this issue bilaterally. Thus the best 
contribution the US can make to a peacefiil resolution of the Kashmir conflict, 
therefore, would be keep off it. 
A. Kashmir : Conflicting Claims 
Both India and Pakistan have advanced several arguments to strengthen their 
respective claims over Kashmir. These arguments are conflicting and contradictor} 
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While analysing the various aspects of the Kashmir dispute' we reach on conclusion 
that this was not merely a territorial dispute. There was strong ideological component 
to the motives of the two states. 
India contended that Kashmir's accession to it was vital because it demonstrated 
that even a Muslim-majority province could thrive within a predominantly Hindu 
State without any fear of discrimination and harassment, thus validating the concept 
of the secular, democratic state. Contrary to it for Pakistan the possession of 
Kashmir was crucial to her ideology, namely that religious ideology could sene as 
the corner stone of a state.^ Pakistan claimed that the religious affinity of the majority 
of the people of Kashmir made it potentially a Pakistani province, because the 
partition of India was based on the recognition of the separate nationhood of the 
Indian Muslims. India, however, totally rejected the two nation theory and obser\ ed 
that it would be fatal for it to accept religion as the fundamental element of politics, 
as it would threaten the welfare of several religious minorities which continued to 
remain in India. It was believed that the strength and integrity of new India would 
largely arise from its capacity to circumscrible sub-national loyalties of caste, 
language and religion.' Burke has also observed that the main reason of the Kashmir 
dispute was the "antithetical nature of Hindustan and Islam",^ Joseph Korbel 
obser\'ed : Kashmir involves the struggle between the Medieval Islamic theocracy of 
Pakistan and the modern secular state of India.' 
Another important ground on which both India and Pakistan claim their 
natural right over Kashmir is "national security". Uniquely Kashmir is located in 
strategic position for both India and Pakistan. In a speech to the Constituent 
Assembly on November 25, 1947 Nehru declared : "We were of course \itall\ 
interested in the decision that the state would take Kashmir because of her 
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geographical position with her frontiers marching with three countries, namely the 
Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and 
international contacts of India.'"' 
The importance of Kashmir for India's security was highlighted in 1959 when 
China seriously challenged India's northern borders. Not only it is not possible to 
defend Laddakh and northwest frontier regions without effective control over the 
Kashmir valley, the latter is also vital for the security of the country as a whole in 
the face ofgrowing military pressures from the north and the threat of a coordinated 
military adventure by India's two hostile neighbours.^ 
Kashmir was equally important for Pakistan from security view point. Its 
importance in Pakistan's security calculation has been highlighted by a former 
Pakistan army general. According to him Pakistan's security depends on having 
Kashmir : "One glance at the map was enough to show that Pakistan's military 
security would be seriously jeopardized if Indian troops came to be stationed along 
Kashmir's western borders. Once India got the chance, she could establish such 
stations anywhere within a few miles of the 180 miles long vital road and rail route 
between Lahore and Pindi. In the event of war, these stations would be a dangerous 
threat to our most important civil and military lines of communication in 
peace time too the situation could be just as unacceptable because we would remain 
permanently exposed to a threat of such magnitude that our independence would 
never be a reality."* 
According to Sisir Gupta Pakistan appeared to believe that India was 
determined to attack Pakistan and that India would be easily able to achieve its 
objectives if the northern boundary of Pakistan were also to run with India 
Pakistan's strategic vuhierability was not merely confined to the military. In December 
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1947, Liaquat Ali Khan pointed out that "the security of Pakistan is bound up with 
that of Kashmir, and ties of religion, cultural affinity and economic interdependence 
bind the two together still closer."' 
B. The US Approach to the Kashmir Dispute 
The Kashmir question, though it concerns mainly India and Pakistan, has 
attracted world-wide attention for nearly five decades. And one of the most 
important states, outsider to dispute, which has thrown its interest in Kashmir is the 
United States. The Kashmir issue has been one of the focal points of American 
foreign policy in India and Pakistan. The US involvement in the Kashmir dispute 
dates fi-om the earliest stages of its reference to the Security Council.. 
Initially, the United States was hesitant to become involved in the Kashmir 
problem Near East Office Director Loy Henderson-soon to become ambassador to 
India-urged acting secretary of state Robert Lovett to stay out of the dispute. He 
argued the United States was already over committed globally, should avoid "making 
a choice between giving support to the interest, of India or Pakistan", and should not 
through our involvement provide the Soviets an opening to mix into the affairs of 
South Asia'". But later as cold war intensified the United States got deeply interested 
in the Kashmir dispute. And in cooperation with the UK, the United States moved 
important resolutions in the Security Council over Kashmir which to a great extent 
shaped the US perception of the dispute at later stages. 
The US stance on Kashmir was more influenced by its cold war strategies than 
the merits of the dispute. The United States found golden opportunity in Kashmir 
dispute and its reference to the UN to establish its strategic interest in the region. 
The role of the United States in the Kashmir conflict was part of an overall American 
design in the Third World and in particular South Asia. Philips Talbot, US Assistant 
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Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, himself admitted in his address 
to the United Nations Association of Wichita on October 23, 1964, that "Kashmir 
is only one aspect, of course, of our larger interests in the subcontinent of South 
Asia."" 
At first, the United States took the position that India was legally within its 
rights in Kashmir and that any activities on the part of Pakistan or other parties were 
in violation of this legality.'^ But by mid 1950's when Pakistan proved more 
adaptable to American foreign policy than did India, the United States became 
increasingly sympathetic towards Pakistan's position vis-a-vis Kashmir. This is 
reflected m the growing insistence by the US in the United Nations that the Kashmir 
problem be resolved by plebiscite, a measure which New Delhi considered inimical 
to its interests. American policy in the Kashmir dispute is widely interpreted as a 
reaction to India's refusal to align itself with the United States in the Cold War. This 
was confirmed in 1954 when America entered into an arms aid agreement with 
Pakistan. 
When the Kashmir issue was brought up before the Security Council the 
United States showed an active interest and involvement in the dispute. Through the 
United Nations intervention m the area, the Truman Administration made attempts 
to bring peace to South Asia that conformed to its overall post-war goals. America 
considered that the Kashmir conflict would jeopardize its unwa\ering goal of 
commerce, peace and security. 
The role of the United States in the Security Council all through the 
discussion of the Kashmir question was that of supporting the case of Pakistan and 
was naturally not appreciated in India. At the first instance, much to India's chagrin 
the United States managed to convert Pakistan's aggression on India into an Indo-
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Pakistani question. American delegate, Austin said : "the parties involved would 
conduct all the proceedings in regard to all the problems under the aegis of the 
Security Council."" Thus through widening the scope of the UN investigation in 
effect expanded the range of possible United States interference in the affairs of 
South Asia. 
When the Security Council passed a resolution for conducting plebiscite in 
Kashmir the United States expressed the view that it was not necessary to go back 
to arguing over earlier causes and help that the best chance of solving the dispute 
lay in achieving agreement on the conditions of plebiscite. The American attitude 
seems to be that no matter what happened in the beginning, no matter how unjustified 
Pakistan's presence in Kashmir might have been, once India agreed to accept the 
UNCIP Resolutions, the past should be forgotten since these events happened prior 
to these resolutions. The US Representative to the Security Council on February 14. 
1964 dismissed the origin of the dispute as being "complicated and deeply buried in 
the history of great subcontinent of India."'"* 
The American delegate, reinforcing the plea for plebiscite, declared that "only 
when the tribesmen were satisfied that there will be a fair plebiscite would they agree 
to retire"." Whether intended or not the effect of the US support of plebiscite was 
to boost the causes of the invading tribesmen. The United States blurred the issue 
of Pakistan's aggression and introduced the distraction of plebiscite. 
The United States also extended its full support for the UNCIP work and the 
mediatory efforts of General McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon and Dr Frank Graham, 
then to bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, and in February 1957 to 
the mission of Mr. Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, President of the Security Council at 
that time. Earlier in January 1957, the United States asserted that an Indian 
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sponsored "Constituent Assembly" in Kashmir had no right to decide the State's 
affiliation. In the following month, an Anglo-American resolution in the Security 
Council sought to bring about the demilitarisation of Kashmir with a view to 
preparing the ground for a plebiscite. The Soviet Union, however, vetoed the move. 
On numerous other occasions, Washington asserted that earlier UN resolution which 
called for a plebiscite continued to be valid and binding on India. 
At the same time, however, there was some minority opinion in the United 
States which supported the Indian argument that a plebiscite as a means of resolving 
the Kashmir dispute had been outdated by the march of events in recent years. To 
start with, this opinion would agree with the statement to the Security Council by 
Gunnar Jarring in April 1957 that "the implementation of international agreement of 
an adhoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedly. may become 
progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has 
tended to change.'"" 
A change was witnessed ia the United States stance on Kashmir when 
Kennedy took the presidency in 1961. He declined to take an active role m settling 
Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir." Kennedy favoured bilateral talks 
between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. He was of the view that US 
influence in the Kashmir dispute was limited specially since the Indian and Pakistani 
leaders had been unable to get together.'" In January 1962. Kennedy suggested to the 
governments of India and Pakistan that the good offices of Eugene R. Black 
(President of World Bank) be used by them in a fiesh effort to resolve the Kashmir 
problem through direct negotiations.''^ While Pakistan favourably inclined towards 
the proposal, India rejected it on the ground that it did not like any third party 
arbitration on an issue of this kind.^" 
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In the wake of Chinese attack on India in 1962, India asked United States and 
other Western countries for military assistance. Taking advantage of India's weakened 
position, the United States applied pressure on it to negotiate a settlement with 
Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Bhagat Vats has observed that : "When the Chinese 
attacked India in October 1962, America and Britain gave nominal aid but with 
sinister condition that India should settle the Kashmir question with Pakistan 
Averell Harriman from Washington and Duncan Sandys from London descended 
upon Delhi and talked less of China but more of Kashmir."^' 
The US Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited New Delhi alongwith the 
delegates from the UK in May 1963. They made it clear that unless India came to an 
agreement with Pakistan, they could not agree to arms aid because they were not 
prepared to alienate their ally, Pakistan.^^ This stand was very strange because by that 
time Pakistan had concluded a border agreement with China ceding it some territor> 
of Jammu and Kashmir. Dean Rusk also persuaded Nehru to accept the idea of 
naming a Kashmir negotiator, even though India had declined a similar proposal.-' 
India felt that its crisis with China was being misused as a pretext for forcing 
it to abandon its essential position in Kashmir. Nehru was puzzled over US pressure 
and asked Chester Bowles (who had now become US ambassador to India) : "why 
did the United States attempt to use India's difficulties with China as a lever to force 
him to make concession to Pakistan on Kashmir ?" '^' Nehru told Chester Bowles that 
if Pakistan had sided with India or atleast remained neutral on the Indo-Chinese 
conflict, "an atmosphere would have been created in which he could have made very 
significant concessions in regard to Kashmir."^- Chester Bowles, however, succeeded 
in persuading Nehru to hold talks with Pakistan on Kashmir issue which resulted ui 
six different sittings-" between December 22, 1962 and May 16. 1963. During these 
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talks, the question of a plebiscite continued to be the main irritant. Dennis Kux has 
observed that: "neither India nor Pakistan, infact, showed any real enthusiasm about 
the Kashmir talks, with pressure from Washington and London the only reason for 
their agreeing to participate."^^ 
The United States later clarified that her intention was only to assist in 
promoting an agreed settlement on Kashmir, acceptable to both parties, and that it 
was not trying to force one country to yield to the other. Chester Bowles said that 
"however mistakenly directed." American approach might have been, "the intent 
was sincere". The US attempts to bring the parties together failed and by September 
1963 Kennedy was ruefully admitting that Kashmir issue was "far from being settled 
today than it was six month ago." 
During the 1970s. there was no significant political activity over Kashmir b> 
the United States. The United States tilted towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh 
crisis. The Simla accord, nonetheless. led to a change in the US stance toward the 
Kashmir dispute. Previously, the United States stood behind relevant UN resolutions, 
including the call for a plebiscite. After 1972, Washington shifted ground; the US 
position since Simla has been to support any settlement the Indians and Pakistanis 
were able to work out. Subsequently while favourable options were assessed and 
discussed, behind the scene diplomacy continued over decades, and there were 
reports of secret missions in Kashmir, especially after the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh 
Abdullah Accord in 1975. Amongtheprominent Americans were Nelson Rockefeller 
who visited Kashmir in April 1978. He led a nine member delegation and had a 
meeting with Sheikh Sahib for 90 minutes. President Reagan's high profile emissary 
Charlton Heston visited Srinagar in 1982 and no less important was the visit of Philip 
Talbot, the roving US Ambassador.^* Obviously these visits and meetings with 
Sheikh Abdullah were not entirely without any design. 
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Since the raid 1980s, the US administration has been consistent in promoting 
Indo-Pak dialogue to reduce tension in the region. Keeping in view this policy, the 
US diplomacy exerted behind the scene pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad to 
discuss their dispute bilaterally. Initially the agenda was the Siachen Glacier, later 
misunderstanding over India's military exercise "Brasstacks" and finally to find a 
permanent solution to the Kashmir problem. The US had been successftil in bringing 
India and Pakistan to the negotiating table with the agreed agenda but the parties to 
dispute failed to reach on any commonly agreed solution to the Kashmir dispute 
If we analyse the US perception of the Kashmir dispute during the Cold War 
days, we would conclude that the United States have been consistently tried to take 
sides with Pakistan and it never appreciated India's stand on the question. To quote 
Norman D. Palmer : "American views on Kashmir have been more sympathetic with 
Pakistan than with the Indian case, an attitude reflected in votes by American 
representatives whenever the Kashmir question has been brought before the Security 
Council."-'* This fact was even acknowleged by Secretary Rusk, who said : "broadh 
speaking we have supported the Pakistan view that the wishes of the people of 
Kashmir are highly relevant to a permanent solution.'"" 
Thus the attitude of the United States to the Kashmir question makes it 
abundantly clear that the United States was keen on a pro-Pakistan solution of the 
Kashmir question. It put forward several suggestions favourable to Pakistan in the 
name of conflict resolution, including arbitration, stationing of foreign troops and 
the like. It championed the cause of plebiscite, evoked the liberal concept of national 
self-determination. Given the strategic importance of Kashmir in the context of the 
Cold War, Washington's decision making ehteunderstoodthat afiiendly Pakistan offered 
an anchor for the implementation of American strategic goals in Asia. Prof Anwar 
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Syed has rightly observed that : "American support to Pakistan was not deliberate 
but it was a matter of reciprocity in response to Pakistan's support to US in Cold 
War". He argued that : "US support to Pakistan did not derive either from an 
ideological commitment to the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination or from 
a compulsion to be on the side of equity and justice in an international dispute."" 
C. Post-Cold War US Perception of the Kashmir Dispute and 
Indo-Pak Relations 
The end of Cold War brought about perceptible change in the US stance on 
the Kashmir issue. Now the United States felt that it no more needed Pakistan to 
contain Soviet Communism and thus no need to adopt a pro-Pakistani stance on 
Kashmir. This post-cold war change in the US perception of the Kashmir dispute was 
first witnessed in 1990. at the peak of the crisis in Kashmir. The United States, 
anxious about the possibility of an India-Pakistan conflict escalating into all out 
nuclear war called on the two countries to avoid steps "which would lead events to 
spin dangerously out of control." Despite skepticism within the US government 
about its ability to resolve the underlying India-Pakistan conflict, the risk of nuclear 
confrontation impelled Washington to involve itself more directly iii subcontinental 
tensions than it had for many years. 
As tension continued to increase President Bush sent his deputy National 
Security Adviser, Robert Gates, and Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly to South 
Asia to urge caution on India and Pakistan. Arguing against resort to force and 
proposing confidence-building measures, Gates wanied leaders of both countries 
that relations with the United States would suffer badly if they went to war.'-
At the same time the United States made a significant pronouncement about 
Kashmir. President Bush himself declared that the Simla Agreement had superseded 
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the UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite ill Kashmir. TheUS visiting senior officials 
(Gates and Kelly) also made clear that Washington no longer backed a UN plebiscite 
as the preferred way to solve the Kashmir dispute, but instead supported bilateral 
India-Pakistan talks in accord with the 1972 Simla Agreement. Bush administration 
appealed both to India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute within the spirit 
of Simla agreement. However it accepted Kashmiris as third party in the issue. The 
United States had also privately conveyed to Pakistan that it is opposed to raising the 
Kashmir issue in the UN Security Council or even internationalising it via such 
forums as the OIC. 
The US policy was elaborated by its Assistant Secretary of State for Near East 
and South Asia John Kelly during a Congressional testimony in Washington on 
March 6, 1990. Kelly said that the US accepts "Kashmir is disputed territory and that 
Pakistan and India should resolve the issue between them as agreed in Simla 
Accord". He also said in clear terms that the US no longer supports a plebiscite in 
Kashmir." Keeping this view the US sought to persuade Islamabad to opt for a 
negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue instead of chanting the mantra of "self-
determination" for the Kashmiris. 
Thus there was a clear departure in the US Kashmir policy and it corresponded 
with India's strongly held preference for bilateral negotiations and was at odds with 
Pakistan's traditional desire to involve outsiders in settling the dispute. 
Besides the US government an influential section of intelligentsia also 
acknowledged that Pakistan was aiding and abetting the insurgency in Kashmir -
John Mallot (Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian 
Affairs) is on record to have stated that : "in Jammu and Kashmir, militants have 
launched an insurgency and have resorted to terrorist acts we continued 
to be concerned by credible reports that the government of Pakistan has been 
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providing official support to some of the militants". He further argued that "any such 
support must come to an end, both for the sake of our fiitiu'e relationship as well as for 
future of India-Pakistan relations and resolution of the Kashmir issue."" 
The distinguished American South Asia expert Selig S. Harrison has 
observed that although Pakistan did not create the Kashmir problem but when, 
locally based opposition to Indian rule developed, the ISI stepped in to help, organise 
and finance armed guerrillas who have proved to be extremely potential especially in 
the Kashmir valley, where India now faces a more serious challenge to its control. ' 
In this connection it may also be recalled that Washington had even threatened 
to put Pakistanit on the watch list of states involved in state sponsored terrorism and 
to cut aid if Islamabad was found to be supporting insurgency in the Kashmir. As such 
Pakistani assistance, in the US view, would amount to "aiding and abetting state 
terrorism". lufact the US intelligence agencies had gathered sufficient information 
and proof about Pakistan's direct involvement ia training and arming the Kashmir 
militants. It seems that the United States wanted to utilize the opportunity and take 
advantage of its influence in the wake of Soviet demise, to exert pressure on both 
countries to resolve Kashmir dispute which otherwise could lead to a nuclear war in 
the region. 
Thus in the early years of J 990s the United States had agreed to accept the 
validity of the "Simla Agreement" as the basis for the settlement of the Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan. And this was widely expressed at every fora by 
the leaders and ofFicials and was also reflected in the media all over. However this 
US policy which appeared visible soon af^er the end of Cold War, could not continue 
Jong and soon the United States stabilised its position in the new context of post-
cold war era, it modified its stand in 1993. The US declared that the whole of Kashmir 
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IS a disputed territory and the instrument of accession is redundant. It regarded Simla 
Agreement as outdated and insisted on taking the wishes of the Kashmiris in any 
settlement of the Kashmir dispute. 
What has worried India more is not the US ambiguity on the legal status of 
Jammu and Kashmir. India has lived with this for more than four decades. Infect 
India's concern arises from the fact that the Clinton administration has now decided 
in a reversal of the Bush policy, to initiate active diplomatic manoeuvres on Kashmir 
and push for a more interventionist policy. 
The US administration's altered line on Kashmir was first witnessed during 
John Mallot's (Principal Deputy Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs), visit to 
New Delhi in May 1993. He made an official statement on the Kashmir dispute. He 
stated that there are three basic principles which govern the US position : (1) We 
consider all of Kashmir to be disputed territory, on both sides of the line of control; 
(2) this is an issue to be settled peacefully by India and Pakistan taking the wishes 
of the Kashmiris, both Muslims and non-Muslims, into account; and (3) the United 
States is prepared to be helpful in this process, if that is desired by both sides. He 
suggested that" it is time for India and Pakistan to begin seriously to resolve the issue 
between them and put an end to 'their' Cold war".'" The most dramatic aspect of 
Mallot's remark was the stress on taking the views of the Kashmiri people on both 
sides-a stand which has not been taken before. 
According to an Indian analyst, perhaps Mallot was only testing the ground 
for a reshaping of Washington's India Policy. Or, the policy has already been made 
and he was sent here to fling it at us, with much ginger and salt added to an already 
pungent potion." 
Then came President Clinton's bombshell when he made a reference to 
Kashmir m his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993 : "Bloody. 
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ethnic, religious and Civil War raging from Angola to the Caucarus to Kashmir." 
This, according to Ms Raphel, was intended to convey that "we see Kashmir on our 
radar screen along with Yugoslavia, Somalia and parts of the former Soviet Union 
where there is civil conflict". No American President had made such reference in any 
international fora in the recent past. India was disappointed and dismayed at this US 
stand and feh threatened that the US bias for Pakistan was emerging. 
The Kashmir issue was once again brought into focus on October 29, 1993 
when Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, questioned the legal 
validity of Kashmir's accession to India. She claimed, "we do not recognise the 
Instrument of Accession as meaning that Kashmir is forever an integral part of 
India The people of Kashmir have got to be consulted in any kind of final 
settlement of the Kashmir dispute."^* In questioning the Instrument of Accession the 
Clinton administration has questioned the basis of not only the accession of Kashmir 
to India, but more than 600 princely states to India and Pakistan. What is more, since 
the Instrument was the lynchpin of the transfer of British paramountcy over the 
princely states to the successor governments of India and Pakistan, it calls into 
question the transfer of power itself and consequently the legal basis for the 
existence of India and Pakistan. 
The US government also dismissed the Simla Agreement out of hand. Raphel 
said that, "it is 20-plus years old and there have been very few discussions, if any. 
under that accord in terms of resolving the Kashmir dispute it is fine to discuss 
the Kashmir dispute under the Simla Accord but it needs to happen but that hasn't 
happened. So by defmition, ipso facto, it has not been very effective."'' Interestingly 
three years earlier the US swore by the Simla Accord which, it was stated, had 
superceded the UN resolutions of 1949 and 1950. Now suddenly the US began to 
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refer to the need for taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. This 
focuses the US attitude from bilateralism of the Simla Accord to what may be 
perceived as trilateralism. 
The new emphasis of the Clinton Administration on ascertaining the wishes 
of the Kashmiri people causes great concern to India. This new US position acquires 
an ominous tone when seen in the light of the new American assessment of the 
situation in Kashmir. The administration now believes that Pakistan's support to 
terrorism is no longer germane to the debate and that the insurgency in Kashmir has 
strong indigenous roots and acquired a "self-sustaining" character. Taking a swipe 
at New Delhi for its constant harping on Pakistani involvement in Kashmir. Ms 
Raphel said : "The Indian government likes to blame all of their problems in Kashmir 
on the government of Pakistan. (But) we think it's a very complex issue there, and 
to a certain degree that insurgency is a homemade problem. Outsiders might ha\ e 
come to stir the pot, taken advantage of the opportunity, but you can't do that if 
people are not happy"""' 
Significantly, the United States has also projected itself as a potential 
mediator "if all parties to dispute want it." The US officials have often expressed 
their country's desire to do so. Ms Raphel admits that Washington is "always looking 
for that window of opportunity" and that "if we see an opportunity where we can be 
helpfiil, we will not hesitate to move". She however also admits her limitations "we 
can't do it without the cooperation of both sides.""" Interestingly while Pakistan 
desires US mediation India plainly rejected it - as it was against the very spirit of Simla 
Agreement. 
India rightly rejected the US offer of mediation because "wherever the USA 
has intervened it has left that country in shambles." The latest example can be cited 
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of Afghanistan - which is in ruins and is not likely to recover for decades. The USA 
went there to liberate it from Soviet occupation. But the world knows today that 
Afghanistan had peace and prosperity only when it had a regime supported by 
Moscow.""*^ 
Although Robin Raphel has rightly pointed out that the Simla Agreement has 
not been able to resolve the Kashmir problem in more than two decades she does not 
seem to have pondered over the reason behind it. Pakistan has been consistently and 
blatantly violating the Simla Agreement since the early 1980s. After all it was 
Pakistan which consistently refused to vacate its aggression and even to resolve the 
Kashmir issue bilaterally and left no stone unturned to intemationaUse the issue in ever\ 
possible international forum. Washington itself urged many times for resolution of 
Indo-Pak differences over Kashmir under the Simla Agreement. Did Islamabad 
accept the US advice ? The solution does not lie in throwing away the Simla 
Agreement. It lies in persuading and pressurising Pakistan to hold discussions with 
India to resolve the bilateral issue bilaterally rather than complicate it fijrther by 
raising the issue time and again in international forums. 
India took a very serious view of Raphel's comments. Indian officials and 
analysts have mostly attacked the US for interference in India's internal affairs and 
questioning its territorial integrity. Raphel's remark smacks of indirect support for 
militancy in the valley. The Indian aide memoir in reaction to Raphel's briefing, stated 
that: "it only encourages Pakistan to persist with its interference". Raphel's dubbing 
of Simla Agreement as outdated would unnecessarily complicate the issue and 
encourage more violence, terrorism and instability. Jasjit Singh rightly observ es : 
"the US approach is counter-productive and likely to reduce the prospects of peace, 
encourage radicalism and militant separatism, undermine the stabilising of democracy 
165 
in Pakistan and prolong the agony of Jammu and Kashmir.""" Ms Raphel's remarks 
were not welcomed even in the USA and were seen as being tendentious and 
undiplomatic. Selig Harrison perceived Raphel's remark "a very grave mistake, 
completely inappropriate for an Assistant Secretary of State." It certainly is not 
contributing towards improved relations" adds Ashok Permeswaran, political 
analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.^ 
In order to smoothen India's ruffled feathers the United States clarify that 
State department officials questioning of the status of Kashmir could not be 
construed as a policy statement and reiterated that there was "no change or shift" in 
the US policy towards India or Kashmir issue. Robin Raphel's senior Peter Turnofi 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in a letter to the Indian Ambassador. 
S.S. Ray stated that "the United States" only interest is towards the ludo-Pak 
relationship being normalized through peacefiil dialogue". He also reiterated that 
negotiations between India and Pakistan under the Simla Agreement "provide the 
best means for resoK iug their dispute over Kashmir", but went on to state that "as 
a practical matter, we believe this process of bilateral negotiations needs to take into 
account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. " '^ Significantly. Turnoff did not apologise 
for Raphel's remarks or tone down the US position as stated by her. Infact the 
statement made by Peter Turnoff signifies nothing more than a tactical reformulation 
of the US stand to defiise the angry Indian outburst. 
In fiirther drive the US Congress also expressed its support of India's stand 
that the Kashmir issue should be addressed through bilateral negotiations. The 
Congress held that it was neither in the best interests of regional security nor the US 
to question the integrity of any of the parties."*^ 
The US attempts to defuse the issue were pushed to the background by 
President Clinton's reply to a letter by Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Chief of Kashmiri 
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American Council, a Washington based pro-Pakistani separatist organization. Clinton's 
commitment on bringing peace to Kashmir in the letter of December 27, 1993 was 
viewed with suspicion in India. The State Department, however, said that there was 
nothing new in Clinton's letter which only reflected the long standing US position i.e 
that it wanted a peaceful solution of all issues between India and Pakistan, including 
Kashmir.^^ 
Although the United States has been interested in the Kashmir dispute from 
very beginning, the recent activism is due to several reasons. According to Tom A 
Travis the American policy stance probably had three aims : firstly, reference to the 
wishes of the Kashmiri people may have been intended to encourage India to be more 
attentive to the internal source of the Kashmir dilemma. Secondly, to exemplify the 
US role as the world's leading power and its concomitant responsibility to provide 
leadership to solve global conflict. And fmally, to soften up India for concessions on 
issues like NPT, MTCR, GATT etc.^* A similar view as expressed by an Indian 
analyst who writes that "the crux of the issue, not withstanding India's legal right 
over Kashmir, the UN resolutions or even the question of India's territorial integrity, 
is whether the US is playing a deeper, more sinister game over Kashmir or whether 
its desire to armtwist New Delhi and Islamabad is a genuine attempt to break the 
deadlock. Raphel's statements echoed by other US officials in less aggressive terms 
seem to suggest the latter."* 
Much of the Kashmir controversy, which had arisen due to the statement of 
the US officials challenging Kashmir's accession to India and questioning the 
relevance of Simla Agreement was cooled off during the visit of Indian Prime 
Minister Narasimha Rao to the USA in May 1994. The US President categorically 
stated that the Simla Agreement is still the best means of resolving the Kashmir 
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dispute. What was more important the President did not mention about taking the 
wishes of the Kashmiri people. Clinton also said that internationalising the issue will 
not help in as "the ultimate answer is for the two great nations together and resolve 
it."'" India's stand that Kashmir issue should be resolved bilaterally was thus 
endorsed by the USA. 
The recent US Kashmir activism is to be seen in the overall change in its South 
Asia policy, which the USA felt necessary to cope up with new realities of the post-
cold war ear. Professor Stephen?. Cohen, an authority on South Asia, holds that even 
if the US has "no vital interests m South Asia - something worth going to war over 
- it must sustain its presence and advance a new South Asian Regional Initiative 
(SARI), and for this it must keep pressing India regarding Kashmir."-' So, Kashmir 
is central to US policy today. IK. Gujral observes that "our policy makers would be 
well advised not to believe that the 1953 strategic doctrine of the USA regarding this 
region has died with the end of the Cold War." 
With the end of Cold War the US has undertaken the responsibility to re-
order the world, but according to its own wishes and whims. In his address to the 
UN in 1995. President Clinton declared : "Let me start by being clear about where 
the United States stands. The United States occupies a unique position in the world 
affairs today. The US intends to remain engaged and to lead." As big market India 
certainly attracts America but Pakistan seems to be more helpful in pursuing its 
strategic mterests in the region. The US perhaps now finds Pakistan of greater use 
in whatever new moves may be contemplated on Afghanistan and contiguous Central 
Asian Repubhcs. All these impelled the United States to improve its relations with 
old ally-Pakistan which was feeling being isolated by the USA as the US relation.s 
with India improved in early years of 1990s. 
The US Kashmir activism is also due to the fear of a nuclear war in the 
subcontinent over Kashmir, as this impression was created by Pakistan. The mo\ e 
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to link Kashmir issue to non-proliferation and "nuclear terrorism" has been a theme 
that has been assiduously built up ever since the Clinton administration took office 
Expert studies and media hype have projected an image of a subcontinent ready for 
a nuclear confrontation. The US policy makers perceive that since both India and 
Pakistan possess the nuclear device and there is every possibility of the two going to 
war over Kashmir, as they have fought in 1947, 1965 and 1971. And this situation 
does not help promoting its economic interests. So America wants to bring both into 
the NPT fold. And thus chose Kashmir issue-sensitive to both India and Pakistan, 
to pressurise them to do so. Stephen Cohen has argued that "the road to accession 
to the NPT runs through Kashmir."" The United States sees a close link between 
regional instability, the regional nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan and the 
Kashmir issue. 
Another important reason for the US more activist posture regarding Kashmir 
is its desire to dominate the Central Asia. The US interest has rekindled as a result 
ofthe geo-strategic location of Kashmir and its proximity to Central Asia. According 
to Hari Jai Singh, Washington had earlier wanted to use this state as a watch tower 
to observe and influence developments in the USSR, China. South Asia and Gulf 
Those objectives are still there more so, now the USSR has broken up. The 
break-up of Central Asia remams an unfinished business. Today, the US wants to 
prevent the Central Asian states from going back to Russia to form an alliance, either 
military or economic."'^ 
The United States was facing foreign policy flak on Somalia and Haiti. It was 
impatient and frustrated and needed new issues to divert attention and restore its 
inteniational credibility." The debacle in these troubled spots had a highly chastening 
effect on the Clinton administration's foreign policy. The administration could not 
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afford a set back or an embarrassment on foreign policy just when it had begun to 
improve its rating. There may, therefore, be a temptation to explore a soft spot for 
a much needed success to neutralise the adverse effect of Somalia. And Kashmir may 
have been perceived as presently precisely such an opportunity. Thus the US 
Kashmir activism has to be seen in the larger global perspective. 
In short, the present US perception of the Kashmir can be summed up as 
follows : 
* The US views the whole of Kashmir as disputed territory on both sides of Line 
of control and that India and Pakistan should resolve the issue between them 
as agreed in Simla Agreement. 
* The United States no longer supports a plebiscite in Kashmir. 
* The US has privately conveyed to Pakistan that it is opposed to raising 
Kashmir issue in the UN Security Council or even raising it at international 
forums such as OIC. 
* The US accepts Kashmiris as the third party in the issue. 
* The Simla Agreement has been a non-starter for over 21 years. No progress 
has been made and position adopted by both sides is far too rigid to allow for 
any flexibility. And also the Agreement did not foresee the emergence of 
Kashmiris as a third party to dispute. 
* Although the US has of late been critical of external aid to the militants in the 
valley but asserts that there are very strong indigenous elements to the 
insurgency. 
* That the underlying causes for the insurgency are not limited to external 
assistance but to the intensity of the anti-Indian mood in the Valley. 
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* India needs to clean up its act in terms of human rights violations in the valley 
and try to restore some semblance of governance. 
* Kashmir will increasingly lead to heightened tensions between India and 
Pakistan, possibly resulting in another regional conflict, this time involving 
nuclear weapons 
* The US believes that peace in the South Asian region would be brittle as long 
as the Kashmir issue remains unsettled and unresolved. 
* The US offers its good offices to resolve the Kashmir dispute if parties to 
dispute agree so. 
Here one should also attempt to analyse the impact of the US Kashmir stance 
on the Indo-Pakistan relations and the nature of Kashmir dispute itself At the outset 
it must be noted that the reactions of the external powers both within the region and 
outside, towards Kashmir, have had bearing on both the nature of the Kashmir 
problem and India-Pakistan relations as a whole. Ifthere is any dispute over Kashmir, 
that is bilateral and hence it should be resolved accordingly. In fact a sound case can 
be made to show that the US bivolvement m the Kashmir dispute will hinder, not 
promote a settlement. 
How sincere and honest may be the US intention its involvement would be 
vehemently resisted by Indians as they feh the US stance as pro-Pakistani It is 
important to note that in Kashmir dispute it is Indian public opinion that is expected 
to be the 'giver' or maker of concessions. But instead of cultivating the prime nio\ er. 
the US has antagonised public opinion. 
In the post Cold War era the USA has actively projected itself as a catalyst 
of peace m the Indian subcontment. It has expressed its willuigness to pla\ a 
mediatory role in the Kashmir dispute. One American scholar has obser\ ed that "as 
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the foremost world power, it is appropriate for the United States to offer its services 
to help governments to resolve their conflicts.""" But the US should mind that India 
and Pakistan have direct diplomatic contacts hence no third party is required to 
interpret to the other what one is saying. 
Pakistan has become habitual of internationalising the Kashmir issue much 
against the spirit of the Simla Agreement. The more the issue is internationalised the 
less the chances of fmding a lasting solution to the problem. The American support 
further encourages Pakistan to harp on this issue more vigorously. American 
rhetoric on human rights helps Pakistan to internationalise the Kashmir issue. The 
more America shows its concern for Kashmirthe greater Pakistan will feel emboldened 
to queer the pitch. If the US does not intervene or involve itself in Kashmir problem. 
Pakistan will be left with no other option but to settle the matter bilaterally. 
The US insistence on taking the wishes of the Kashmiris further complicates 
the situation The American posture has helped boost the morale of the militants in 
Kashmir, just when the operations of the Indian security forces were beginning to 
show some signs of positive results. By boosting the insurgency in Kashmir, the 
Clinton administration has smothered whatever limited prospects there were for 
resolving the Kashmir imbroglio. It has also effectively undermined all chances of 
breathing new life into the stalled ludo-Pakistani negotiations. 
Any objective analysis of the US Kashmir policy would lead to conclude that 
it has taken a pro-Pakistani stance from the very first day when the Kashmir dispute 
arose. The US tilt towards Pakistan reducesits leverage to bring India on negotiating 
table to sit with Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir issue. The US partisan approach 
greatly undermines its chance of playing any significant role in the Kashmir issue. 
Tom A. Travis has rightly observed that "Raphel's particular comments ha\e 
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probably disqualified Washington from playing a mediative role." He further argued 
that "her statement may have played into the hands of hard-liners in Pakistan, India, 
and Kashmir, impeding the prospect of a negotiated solution."" 
The Kashmir problem, infact, requires not outside crutches but political will 
from India and Pakistan. A mutually satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir issue will 
leave the US with no alibi to intervene and this is where India and Pakistan must 
focus. A bilateral determination to resist outside intervention and a sustained 
dialogue, with small confidence building measures is the best antidote to US 
activism. And the best contribution that the US can make to a peaceful resolution of 
the Kashmir conflict, therefore, would be to keep off it. 
Notes and Re fe rences 
1. For details see S. Gupta, Kashmir : A Study in /ndia-Pakistan Relations. Asia 
Publishing House. New Delhi, 1966: J. Korbel. Dangers in Kashmir. Princeton 
University Press. Princeton, 1954; M. Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir. 
Oxford University Press. London, 1952; Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and 
Kashmir, Robert Hale Ltd, London, 1956; Alastair Lamb, Kashmir . A 
Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, Roxford Books. Hertford, 1991. 
2. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia. Vanguard, Lahore. 1988. 
p. 45. 
3. Sisir Gupta, no. l .p . 441. 
4. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
1973, pp. 10-11. 
5. Joseph Korbel, no. 1. 
6. Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian 
Constitution, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1957, pp. 388-89. 
7 Gupta, p. 442. 
8. Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir. Pak Publishers. Karachi, 1970, pp. 14-16. 
173 
9. Maurice Gwyer and Appadorai, no. 6, p. 395. 
10. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies : India and the United States 1941-91. 
Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993, p. 60. 
11. Department of State Bulletin,Vol LI, No. 1325, November 16, 1964, p. 702. 
12. The American United Nations representative endorsed the Indian Position : 
"External sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is no longer under the control 
of the Maharajah with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India 
.this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India and that 
is how India happens to be here as a petitioner," quoted to Patwant Singh, 
India and the Future of Asia, Alfred A. Knoff, New York, 1966, p. 152. 
13. SCOR, 236 meeting, 1948. 
14 Quoted in B.N. Chakravarti, India Speaks to America, Orient Longmans. 
New Delhi, 1966, p. 123. 
15. SCOR. Third year, Nos. 1-5, pp. 206-7. 
16. UN, Security Council. Report on the India-Pakistan Question Submitted in 
Persuance of the Resolution of the Security Council of 21 February 1957. S/ 
3393, 8/3821. April 29, 1957, p. 6. 
17. NeM York Times. July 15, 1961. 
18. Ibid. 
19. J.K. Galbraith. Ambassador's Journal : A Personal Account of Kennedy's 
Year, London. 1969, p. 299; and New York Times. January 24, 1962. 
20. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, p. 347. 
21. Bhagat Vats, Foreign Intrigue Against India, New Delhi, 1967, p. 81, 
22. K. Subrahmanyam, "Kashmir" in Jasjit Singh, ed., India and Pakistan : Crisis 
of Relationship. Lancer, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 132-33. 
23. Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on August 13. 1963. Foreign Affairs Record. 
Vol. IX, August 1963. p. 178. 
24. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep : My Years in Public Life 1941-1969. New 
Delhi, 1972, p. 473. 
174 
25. Ibid. 
26. The Indian and Pakistani delegations for Kashmir talks were headed by 
Swaran Singh and Z.A. Bhutto respectively. 
27. Denix Kux, no. 10, p. 211. 
28. K.N. Pandit, "The American Hand", The Pioneer, November 27, 1993, p. 9, 
29. N.D. Palmer, South Asia and US Policy, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1968. 
p. 26. 
30. Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1963, p. 22. 
31. Anwar H. Syed, China and Paksitan : Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale. 
University of Massachussets, Boston, 1974, pp. 33-41. 
32. New York Times, May 16, 1990. 
33. Quoted in Mushahid Hussaiu, "Kashmir Issue: The International Dimension" 
Parlance, October 1991. 
34. Quoted in David O. Smith, From Containment to Stability : Pakistan-US 
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Proceedings of the first Pakistan-US 
Symposium, National Defence University, Washington. 1993. p. 38. 
35. Salig S. Harrison. "South Asia and the United States : A Chance for a Fresh 
Start", rwrrf//////5/or)'. Vol. 91. No. 563 March 1992; Reprinted in ^/ra/t^^/r 
Digest, December 92. p. 1605. 
36. For the texl of John Mallot's speech at India International Centre, New Delhi 
on May 1993 see. Strategic Digest. July 1993, pp. 57-60. 
37. Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra, "America Meddles in Kashmir Again", The 
Hindustan Times. New Delhi, June 3, 1993. 
38. The Times of India, New Delhi, October 30, 1993. 
39. Indian Express. New Delhi. October 30, 1993. 
40. The Pioneer. New Ddhi. May 23, 1996. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Hah ]aiS'mgh. Kashmir . A Tale of Shame,{JBSPD.^CWDQWU. 1996.p. 180 
175 
43. Jasjit Singh. "Accession of J&K", Indian Express, New Delhi, November 5, 
1993, p. 8. 
44. India Today. New Delhi, November 30, 1993, p. 61. 
45. //j<y/a//£x/?/"e55. New Delhi, November 4, 1993. 
46. The Pioneer, New Delhi, January 12, 1994. 
47. /6/f/, January 12, 1994. 
48. Tom A. Travis, "Indo-American Relations : The Kashmir Controvery", Itidia 
Quarterly, Vol XLIX, No. 4, Oct-Dec 1993, p. 54. 
49. See India Today, New Delhi, November 30, 1993, p. 61. 
50. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 21, 1994. 
51. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 13, 1994. 
52. Ibtd. 
53. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 2, 1994. 
54. Hari Jai Singh, Kashmir, no. 42, p. 182. 
55. India Today, November 30, 1993, p. 57. 
56. Tom A. Travis, no. 48. p. 56. 
57. Ibid. 
176 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of discussion in the preceding chapters one can now attempt to present 
an overaU view of the US South Asia poUcy, having special stress on the issues of Indo-
Pakistan relations viz-Nuclear, SecurityAssistance and the Kashmir dispute. And some broad 
conclusions may also be drawn about the fiiture prospects of the US pohcy and Indo-Pak 
relations. 
The contents of Indo-Pak relations, though generally bilateral m nature, their mutual 
relations and course of actions have been mflueuced by the actions and pronouncements of 
the outside players. The US has been the most in^ortant state which has profound mfluence 
on the policy and perceptions of these two neighbours. 
Incidentally when India and Pakistan opened their eyes as independent and so\ ereigii 
states the cold war between the two great victors of the second world war had already been 
started. Though initially the stage of cold war 'play' was limited to the European continent, 
the preoccupation of the US administration with European affairs was bound to accord a 
lower place to South Asia in its foreign pohcy priority. However, a httle more than two years 
after that the populous Indian subcontinent drew attention of the US administration when the 
communists won the civil war in China and the cold war by impUcation, spilled o\ er into the 
Asian continent. By this time the doctrine of contamment of communism had become well 
estabUshed and the US pohcy makers would not have sat quiet if South Asia had come under 
communist threat. 
Thus since the initiation of the superpower rivalry the U.S. has constantly been in 
search of new areas and new aUies to extend its influence in international commmiit\. It has 
focussed on the objective of winning alhes for hs anti-Soviet and anti-communist compaign. 
as well as of preventing the development of any regional power which could not be made an 
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American satellite. Tlie US South Asia policy has also been framed in accordance with these 
objectives. The US is not an Asian Power. Its attention is only focussed on the region "in 
times of crisis in the area, be it regional conflict or a heightened perception of the Soviet 
threat". Thus, the relevance ofthe region has witnessed fluctuations with evolving American 
relations with the Soviet Union and China. If the region has appeared to serve economic geo-
pohtical or strategic goals it has arisen in American priorities. Similarly priorities accorded 
to various countries within the region have also varied with changes in international 
circumstances. 
In the beginning the USpoUcy makershad aimed at cultivating India asits ally in South 
Asia, but when it failed to woo India, their overtures were directed towards India'straditional 
rival, Pakistan, with a view to maintain balance of power in the Middle East and oppose soviet 
adventurism in the region. Interestingly while India was reluctant to associate itself with the 
US foreign poUcy objectives Pakistan was more than eager to oflFer its services to the US 
Moreover India's poUcy of non-aUgnment was perceived by the US as an obstacle to its 
aspirations in the region. It also presented the risk of creating an additional world force based 
on poUtical mobilisation of national eUtes in Asia and Africa. Pakistan on the other side took 
advantage ofthe many opportunities inherent in the cold war enviroimient to bolster its own 
mihtary and poUtical power vis-a-vis India. The U.S. and Pakistan subsequently entered into 
a wide ranging security relationship. 
This US - Pak collusion certainly had profound bearing on Indo-Pak relations as it 
had brought obnoxious cold war poUtics to their bilateral relations, and also destroyed 
whatever little hopes of a reduction in Indo-Pak tensions. It is believed that the US interests 
were best served if the two neighbours remained engrossed in their dispute. Their rivah}' not 
only prevented the emergence of a regional threat to the US but also provided oppoitunit> 
for it to assume a role in the region. 
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Today when the longstanding holdouts Uke China and France have finally come into 
the NPT fold, countries hke Argentina, Brazil and South Afiica have renounced their nuclear 
option and North Korea has been virtually denied the right to invoke the withdrawal 
provisions, countrieslike India and Pakistan have clearly emerged asthe two foremost targets 
of nonproliferation. Having akeady fought three wars and more than once having flirted with 
a fourth, India and Pakistan are often identified as the two coiintries most likely to wage a 
nuclear war. The US is. moreover, worried that in the event of the use of nuclear weapons 
in a regional conflict there would remain a probability of the crisis spreading beyond the 
boundaries of the region. 
The Nuclear Issue : In the context of nuclear proliferation in South Asia it might be said 
that both India and Pakistan have fairly advanced nuclear development programmes and both 
are capable of making the bomb within a short time. If India is assumed to be in possession 
of fissile material sufficient for 40 to 60 nuclear explosive devices, Pakistan is in position to 
produce 6 to 13 nuclear exjjlosive devices. Whereas Pakistan has Hatfl and Hatfll (range 
of 80 km and 300 km) India has Prithvi and Agtii (range of 250 and 2000 km) as deli\er> 
vehicles. 
At the root of regional proHferation are the differing security perceptions and the 
dKergent poUcy pursuits of both India and Pakistan. Tlie differing perspecti\'es of these two 
countries on South Asian security have become a major hurdle for US non-proliferation 
poUcy. Pakistan sees India as the principal threat and is not likely to be receptfve to a non-
prohferation agenda that does not treat it equally with India. India, on the otherhand. retains 
the nuclear option as a potential deterrent primarily against China. Consequently it is unlikely 
to reUnquish that option entirely except as part of a deal that includes China. 
The US conceni about the nuclear arms race in South Asia appears to be genuine 
although in resolving the tangle successive US administrations have been pla\ing more to the 
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gallery than playing fair. While Washington has always wanted India to concede on non-
proliferation, it has adopted a soft and permissive approach towards Pakistani nuclear 
development. To pursue a credible non-proliferation strategy in South Asia, the US will need 
to adopt a pohcy that does not appear discriminatory. Further attention must be drawn 
towards more substantial cuts in its own nuclear arsenal. Disclosures ofthe Chinese transfer 
of nuclear technology and material to Pakistan and inabiUty ofthe US to take any action 
against China, has further comphcated the US nuclear non-proliferation dilemma in South 
Asia. 
Here one point is worthnoting that the three saUent features that had continued to 
characterise the US nuclear non-prohferation pohcy during cold war years and that need to 
be corrected in the promising scenario ofthe post-cold war world include : (i) The US non-
acceptance ofthe inherent linkage between vertical and horizontal proliferation, (ii) ignoring 
the important linkage between nuclear proliferation and sales of conventional weapons; and 
(iii) US proliferation concerns having often been compromised for other security concerns 
or strategic manoeuvres. 
However, American non-proliferation pohcy has lately appreciated the imperati\ e 
need to defijse regional tensions which he at the heart ofthe search for nuclear amis by 
adversaiy nations. An effort has consequently been made to help create a climate in which 
the sense of security of both India and Pakistan is enhanced through tension reduction, 
confidence building and anns control measurs and where both the countries perceive distinct 
advantages in rejecting nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems, and recogni.'^ e 
the disadvantages inherent in their possession. 
The US should reahse that the goal of complete nuclear disarmament in South Asia 
may not be achieved. The strategic, poUtical, bureaucratic and natioalistic forces at work in 
South Asia make it extremely imlikely that India and Pakistan will agree to roll back or cap 
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their nuclear programme, these programmes are too advanced to be disbanded. Outside 
pressure is unlikely to change this situation. The only workable solution can be the lowering 
of the nuclear weapoiuy to the level of "minimum deterrence" or "defensive defence". Thus 
mstead of pursuing the unattainable goal of seeking to induce hidia and Pakistan to give up 
its nuclear option, the United States should shift from a focus on non-proliferation in South 
Asia to a policy designed to maintain nuclear restraint. Such a policy would seek to freeze 
the stockpile of fissile material, the development of military related nuclear capabihties and 
the development, production and deployment ofnuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan 
The U. S. should also focus its eflForts on prodding India and Pakistan to embrace confidence 
building measures. This would help promote regional stability. 
Both India and Pakistan should also reahse that nuclear arms are not very usefiil 
instruments for achievmg poUcy objectives. Nuclear weapon capability outside the ftill 
paraphemaha of assured mutually-destructive capacity and verification capability can onK 
give an iDusion of deten ence. Tlie fact that Soviet-American nuclear arms race had resulted 
not m greater safety for either participant, but only in greater burdens imposed by the con stant 
development and maintenance ofcostly weapon systems is perhaps the single most influential 
force shaping this perspective. 
IMilitary Aid Diplomacy : The military aid diplomacy of the great powers has not onl> 
fomented afready existing disputes between many neighbouring countries in many cases: it 
even yielded in new problems and disputes. Tlie US military aid diplomacy in South Asia is 
a case in point. The massive influx of US anns mto Pakistan embittered the akeady sullen 
relationsbetween India and Pakistan. It prevented the nonnalization of their relations because 
it not only posed a great security problem for India; it even made Pakistan more adamant 
towards the outstanding bilateral issues. The US militar\' alHance with Pakistan changed the 
whole content of the problems existing between bidia and Pakistan. The bilateral Indo-Pak 
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relations now assumed a triangular relationsliip with the US as the third party. The miJitai-y 
aUiance sharpened Indo-Pak tensions. It became a constant factor in the reaction and 
counteraction which characterized subsequent relations between the suspicious neighbours. 
The cost of this blundering American decision, which had only a marginal and doubtful 
mihtary advantage was very heavy in poUtical and diplomtic terms to all the three parties 
involved the US, India and Pakistan. 
While the thi eat of communist expansion was the prime motive behind the supply of 
US arms to Pakistan, the thinkmg in Pakistan was quite different from that of USA. Pakistan 
did not feel any threat, either ideological or territorial, from any of the communist powers. 
The perceived threat of India has been the main factor m Pakistan's willingness to join hands 
with the USA. Its overall weakness and strategic vuberability vis-a-vis India, the continuance 
of several disputes in which it accused India of having changed the rule of game according 
to its convenience and lingering memories of partition have combined to present India as the 
most important threat to its existence and security. It needed modem arms in an appreciable 
quantity to counterbalance India's power position, which Pakistan could not have acquired 
with its own financial resources. 
It is also important to note tliat the weapons which the US provided to Pakistan were 
not appropriate for figliting in the mountain areas which was needed to check a So\iet or 
Chinese move through the Himalayas, rather arms provided could be used only on a relatn ely 
flat terrain, possibly against hidia. From this point one can draw the conclusion that while 
supplying huge arms to Pakistan the communist threat was not the only working factor. Tliis 
was also intended to teach a lesson to disobedient India. 
After the end of the cold war it has appeared that the US would no longer need 
Pakistan to counter communism and thus it would desist in the promising scenario ofthe post-
cold war era from providuig arms to Pakistan. But this thesis did not prove tme. Tlie US still 
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considers Pakistan an important partner in safeguarding its interestsin the Gulf, on the eastern 
flank of the region. It also considers Pakistan an useful base for influencing pohtical process 
in Central Asia, the US also beheves that Pakistan is a country which if strengthened militarily 
and technologically can counter India's emergence as an effective regional power. Perception s 
in Washington since the emergence of pan-Islamic trends in world poUtics are that being 
supportive ofPakistan will contribute to encouraging moderate Islamic forces and countering 
Islamic extremism. The US is now observed so much with these factors that it is even willing 
to pay any price for Pakistani collaboration. Their obsession bUnds them to the reality and 
Pakistanis are exploiting that to serve their own interests. 
The US restoring of mihtary supphesto Pakistan and enacting an amendment (Hank 
Brown Amendment) that not only negates earUer legislation aimed at penaUsing Pakistan for 
its nuclear weapons programme, is a clear political signal that it tacitly accepts Pakistan's 
nuclear weapoiiizatiou as a part of its strategic plan to secure interests in Sougli Asia. West 
Asia and Central Asia. Thus aU the pious concern of the US for nuclear proliferation lias been 
shown to be an eyewash in relation to an old and trusted ally. 
Any accretion of Pakistan's raihtar>' capabilities will inevitably exacerbate tensions in 
the region. It will disturb the current arms equihbrium and lead to an arms race. It is not that 
Washington is unwaiy of the adverse impact on the security envuonment. but in its 
calculations, commercial considerations outweiglit qualms of conscience, if an>'. about 
escalation of conflict. Besides, the US pohcy makers feel, though wrongly, that they can 
browbeat India into signing on the dotted nuclear non-proliferation hne. That the ill-ad\ ised 
move will embolden Islamabad in its evil designs on Kaslimir and make it more obdurate and 
per\'erse in its deahng with India is of Uttle gravity to the US planners. 
It must be clearly understood that war is a costly, inhuman and an unrehable method 
of achieving national objectives. In the long run and in the interest of maintaining pace and 
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stability in the Indian subcontinent, it is of paramount importance, that India and Pakistan 
should learn to coexist. All real or imaginary apprehensions, fears, suspicions, mistrust and 
irritants should be removed througli diplomacy, cooperation, negotiations and an attitude of 
give and take. The top leaders must establish personal rapport and set the peace for 
normahzation of relations between India and Pakistan. It is only then and then alone that 
lasting peaceful relations can be ensured. Hence, a long-term objective of concihation and 
friendship should not be lost sight of, which is essential for peaceful co-existence 
The Kashmir Issue : Another major irritant in the Indo-Pak-US tangle has been the 
Kashmir issue. The Kashmir issue has been one of the focal points of American foreign pohc\ 
ui India and Pakistan, hi the past the US had endorsed Pakistan's demand for plebiscite. In 
the early parts of 1990 and 1991 it started agreeing with the Indian stand that the 1972 Simla 
Agreement had superseded the UN resohuions caUing for plebiscite. The US even agreed 
with the Indian view that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism in the valley and tlireatened to 
place Pakistan on its hst of nations abetting terrorism. 
The Kaslmiir issue returned back with a fervour in 1993 just when it was appearing 
that the United States would no longer take sides m ludo-Pak bilateral issues. Trouble started 
with a statement of Piesident Clinton in which he had equated Kashmir with the civil war in 
Angola and the Caucasus. This was followed by another sensational remarks of an US official 
which regarded Kaslmiii as a disputed territory and challenged the 1947 Instrument of 
Accession by which Kashmir had become a part of the Indian Union. Thougli the US was not 
interested in ioterferiug ui the Kashmir issue, it was willing to mediate if both the parties to 
dispute agreed to it. 
If we analyse the US perception of Kashmir dispute during the cold war days, we 
would conclude that it had always taken a pro-Pakistani stand and never appreciated India s 
stand on the question though its poUcy was entirely influenced by cold-war imperatives Tlie 
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US was keen on a pro-Pakistani solution of the dispute. It put forward several suggestions 
favourable to Pakistan in the name of conflict resolution, including arbitration, stationing of 
foreign troops and the like. It also championed the cause of plebiscite, and evoked the Uberal 
concept of national self-determination. 
In the post-cold war era except for a brief period, the US continues to follow the same 
line which it followed during the cold war period. The US pronouncement that the UN 
resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir created misperception among analysts that the 
US no longer supports Pakistan's demand for plebiscite. The US now started insisting on 
ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The US took the same stand thougli in a 
diflFerent manner. The changed US poUcy was nothing but 'old wine in new bottle.' 
Tlie U.S. stance on Kashmii- seems paradoxical. At one instance it supports the view 
that Kashmir is a bilateral issue and hence it should be resolved through peacefiil bilateral 
dialogue, but at the same tune it insists on ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiri people and 
even offer its own role. If the wishes of the Kashmiri people are taken it means tliey should 
be accepted as a third party; then how could Kashmir be a bilateral issue ? 
One point which desei-ves higli attention is that the reactions of the external powers 
have had profound bearing on both the nature of Kashmk problem and Indo-Pak relations 
as a whole. Infact a sound case can be made that the U. S. involvement in the Kashmir dispute 
will hinder, not promote a settlement. One should also not forget that the more the issue is 
inteniationahsed the less are the chances of findmg a lasting solution to the problem 
American pro-Pakistani stand encourages Pakistan to harp on the issue more vigorously. Tlie 
US insistence on taking the wishes of the Kashmiris has helped boost the morale of the 
mihtants in Kashmir just when the operations of the Indian security forces were beginning 
to show some signs of positive resuhs. The more America shows its concern for Kashmir the 
greater Pakistan will feel emboldened to queer the pitch. If the U.S. does not involve itself 
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Pakistan will be left with no other option but to settle the matter bilaterally. Thus the best 
contribution the US can make to a peacefiil resolution of the Kashmir conflict, therefore, 
would be to keep off it. 
Need for a Policy of Mutual Trust: It will be in the interest of both India and Pakistan 
and outsidepowerslikethe USto follow a pohcyofleast provocation and try and build mutual 
trust. This trend has to be consoUdated in the interest of regional and global peace. Any 
solution to the Kashmir dispute must be based on the existing territorial and ground reaUties. 
An unstable India or unstable Pakistan could be mutually damaging to both. India and 
Pakistan both need to be aware of the fact that war cannot decide the fate of Kashmir. By 
its covert operations Pakistan cannot force a settlement. Pakistan cannot wrench Kashmir 
fiom India by force. And India cannot win by repression. They must seek a poUrical solution. 
However, httle progress can be made unless there is an eflFort to overcome the mindsets and 
mutual misperceptions of one another. Tlie myths in India-Pak relations have to be debunked 
and a climate of mutual trust would be the ideal starting point to approach the issue. Tliere 
is need for greater pragmatism on either side. BilateraUsm offers the best way to resolve the 
ludo-Pak differences oxer Kashmir. 
Keeping in \'iew the failure of traditional avenues of dialogue, Track-D diplomacy 
may be suggested as a conflict resolution model to resolve Indo-Pak dififerences. Several 
rounds of oflScial and fonnal negotiations have not brought about a quaUtative improvement 
ill our relations, probably because m the area of conflict resolution our rehance has been 
largely on traditional instruments of statecraft and conventional diplomacy. The excessive 
rehance on official diplomacy has not been possible to break the logjam ui several conflicts, 
and on the contrary, it has proved to be a non-starter. 
It must be. how ever, understood that Track-II diplomacy is in no way a substitute for 
oaicial, formal "Track One" government to government or leader to leader relationship. 
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Rather Track-II activity is designed to assist official leaders by compeiisatiiig for the 
constramts imposed upon them by the matrix of their domestic politics. Official diplomacy 
often remains mired in bureaucratic wrangles and is unable to go beyond the stereotype of 
a war-peace scenario, wiiere peace has acquired a passive quahty as being the "absence of 
war". But according to the concept of conflict resolution negative peace (absence of war) 
does not go far enough, it is one part-albeit, often an essential part of a larger process. The 
remaining part consists of "positivepeace", the elimination ofthe underlying structural causes 
and conditions that has given rise to the violent conflict which negative peace processes seek 
to contain. 
Track-II diplomacy becomes extremely important m the resolution of Indo-Pak 
conflict, which still brews in the cauldron of official diplomacy for the past several years. As 
a result, bido-Pak relations have taken a roller-coaster ride and are characterised by mutual 
suspicion, closing of consulates, exijelling and even beating of diplomats, false propaganda 
etc from the otherside. Besides this, a majority of people on both sides ofthe border remain 
captive to the historically circulated stereotypes of animosities, misinformation and distrust 
Given the etlmo-religious overlap in the two societies, the domestic disaffection easily feeds 
on the mutual hostihty perceptions ofthe two states. The 'hidden hand theory* also plays an 
important role in worsening the situation. In short, Indo-Pak conflict offers a typical instance 
of an artificially created people to people couffict in addition to state conflict. So there is a 
crying need for non-state actors to thi ow in theii Jot to trausfonn their own relationship and 
go beyond state-centric paradigms. 
Despite the inertia in the official negotiations, some remarkable initiatives have been 
taken by interested outside parties and people's groups. Most notable of these has been the 
NEEMRAN A initiative which has brought together an eminent group of Indian and Pakistani 
citizens including academics, joumahsts. ex-foreign service and army personnel on an 
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ongoing dialogue. Another such initiative is known as "Pakistan India Peoples Forum for 
Peace and Democracy" (PIPFPD) which has held a number of meetings involving hundreds 
of people from the two countries. Its recent convention held at Calcutta on December 26. 
1996, also augur well for improvement of Indo-Pak relations through Track-II diplomacy. 
Surely no ready and overnight solutions are e?q)ected but each step is important; 
given the complexity of present situation, diplomatic demarche seems to be the Hobson's 
choice for the betterment of Indo-Pak relations. 
It is very strange that India and Pakistan have paid too much attention to improve their 
ties with the United States and too Uttle to coming to terms with each other. Seeking to 
influence American poUcy in their own favour both New Delhi and Islamabad have lost 
vahiable opportunities to bring a measure of^ace and stability to their bilateral relationship 
As a resuh, both have sought to pull each other down in Washington and degraded their 
uidividual diplomatic standing with the US. bistead if they work towards reaUstic solutions 
on the ground, they could both find their credibility going up in Washington. It is thus 
advisable for both to end theii excessively deferential attitude to the US and a demeaning 
competition hi Washington to pull the otherside down, and concentrate on improving their 
bilateral relations. 
The newly installed Pakistani premier Nawaz Sharif s call for the resmnption of 
bilateral talks and India'spositive response have raised hopes of the dawn of a new bonhomie 
in the historically sensitive Indo-Pak relations. The proposed renewal of bilateral talks 
provides an important opportunity to both the countries to rework at normaHsing the mutual 
relationship. There cannot be a better way to celeberate the 50th year of independence for 
both countries than by consigning the bitter memories of the three wars and painfiil co-
existence of the last half-a-century mto the dustbin of history. Both India and Pakistan have 
picked up the threads of their bilateral relationship but \\1iether they can entwine them into 
stronger bonds of an enduriag relationship is a matter which time alone will tell. 
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